Opinion
CR. A. No. IN05-11-0688.
Submitted: December 4, 2006.
Decided: February 15, 2007.
Upon Consideration of Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief, CR. A. No: IN05-11-0688.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
This 15th day of February, 2007, upon consideration of the Motion for Postconviction Relief brought by Defendant, Priscilla Dorsey ("Defendant"), it appears to the Court that:
1. On December 4, 2006, Defendant filed this Motion for Postconviction Relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). It is Defendant's first Motion for Postconviction Relief. For the reasons explained below, Defendant's Motion is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
2. Defendant, also known as Priscilla Wilson, Deborah Harrigan, Princess Y. Gibson, Shelley Spencer, Selina Ellerbe, Shelly McNeill, Annette Davis, Selina Elliby, and Princess Y. Numeroos, was charged with murder first degree, arson first degree, and reckless endangering first degree. On June 7, 2006, she pled guilty but mentally ill to murder first degree. In exchange, the State committed not to seek the death penalty and entered nolle prosequi on the remaining charges. The Court accepted Defendant's plea and thereafter sentenced her to the mandatory punishment of life in prison without the possibility of parole.
11 Del. C. § 408.
See Sentence Order, Sept. 15, 2006.
3. Defendant seeks postconviction relief on the following grounds stated here in toto:
(a) I was cocreed [sic] to make the plea he Mr. Goff kept telling me that they where [sic] going to kill me if I didn't take the plea.
(b) I was under meds at the time I took the plea it was 300mg Thorzine [sic] 3 times a day.
(c) I had been under psychiatric care sence [sic] I was 14yrs old and my Doctor (Dr. Bill) was never no infortion [sic] never exceded [sic] from him. He planey [sic] stated that it was my criminal record.
Def. Mot. at 3.
Defendant sets forth no further facts, assertions, or legal authorities to support her motion.
4. Before addressing the merits of any postconviction relief claim, the Court must determine whether the claims pass through the procedural filters of Rule 61. To protect the integrity of the procedural rules, the Court will not address the substantive aspects of the claims if Defendant's claims are procedurally barred. Rule 61 imposes four procedural imperatives on Defendant's motion: (1) the motion must be filed within three years of a final order of conviction; (2) any basis for relief must have been asserted previously in any prior postconviction proceedings; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules; and (4) any basis for relief must not have been formally adjudicated in any proceeding. Under Rule 61(i)(5), a defendant may avoid the first three procedural imperatives if the claim challenges the Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the charges or is a "colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity, or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction."
See Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990) ("It is well-settled that the Superior Court and this Court must address the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before considering the merits of this motion.").
Id.
5. Defendant's claims are not barred by any of the procedural filters. Her motion was filed within three years of sentencing and there are no prior postconviction proceedings, trial, direct appeal, or any other proceeding where Defendant's claims could have been formally adjudicated.
6. With respect to the merits of her claims, defendant must set forth a "sufficient factual and legal basis" to support her "collateral attack" on her conviction. "If it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified." The Court may summarily dismiss a defendant's postconviction relief motion when the claims are conclusory and unsubstantiated. For example, this Court summarily dismissed a defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, coerced guilty plea, and violation of a right to speedy trial where the defendant failed to "create any factual basis or provide any legal framework for any of his claims." Like the claims addressed in Jones, Defendant's stated grounds for postconviction relief here are conclusory and wholly unsubstantiated. She is not, therefore, entitled to relief as a matter of Delaware law.
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1).
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4).
Zimmerman v. State, 1991 WL 190298, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Jan. 5, 1990) (internal citations omitted) ("This Court will not address Rule 61 claims that are conclusory and unsubstantiated."); State v. Cooper, 2001 WL 1729147, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Dec. 20, 2001) (The Court summarily dismissed defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and false testimony where claims were stated in a conclusory manner and "offer no specific, supporting facts to sustain the defendant's mere assertions."); State v. Younger, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990) (Conclusory statements regarding allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel not sufficient to show "that consideration of the claim is warranted in the interests of justice."); State v. Brittingham, 1994 WL 750341, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Dec. 29, 1994) (citations omitted) ("It is settled Delaware law that allegations that are entirely conclusory are legally insufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel.").
State v. Jones, 2006 LEXIS 264, at*4 (Del.Super.Ct. June 23, 2006).
7. Although it is by no means clear in the Petition, it appears that Defendant's focus is on the propriety of her entry of a plea of guilty but mentally ill in this case. Before accepting a plea agreement, the trial judge must address the defendant in open court. The court must inform the defendant of the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered and explain the penalties attendant to those offenses. The court must determine that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats, or of promises apart from a plea agreement, and that by pleading guilty, the defendant waives his right to a trial. A review of the plea colloquy between the Court and Defendant reveals a voluntary and knowing plea in full compliance with Rule 11. As an initial matter, the Court confirmed that the Defendant had read, understood and signed her plea agreement and the Court's truth in sentencing guilty plea form. Then, the Court informed Defendant that she was entering a plea of guilty to the charge of "Murder First Degree, as set forth in Count I of the indictment." The Court further explained that the offense carried a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole and that Defendant would initially serve her sentence at the Delaware State Hospital for treatment of her mental illness. The Court reviewed with Defendant the constitutional and civil rights she was forfeiting as a result of her guilty plea. Lastly, the Court confirmed that the Defendant was satisfied with her lawyer's representation and that she decided to plead guilty on her own.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11 ("Rule 11").
