This reading of the Act misconstrues its plain language. See United States v. Howe, 736 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2013) ("A court interpreting New Hampshire law must 'first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.'" (quoting State v. Dor, 165 N.H. 198, 200 (2013))). By its plain language, the Act allows the creation of buffer zones of less than 25 feet.

This reading of the Act misconstrues its plain language. See United States v. Howe, 736 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2013) ("A court interpreting New Hampshire law must 'first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.'" (quoting State v. Dor, 165 N.H. 198, 200 (2013))). By its plain language, the Act allows the creation of buffer zones of less than 25 feet.

A court interpreting New Hampshire law must “first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.” State v. Dor, 75 A.3d 1125, 1127 (N.H.2013). When construing statutory text, New Hampshire follows the widely accepted rule that “all of the words of a statute must be given effect and that the legislature is presumed not to have used superfluous or redundant words.” State v. Guay, 164 N.H. 696, 62 A.3d 831, 835 (2013) (quoting Pennelli v. Town of Pelham, 148 N.H. 365, 807 A.2d 1256, 1258 (2002)) (internal quotation mark omitted).

"A court interpreting New Hampshire law must 'first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.'" Howe, 736 F.3d at 3 (quoting State v. Dor, 165 N.H. 198, 200 (2013)). The court interprets a statute "in the context of the entire statutory scheme."

However, we acknowledge the State's point that its reading of the statute arguably advances the goal of the statute — to prevent child exploitation and abuse — to a greater extent than our construction. See State v. Dor, 165 N.H. 198, 205, 75 A.3d 1125 (2013). "But, as the Supreme Court has aptly observed, ‘it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law.’ "

"We are the final arbiters of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole." State v. Dor, 165 N.H. 198, 200, 75 A.3d 1125 (2013). "When interpreting a statute, we first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning."

United Statesv.Howe, 736 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Statev.Dor, 75 A.3d 1125, 1127 (N.H. 2013)). The New Hampshire Supreme Court has explained that, in construing a statute, it looks to "the statute as a whole," rather than "merely look[ing] at isolated words or phrases."

"A court interpreting New Hampshire law must 'first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.'" United States v. Howe, 736 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting State v. Dor, 165 N.H. 198, 200 (2013)). As explained supra Part III.A, through both of these claims, Superior Fire seeks to apportion the damages arising out of an alleged deficiency in the sprinkler system as between itself and Hampshire Fire — that is, to recover either all or a portion of such damages, for which it may be held liable, from Hampshire Fire. But the statute prohibits, after eight years have passed, "all actions to recover damages . . . arising out of any deficiency in the creation of an improvement to real property . . . .

One of those principles is that a court will not "consider what the [agency] might have said or add language that the [agency] did not see fit to include." New Hampshire v. Dor, 165 N.H. 198, 199 (2013). Because the New Hampshire Department of Insurance used the phrase "issue date of the policy," rather than "date of agreement to issue the policy," in specifying the permissible commencement date of a suicide exclusion, this court rejects Mrs. Partridge's proffered reading of Rule 401.04(m) to require the two-year period for such an exclusion to run from the date when the insurer agrees to provide coverage, rather than the date on which coverage actually commences.

Of course, if the legislature disagrees with our interpretation of RSA 259:125, II, then "it is free, subject to constitutional limitations, to amend the statute." See State v. Dor, 165 N.H. 198, 203, 205-06, 75 A.3d 1125 (2013). Having determined that the hearing examiner erred by applying the definition of "way" contained in paragraph II, we can uphold the suspension of the petitioner's license only if the church parking lot comes within the definition of "way" set forth in paragraph I.