Opinion
No. 59210-6-I.
January 7, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 06-8-03356-8, Harry J. McCarthy, J., entered November 15, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cordero Duckworth, a juvenile, appeals his conviction and sentence for violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, claiming there was no probable cause to support his arrest. Because no probable cause existed, he argues the trial court erred when it did not suppress cocaine found during a search incident to the arrest. Because the facts and circumstances known to the officer were sufficient to warrant the belief that a crime had been committed, probable cause for the arrest existed. We affirm.
Facts
While on patrol on September 3, 2006, Seattle Police Officer Jonard Legaspi, responded to a 911 called about a "strong-arm robbery" in downtown Seattle on Third Avenue. Upon his arrival at that location, the victim immediately contacted Officer Legaspi. The victim relayed that a female attempted to steal her purse, but after a struggle, she was able to grab it back. The victim immediately called 911. While she was on the phone with 911, the victim noticed a man, later identified as Duckworth, approach and speak with the female who had tried to take her purse. After that conversation ended, Duckworth began "chasing" the victim northbound on Third Avenue. He made no contact with the victim, nor did he attempt to speak to her. He was unable to catch her. The victim stopped mid block on Third Avenue and was met by police. Police promptly caught the female suspect nearby and the victim identified her. Then, Officer Legaspi returned to the scene of the crime and interviewed the victim in the back of his patrol car. At some point, the victim pointed to Duckworth, who was walking across the street and proclaimed, "That's the guy that chased me."
Officer Legaspi stopped Duckworth. An additional police unit was called. Once the unit had arrived, Legaspi returned to the patrol car with Duckworth. Once again, the victim positively identified Duckworth as the person who spoke to the female suspect and chased her immediately following the first robbery attempt. Legaspi placed Duckworth under arrest. Incident to the arrest, Legaspi searched Duckworth and found four grams of rock cocaine.
The State charged Duckworth with possession of cocaine in violation of RCW 69.50.4013. At a Criminal Rule (CrR) 3.6 hearing, the trial court concluded that probable cause supported Duckworth's warrantless arrest and denied his motion to suppress the cocaine evidence. The trial court found Duckworth guilty. Duckworth appeals.
Discussion
Duckworth argues that the trial court erred in concluding the officer had probable cause to arrest him. We disagree.
As a general rule, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable. State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 736, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984). The State may rebut this presumption by establishing one of the "jealously and carefully drawn" exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 149, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980). One of these exceptions exists where an officer has probable cause to arrest. State v. Todd, 78 Wn.2d 362, 365, 474 P.2d 542 (1970). This court reviews probable cause determinations de novo. State v. Jackson, 82 Wn. App. 594, 604, 918 P.2d 945 (1996).
Probable cause exists when sufficiently trustworthy facts or circumstances would lead a reasonable officer to believe a crime has been committed. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 872 (2004); State v. Scott, 93 Wn.2d 7, 10-11, 604 P.2d 943 (1980). A warrantless arrest is justified if police have probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a felony. RCW 10.31.100. The standard for a warrantless arrest requires the following elements:
In order to be justified in arresting without a warrant, an officer must believe and must have good reason to believe that a person has committed or is about to commit or is in the act of committing a felony. Not only must the officer have a real belief that the person is guilty, but that belief must be based upon reasonable grounds. Proper cause for arrest has often been defined to be a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing the accused to be guilty.
Scott, 93 Wn.2d at 10-11. In determining whether probable cause existed, the court must consider the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of arrest and take into consideration his or her special experience and expertise in identifying criminal behavior. Todd 78 Wn.2d at 367; State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 724, 927 P.2d 227 (1996). It is not a technical inquiry, but a set of factual circumstances and practical considerations governing the actions of reasonable and prudent people in their normal, everyday affairs. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975). However, the evidence does not need to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Scott, 93 Wn.2d at 11.
At the time of arrest Officer Legaspi, the primary investigating officer knew the following: (1) a female suspect attempted to steal the victim's purse; (2) subsequently, Duckworth spoke to the suspect; (3) immediately after speaking to that suspect, Duckworth ran after the victim; (4) the victim positively identified Duckworth as the person who chased her after the first botched robbery.
Duckworth however claims there was insufficient probable cause to arrest him as an accomplice to robbery: he was not present at the initial robbery attempt. Further, the officer engaged in "utter speculation" when he assumed Duckworth's contact with the female suspect and subsequent chase of the victim were connected to the attempted robbery. In essence, he argues mere presence at the scene is an insufficient nexus to connect him to the robbery. In order to find reasonable cause based on association with persons engaging in criminal activity, some additional circumstance must be shown that allow the officer to infer involvement. State v. Dorsey, 40 Wn. App. 459, 466-67, 698 P.2d 1109 (1985) (citing U.S. v. Hillison, 733 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1984)). Mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient grounds for a warrantless arrest as an accomplice. In re Welfare of Wilson, 91 Wn.2d 487, 491, 588 P.2d 1161 (1979).
Here, the officer based his arrest on the statements of the victim, who provided a description of Duckworth and positively identified him as someone who spoke with the initial suspect and subsequently chased the victim. These were the totality of facts known to the officer. Duckworth was not arrested by his mere presence. It was reasonable for the officer to believe that Duckworth was a second assailant. Whether the officer knew Duckworth's motives when he spoke with the female suspect and subsequently chased the victim are irrelevant. Officer Legaspi, based on his training and expertise, recognized Duckworth's behavior as contemporaneous with the first attempted robbery. This behavior could reasonably be perceived as consistent with a second attempt to steal the victim's purse. We conclude that all of the circumstances and facts known to the officer were sufficient to support his belief that Duckworth was part of a criminal scheme. The officer therefore had probable cause to arrest.
Duckworth also assigns error to the trial court's entering a finding of "undisputed fact" and "disputed fact" that the defendant chased the victim. Duckworth claims the trial court erred "to the extent the finding implies any sinister intent on appellant's part." Duckworth does not argue the issue in his brief. Assignments of error that are not argued or discussed in the appellant's brief are deemed to be abandoned and will not be considered by the court. Kent v. Whitaker, 58 Wn.2d 569, 571, 364 P.2d 556 (1961).
Because Duckworth has failed to argue this issue, we decline to find the trial court erred.
We Affirm.