Opinion
No. 5-711 / 05-0203
Filed November 23, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Michael Moon, Judge.
A defendant appeals her judgment and conviction for forgery by the district court. AFFIRMED.
Trever Hook of Hook Law Firm, West Des Moines, and William Kutmus of Kutmus and Pennington, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Robert P. Ewald, Assistant Attorney General, Jennifer Miller, County Attorney, and Michael Salvner and Paul G. Crawford, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Julie Dowell-Patterson appeals her judgment and conviction for forgery, a class D felony. She claims her attorney breached an essential duty by failing to assess her mental status prior to advising her to enter a guilty plea. She now asserts she was incapable of entering a voluntary plea or establishing a factual basis for the charge.
Although Dowell-Patterson did not file a motion in arrest of judgment or otherwise seek to withdraw her plea at sentencing, she asserts an ineffective assistance claim bearing directly on the knowing and voluntary nature of her plea. See State v. Ryan, 493 N.W.2d 82, 84 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992) (stating that to meet constitutional muster a defendant must enter a guilty plea voluntarily with a full understanding of the nature of the charges made, including any available defenses). The defendant has the burden of proving (1) the attorney's performance fell below "an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). To prove Strickland prejudice, the defendant must prove a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id., 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698.
There had been indications throughout the pendency of this case that Dowell-Patterson suffered from some mental health issues which the district court addressed in an extensive plea colloquy. While trial counsel indicated at sentencing that she believed that Dowell-Patterson had "some very, very, very serious cognitive distortions which need to be addressed," the record is unclear as to whether trial counsel explored this further to determine whether Dowell-Patterson's psychological problems impacted her ability to knowingly and voluntarily enter a guilty plea.
Therefore, we find that the record is not adequate to decide the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal and preserve it for possible postconviction proceedings. See State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744, 752 (Iowa 2004) (stating when the record is inadequate to decide an issue on direct appeal and trial counsel has not had opportunity to explain his actions, an ineffective assistance claim will be preserved for postconviction proceedings).