State v. Dooly

13 Citing cases

  1. State v. Martin

    137 Wn. 2d 149 (Wash. 1999)   Cited 14 times
    Discussing different meanings of "may" and "shall"

    As the State points out, this court has long held that the superior court is a court of general jurisdiction and has the authority to render a judgment at any time except as the law may expressly forbid. State v. Regan, 76 Wn.2d 331, 341, 457 P.2d 1016 (1969); State v. Dooly, 14 Wn.2d 459, 467, 128 P.2d 486 ((1942); In re Petition of Cress, 13 Wn.2d 7, 15, 123 P.2d 767 (1942); Brown v. Porter, 7 Wn. 327, 330, 34 P. 1105 (1893). In In re Cress, the court held a life sentence for the crime of habitual criminal was void, but stated that the petitioner could still be lawfully sentenced on his convictions for murder, burglary, robbery, assault and arson upon which sentence had not been imposed.

  2. Marriage of Little

    96 Wn. 2d 183 (Wash. 1981)   Cited 76 times
    Remanding to trial court following reversal of a parenting plan to "look into the present circumstances of the children and their parents" to ensure the children's best interests were served

    This court has held that, even though Const. art. 4, § 20 requires a superior court to render its decision within 3 months after the matter was submitted, the court does not lose jurisdiction by failing to do so, and a decision rendered after that date is not void. Phillips v. Phillips, 52 Wn.2d 879, 329 P.2d 833 (1958); State v. Dooly, 14 Wn.2d 459, 128 P.2d 486 (1942); In re Cress, 13 Wn.2d 7, 123 P.2d 767 (1942). In the latter case (quoting from Bickford v. Eschbach, 167 Wn. 357, 9 P.2d 376 (1932)), we said that

  3. State v. Garman

    76 Wn. 2d 637 (Wash. 1969)   Cited 8 times

    The maximum punishment for a gross misdemeanor is imprisonment for 1 year in the county jail and/or a fine of $1,000. Persinger v. Rhay, 52 Wn.2d 762, 329 P.2d 191 (1958); State v. Dooly, 14 Wn.2d 459, 128 P.2d 486 (1942). In view of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the state cannot assert, as it does in its information and as it does before this court, that attempted petit larceny is a crime involving the element of fraud or an intent to defraud.

  4. State v. Regan

    76 Wn. 2d 331 (Wash. 1969)   Cited 21 times
    In State v. Regan, 76 Wn.2d 331, 457 P.2d 1016 (1969), this court held there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment when a police officer shone a flashlight into the interior of a car lawfully stopped for a traffic offense, and thereby discovered seizable matter.

    Aside from the fact that the delay was, in significant part, attributable to appellants' demand for a presentence investigation — which the trial judge advised them would consume considerable time — we have specifically held that the superior court is a court of general jurisdiction, and that nothing in the constitutional provision alluded to lessens that jurisdiction or otherwise forbids a judgment after the expiration of the 90-day period. State v. Dooly, 14 Wn.2d 459, 128 P.2d 486 (1942). This contention accordingly fails.

  5. Boner v. Boles, Warden

    148 W. Va. 802 (W. Va. 1964)   Cited 36 times
    In State ex rel. Boner v. Boles, 148 W. Va. 802, 137 S.E.2d 418, this Court held in point 3 of the syllabus that "A void sentence is in law no sentence at all and the court upon a valid sentence may impose any penalty provided by law."

    .Ed. 149; Mathes v. United States, 9th cir., 254 F.2d 938; McNutt v. Schneckloth, 9th cir., 241 F.2d 128; United States v. Bozza, 3d cir., 155 F.2d 592, affirmed in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 330 U.S. 160, 67 S.Ct. 645, 91 L.Ed. 818; King v. United States, 69 App. D.C. 10, 98 F.2d 291; Tilghman v. Culver, (Fla.), 99 So.2d 282, certiorari denied, 356 U.S. 953, 78 S.Ct. 918, 2 L.Ed.2d 845; McLendon v. State, 207 Ga. 328, 61 S.E.2d 502; State v. Shilinsky, 248 Iowa 596, 81 N.W.2d 444; Richardson v. Hand, 182 Kan. 326, 320 P.2d 837; Ex Parte Moore, 71 N.D. 274, 300 N.W. 37; State ex rel. Gladden v. Kelly, 213 Or. 197, 324 P.2d 486; State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P.2d 825; Frankey v. Patten, 75 Utah 231, 284 P. 318; Carter v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 466, 100 S.E.2d 681; Royster v. Smith, 195 Va. 228, 77 S.E.2d 855; Crutchfield v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 291, 46 S.E.2d 340; Jessup v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 610, 39 S.E.2d 638; Powell v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 327, 28 S.E.2d 687; State v. Dooly, 14 Wn.2d 459, 128 P.2d 486. The Circuit Court of Fayette County had the power and the authority to impose a valid sentence in conformity with Section 12, Article 8, Chapter 61, Code, 1931, which requires a sentence of confinement in the penitentiary for not less than five years or more than ten years; and the form of the sentence imposed by the circuit court by its order of November 24, 1961, was in conformity with the requirements of the statute.

