State v. Donovan

23 Citing cases

  1. Vatistas v. Hickens

    431 A.2d 121 (N.H. 1981)   Cited 3 times

    Whether to poll the jury is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, who may exercise the option as justice requires. State v. Donovan, 120 N.H. 603, 606, 419 A.2d 1102, 1104 (1980); State v. Kenna, 117 N.H. 305, 309, 374 A.2d 427, 430 (1977); see Patten v. Newton, 102 N.H. 444, 447, 159 A.2d 809, 811 (1960). The trial court has broad discretion in this regard, and we will not interfere with its exercise of that discretion in the absence of abuse. State v. Donovan, supra at 606, 419 A.2d at 1104; Bothwick v. LaBelle, 115 N.H. 279, 281, 339 A.2d 29, 32 (1975).

  2. State v. Pugliese

    122 N.H. 1141 (N.H. 1982)   Cited 9 times

    It is well settled that the decision to poll the jury is one for the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion and that absent an abuse of discretion, its decision will not be overturned by this court. State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 819, 451 A.2d 396, 397-98 (1982); State v. Donovan, 120 N.H. 603, 606, 419 A.2d 1102, 1104 (1980). [13, 14] In this case, the trial court instructed the jury to base its verdict solely on the evidence presented at trial.

  3. State v. Bird

    122 N.H. 10 (N.H. 1982)   Cited 32 times

    We hold that the court's actions, as a whole, provided the jury with an adequate definition of "recklessly." Cf. State v. Donovan, 120 N.H. 603, 609, 419 A.2d 1102, 1106 (1980). [8, 9] We also find that the trial judge did not err in failing to provide a more specific definition of the term "cause."

  4. State v. Aubert

    120 N.H. 634 (N.H. 1980)   Cited 29 times
    In Aubert, the trial court did not merely instruct the jury that the State need not establish guilt beyond all doubt or to either a mathematical or scientific certainty.

    We have repeatedly criticized such efforts. See, e.g., State v. Donovan, 120 N.H. 603, 419 A.2d 1102 (1980). In the instant case, the second paragraph of the court's charge overly favored the prosecution.

  5. State v. Depaula

    170 N.H. 139 (N.H. 2017)   Cited 8 times
    Concluding that custodians of cell phone records could provide lay testimony regarding the range of cell towers based upon personal knowledge gained through their employment

    There can be little doubt that a jury, upon learning that Sanchez was willing on the same day to participate in a murder with the defendant, would find such evidence highly probative in rebutting the defendant's implied assertion that Sanchez mistranslated the conversation to keep him from knowing the true criminal purpose of the July 11 trip. See State v. Donovan, 120 N.H. 603, 607–08, 419 A.2d 1102 (1980) ; see alsoUnited States v. Pelletier, 666 F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st Cir. 2011) (when, through cross-examination of government witness, defense counsel created impression that defendant had legitimate sources of income and had nothing to do with delivery of marijuana, which just "mysteriously appeared" in buyer's car, trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant's prior drug convictions); United States v. Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 110, 119 (1st Cir. 2000) ("By offering evidence of a second [later] incident in which Santana [one of the defendants] was involved in a completed drug venture with some of the same participants, the government gave the jury a reason to view skeptically Santana's claim that he was just an innocent bystander who was ‘merely present,’ but rather to conclude that he was a knowing and intentional participant in the crimes charged in the indictment."). Finally, we turn to the defendant's claim that the court erred in allowing the evidence of the Manchester homicide becau

  6. State v. Rogers

    687 A.2d 1242 (R.I. 1996)   Cited 3 times

    In respect to the trial justice allowing the rebuttal testimony of Giguere, we have stated that "the proper function and purpose of rebuttal testimony is to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adverse party." State v. Stewart, 663 A.2d 912, 927 (R.I. 1995) (quoting State v. Donovan, 419 A.2d 1102, 1105 (N.H. 1980)). In that case we also stated that the decision to permit rebuttal testimony lies in the discretion of the trial justice.

  7. State v. Kholi

    672 A.2d 429 (R.I. 1996)   Cited 31 times
    Determining that the stepdaughter's statements to a school counselor were admissible as prior consistent statements because they were made before allegations about her improper motives

    In like manner, "the proper function and purpose of rebuttal testimony is to explain" or to discredit the evidence of an adverse party. State v. Stewart, 663 A.2d 912, 927 (R.I. 1995) (citing State v. Donovan, 120 N.H. 603, 607, 419 A.2d 1102, 1105 (1980)). In the instant case both victims testified that their ability to obtain necessities, to attend social functions, or to use the telephone was always conditioned upon their acquiescence to defendant's sexual demands.

  8. State v. Stewart

    663 A.2d 912 (R.I. 1995)   Cited 38 times
    Upholding felony-murder conviction based on the defendant's failure to feed and care for her child

    We note that "the proper function and purpose of rebuttal testimony is to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adverse party." State v. Donovan, 120 N.H. 603, 607, 419 A.2d 1102, 1105 (1980) (quoting United States v. Chrzanowski, 502 F.2d 573, 576 (3d Cir. 1974)). The decision to permit rebuttal testimony lies in the discretion of the trial justice, whose decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.

  9. State v. Smart

    136 N.H. 639 (N.H. 1993)   Cited 45 times
    Finding no presumed prejudice despite some hostile and accusatory pretrial publicity

    Unsupported speculation does not entitle a defendant to have the trial court interrogate the jurors about alleged impropriety in deliberations. State v. Donovan, 120 N.H. 603, 607, 419 A.2d 1102, 1104-05 (1980). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to poll the jury based on the defendant's sheer conjecture.

  10. State v. Pinardville Athletic Club

    134 N.H. 462 (N.H. 1991)   Cited 7 times

    "The speculation or surmise of defendant's attorney, unsupported or uncorroborated either by sworn affidavit or statements of any party, that there was any impropriety, wrongdoing or violation of the oath of a juror affecting the verdict, does not require the trial court to examine or interrogate or interview the jurors after their verdict is revealed." State v. Donovan, 120 N.H. 603, 607, 419 A.2d 1102, 1104-05 (1980). Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's ruling.