According to the State, "[a]n appellate court may affirm a judgement of the lower court on any ground in the record that supports affirmance," and "[the State] is merely submitting a different reason explaining why the trial court's denial of [Defendant's] oral motion to dismiss is the correct result." (Citing State v. Fukagawa, 100 Hawai‘i 498, 506, 60 P.3d 899, 907 (2002) ; State v. Dow, 96 Hawai‘i 320, 326, 30 P.3d 926, 932 (2001) ; Poe v. Hawai ‘i Labor Relations Bd., 87 Hawai‘i 191, 197, 953 P.2d 569, 575 (1998).) 2.
The jury could have reasonably inferred that Paris's incarceration was ordered by a court. See State v. Dow, 96 Hawai‘i 320, 324, 30 P.3d 926, 930 (2001) (when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court looks at "the testimony at trial[ ] and any justifiable inferences that may be drawn therefrom"). Further, Villanueva testified that he was an employee of the State of Hawaii's Department of Public Safety, and that he "work[ed] at Oahu Community Correction Center, at Laumaka Work Furlough."
We review the relevance of evidence de novo, State v. Cordeiro, 99 Hawai‘i 390, 404, 56 P.3d 692, 706 (2002), and "it is well-settled that ‘an appellate court may affirm a judgment of the lower court on any ground in the record that supports affirmance.’ " State v. Fukagawa, 100 Hawai‘i 498, 506, 60 P.3d 899, 907 (2002) (quoting State v. Dow, 96 Hawai‘i 320, 326, 30 P.3d 926, 932 (2001) (brackets omitted)). The defense attacked the CW's credibility by calling attention to the discrepancies between her trial testimony and her statements made shortly after the rape, including to Detective David Yamamoto, who interviewed her the day after the rape and a few short hours after the sexual assault examination.
While the circuit court did not rely on this assertion in its Order, "it is well-settled that ‘an appellate court may affirm a judgment of the lower court on any ground in the record that supports affirmance.’ " Fukagawa, 100 Hawai‘i at 506, 60 P.3d at 907 (quoting State v. Dow, 96 Hawai‘i 320, 326, 30 P.3d 926, 932 (2001) ). Thus, we may consider the fact that the "very small amount" of methamphetamine that Enos possessed was recovered from paraphernalia, possession of which is only a violation, in reaching our conclusion that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.
Additionally, even if it was erroneous for the circuit court, based on the evidentiary record, to conclude that Melendez had proved that the .005 grams of cocaine that he possessed was incapable of producing a pharmacological or physiological effect, "it is well-settled that ‘[a]n appellate court may affirm a judgment of the lower court on any ground in the record that supports affirmance.’ " Fukagawa, 100 Hawai‘i at 506-07, 60 P.3d at 907-08 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Dow, 96 Hawai‘i 320, 326, 30 P.3d 926, 932 (2001) ). Thus, the ICA should have considered other grounds in the record supporting affirmance of the De Minimis Order, particularly the stipulated fact that the cocaine Melendez possessed was unusable and unsaleable.
Thus, in order for this court to reach this issue, it would have to be noticed as plain error. While it is accepted that an appellate court may affirm a lower court's judgment on any ground in the record supportive of affirmance, seeState v. Dow, 96 Hawai'i 320, 326, 30 P.3d 926, 932 (2001), to uphold the circuit court's ruling as to Phillips' motion to suppress unlawful seizure of evidence upon a theory never presented "would raise serious questions of due process." United States v. Parrilla Bonilla, 648 F.2d 1373, 1385–86 (1st Cir. 1981) ; seeCole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 202, 68 S.Ct. 514, 92 L.Ed. 644 (1948) ("To conform to due process of law, petitioners were entitled to have the validity of their convictions appraised on consideration of the case as it was tried and as the issues were determined in the trial court.").
Additionally, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the prosecution waived this argument, because “[a]n appellate court may affirm a judgment of the lower court on any ground in the record that supports affirmance.” State v. Fukagawa, 100 Hawai‘i 498, 506–07, 60 P.3d 899, 907–08 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Dow, 96 Hawai‘i 320, 326, 30 P.3d 926, 932 (2001)); State v. Duncan, 101 Hawai‘i 269, 275, 67 P.3d 768, 774 (2003) (upholding the trial court's decision to exclude testimony on other grounds and noting that “we have consistently held that where the decision is correct it must be affirmed by the appellate court even though the lower tribunal gave the wrong reason for its action”) (quoting State v. Taniguchi, 72 Haw. 235, 240, 815 P.2d 24, 26 (1991)). The majority asserts that the circuit court did not address this argument and the argument was waived.
Additionally, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the prosecution waived this argument, because "[a]n appellate court may affirm a judgment of the lower court on any ground in the record that supports affirmance." State v. Fukagawa, 100 Hawai'i 498, 506-07, 60 P.3d 899, 907-08 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Dow, 96 Hawai'i 320, 326, 30 P.3d 926, 932 (2001)); State v. Duncan, 101 Hawai'i 269, 275, 67 P.3d 768, 774 (2003) (upholding the trial court's decision to exclude testimony on other grounds and noting that "we have consistently held that where the decision is correct it must be affirmed by the appellate court even though the lower tribunal gave the wrong reason for its action") (quoting State v. Taniguchi, 72 Haw. 235, 240, 815 P.2d 24, 26 (1991)). The majority asserts that the circuit court did not address this argument and the argument was waived.
" A claim of insufficient evidence is reviewed to determine whether the prosecution adduced "[s]ubstantial evidence as to every material element of the offense charged." State v. Dow, 96 Haw. 320, 323, 30 P.3d 926, 929 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). HRS § 707-720(1)(e) states that "[a] person commits the offense of kidnapping if the person intentionally or knowingly restrains another person with intent to . . . [t]errorize that person or a third person."
Furthermore, it is well-settled that "'[a]n appellate court may affirm a judgment of the lower court on any ground in the record that supports affirmance.'" State v. Dow, 96 Hawai`i 320, 326, 30 P.3d 926, 932 (2001) (quoting State v. Ross, 89 Hawai`i 371, 378 n. 4, 974 P.2d 11, 18 n. 4 (1998)). As previously indicated, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that "his or her conduct neither caused nor threatened to cause the harm or evil that the statute, under which he or she is charged, seeks to prevent."