  6. Phillips v. Phillips

    52 Wn. 2d 879 (Wash. 1958)   Cited 5 times
    Recognizing authority of trial court to defer final determination of issues in a custody modification action until after a trial period during which the effectiveness and propriety of a temporary order could be observed

    In any event, the constitutional requirement does not lessen the jurisdiction of the court or render void a decision made beyond the ninety-day period. State v. Dooly, 14 Wn.2d 459, 128 P.2d 486; In re Cress, 13 Wn.2d 7, 123 P.2d 767; Demaris v. Barker, 33 Wn. 200, 74 P. 362. [5] Lastly, the court is asked to increase the attorneys' fees which were awarded the appellant.

  7. State v. Thomas

    302 P.2d 261 (Ariz. 1956)   Cited 5 times

    When the statute prescribes imprisonment in the county jail the court has no jurisdiction to impose a sentence in the state prison and his action in attempting to do so is void. In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 14 S.Ct. 323, 38 L.Ed. 149; State v. Dooly, 14 Wn.2d 459, 128 P.2d 486. Defendant seems to contend that since this court has heretofore affirmed the conviction on the misdemeanor charge, it likewise affirmed the sentence and to allow the trial court to resentence the defendant would permit that court to modify or change the judgment and mandate of this court.

  8. State v. King

    18 Wn. 2d 747 (Wash. 1943)   Cited 21 times

    While this precise question has never been decided by this court, there are many of our decisions which not only bear closely upon it but also very clearly indicate the circumstances under which a defendant may be sentenced or resentenced, as distinguished from the conditions under which no second, or even first, sentence may be imposed upon him. See State ex rel. Edelstein v. Huneke, 138 Wn. 495, 244 P. 721; Blake v. Mahoney, 9 Wn.2d 110, 113 P.2d 1028; In re Lombardi, 13 Wn.2d 1, 123 P.2d 764; In re Cress, 13 Wn.2d 7, 123 P.2d 767, affirmed in State v. Cress, 15 Wn.2d 661, 131 P.2d 955; State v. Dooly, 14 Wn.2d 459, 128 P.2d 486; In re Towne, 14 Wn.2d 633, 129 P.2d 230. [1] Those decisions recognize and suggest as the proper procedure in this general type of case the following method: Where a defendant has been convicted of a crime, consequent upon which an habitual criminal proceeding is instituted against him, sentence upon the substantive offense upon which he has been convicted shall await the outcome of the habitual criminal proceeding, and if the latter be substantiated, then, and not until then, shall sentence be imposed upon the defendant for the commission of the substantive crime, with an increased penalty exacted because of the adjudication of defendant's habitual criminal status.

  9. In re Towne

    129 P.2d 230 (Wash. 1942)   Cited 26 times

    State ex rel. Edelstein v. Huneke, 138 Wn. 495, 244 P. 721; State v. Fowler, 187 Wn. 450, 60 P.2d 83; State v. Johnson, 194 Wn. 438, 78 P.2d 561; State v. Domanski, 5 Wn.2d 686, 106 P.2d 591; Blake v. Mahoney, 9 Wn.2d 110, 113 P.2d 1028; In re Lombardi, 13 Wn.2d 1, 123 P.2d 764; In re Cress, 13 Wn.2d 7, 123 P.2d 767; accord, State v. Furth, 5 Wn.2d 1, 104 P.2d 925. [2] We have also held that any judgment of conviction for the alleged crime of being an habitual criminal, and any sentence based upon such judgment, are not merely erroneous or irregular, but are absolutely void. Blake v. Mahoney, supra; In re Lombardi, supra; In re Cress, supra; State v. Dooly, ante p. 459, 128 P.2d 486. [3] We have further held that if a judgment under which one is restrained of his liberty is utterly void, and not merely voidable, it may be assailed, and habeas corpus is a proper remedy.

  10. In re Marriage of Wood

    No. 32022-7-III (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2015)

    State v. Regan, 76 Wn.2d 331, 341, 457 P.2d 1016 (1969); State v. Dooly, 14 Wn.2d 459, 467, 128 P.2d 486 (1942).