Id.
Id.
Docket Item ("D.I.") 23 at 12:7 — 10.
D.I. 23 at 13: 5 — 14: 23; 18:18 — 19:7.
Id. at 15:20 — 18:17.
Id. at 12:3 — 6; 19:22 — 20:15.
8. As best as the Court can discern, Defendant is claiming that her guilty plea was involuntary for two reasons: (1) her attorney coerced her to plead guilty; and (2) she was under the influence of psychotropic medication. A "defendant bears the burden of proving that [her] plea was involuntary or that [she] misapprehended [her] legal rights. Upon a contention of an involuntary guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate a manifest injustice to permit withdraw of [her] guilty plea." The Defendant is also bound by any averments made at the plea colloquy unless she can show by clear and convincing evidence that the statements were not made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
See Def. Mot. at 3.
State v. Saunders, 2004 WL 772070, at *4 (Del.Super.Ct. Apr. 12, 2004) (citations omitted). See also Smith v. State, 451 A.2d 837 (Del. 1982) (applying the manifest injustice standard in denying defendant's request to withdraw his guilty plea).
Felix v. State, 2006 WL 1971786, at *2 (Del. 2006). See also Hammons v. State, 2005 WL 2414271, at *2 (Del. 2005) ("Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, we find that [the defendant] is bound by all the representations he made during his plea colloquy, including his representation that he was satisfied with his counsel's performance.") (citation omitted). See also Smith v. State, 2004 WL 120530, at *1 (Del. Jan. 15, 2004) ("A voluntary guilty plea waives a defendant's right to challenge any errors or defects before the plea, even those of constitutional dimension."); Rodriguez v. State, 2003 WL 1857547, at *1(Del. Apr. 7, 2003) (The defendant's "guilty plea . . . eliminates his claim relating to events that occurred before the entry of the plea[.]").
9. Defendant claims that her counsel coerced her to plead guilty "because [defense counsel] kept telling me they where [sic] going to kill me." Regardless of how the Court may construe this allegation, the record of the plea colloquy indicates that no coercion occurred here. Defendant signed the "Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form" attesting that: (1) she freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charge listed in the plea agreement; (2) she had not been promised anything not stated in the written plea agreement; and (3) that neither her attorney, the State, nor anyone else had threatened or forced her to enter this plea. Defendant confirmed in open court that she read, reviewed with her attorney, and signed both the Plea Agreement and Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and that she understood what she was agreeing to by signing these documents. Defendant informed the Court that no one had threatened or coerced her to enter this plea and that her decision to do so was the product of her own free will. Defendant's first claim, therefore, is precluded because her clear and unambiguous answers to the Court's questions indicating that she was voluntarily entering the plea have not been called into question by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, she has not demonstrated any "manifest injustice" because her claim is entirely unsubstantiated and conclusory.
Def. Mot. at 3.
See Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form.
D.I. 23 at 11:4 — 12:2.
Id. at 19:22 — 20:15.
10. Defendant also appears to claim that her guilty plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently because she was under the influence of psychotropic medication. The transcript of the plea colloquy indicates that the Court was aware Defendant was taking prescription medications, as that fact is noted on the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form Defendant signed. The record reflects that the Court questioned Defendant about the effects of her medication and whether they influenced her ability to understand the nature of the charges and the consequences of her decision to plead guilty. Defendant confirmed that (1) she was thinking clearly; (2) her medications did not impair her ability to think clearly; (3) that she was not hearing voices at the time of the hearing, and (4) that her medications helped her to understand the proceedings. Her attorneys, likewise, confirmed that the Defendant was thinking clearly and was not impaired by her medications or any underlying mental illness. Once again, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that Defendant's plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, Defendant is bound by her representations to the Court.
Def. Mot. at 3.
The record indicates that the Defendant was taking Thorazine, Haldol, and Seroquel at the time of the hearing.
D.I. 23 at 20:21 — 22:14.
Id.
Id. at 6:10 — 10:1; 22:18 — 23:2.
11. The Court will not address Defendant's third listed ground for postconviction relief because it is unable to discern any factual or legal argument.
See Def. Mot. at 3. See also Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(b)(2) (motion for postconviction relief "shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified."); State v. Eley, 2002 WL 337996, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct. Feb. 19, 2002) (refusing to address "vague" and "unclear allegations" in defendant's motion for postconviction relief); State v. Dorman, 2000 WL 1611089, at *4 (Del.Super.Ct. July 27, 2000) (declining to address "indecipherable" allegation in motion for postconviction relief because the "[c]ourt cannot deal with assertions which it cannot understand."); State v. Keperling, 2000 WL 305493, at *6 (Del.Super.Ct. Jan. 27, 2000) (refusing to address "vague allegation" in motion for postconviction relief because the court could not "discern what defendant maintains is a wrong.").
12. Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED