Opinion
Def. ID # 0311018699A.
Submitted: August 11, 2006.
October 26, 2006.
Phyllis Drummond, SBI #, Baylor Women's Correctional Institution, New Castle, DE.
Dear Ms. Drummond:
This is my decision on your second motion for postconviction relief. You were convicted by a jury of Robbery in the First Degree and Wearing a Disguise during the Commission of a Felony. The convictions arose out of your robbery of the Wilmington Trust Bank in Millsboro, Delaware on November 22, 2003. You appealed your convictions to the Supreme Court, which affirmed them on August 24, 2005. You filed your first motion for postconviction relief on March 2, 2006. I denied it on May 24, 2006. You filed your second motion for postconviction relief on June 8, 2006. You allege in your second motion that (1) the Court committed an error of law when it allegedly failed to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence, burden of proof and reasonable doubt; (2) your attorney (a) failed to request jury instructions on the presumption of innocence, burden of proof and reasonable doubt; (b) failed to stipulate with the State as to the admissibility and results of your polygraph test, and (c) failed to present a coherent argument based on alleged police fabrication of evidence; and (3) the State's evidence was insufficient, falsified, unfair and contradictory.
Drummond v. State of Delaware, Del. Supr., No. 530, 2004, Ridgely, J. (August 24, 2005) (ORD ER).
The jury instructions on the presu mption of innocen ce, burden of proof and reaso nable doubt were prov ided to the Jury (see attached exh ibit 1).
The allegations in grounds one and three of your second motion are barred by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3) because you could have raised them in your direct appeal, but you did not do so. In order to avoid the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(3), you must show that there was some external impediment that prevented you from raising your claims and that there is a substantial likelihood that if your claims had been raised on appeal, the outcome would have been different. There is nothing in your second motion for postconviction relief that even addresses, let alone satisfies, these requirements.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990).
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 748 (Del. 1990).
The allegations in ground two of your second motion are barred by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(2) because you could have raised them in your first motion for postconviction relief, but you did not do so. In order to avoid the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(2), you must demonstrate that the consideration of your claims is warranted in the "interests of justice." Your claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are nothing more than a rehash of issues that have either been previously raised and rejected or are based on nothing more than your own distorted and unsubstantiated view of the evidence. Thus, the "interests of justice" do not require this Court to consider your claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Your second motion for postconviction relief is denied.