Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1971). The superior court upheld the district court's dismissal of the charges, finding that mailing the notice to an address other than the one provided by the license holder did not comply with due process as set forth in State v. Dolson, 138 Wn.2d 773, 982 P.2d 100 (1999). We reverse.
Procedural elements of this constitutional guarantee are notice, the opportunity to appear and to defend, before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding, adapted to the nature of the case. State v. Dolson, 138 Wn.2d 773, 776-77, 982 P.2d 100 (1999). An agency may not revoke a license without due process of law.
In a prosecution for driving with a revoked license, the State has the burden to prove that the revocation of the defendant's license complied with due process. State v. Dolson, 138 Wn.2d 773, 777, 982 P.2d 100 (1999) (superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in City of Redmond v. Arroyo-Murillo, 149 Wn.2d 607, 614-16, 70 P.3d 947 (2003)). ¶23 As the department demonstrates by citation to Supreme Court cases, due process does not intrinsically require a prerevocation hearing.
See City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 668, 91 P.3d 875 (2004). ¶6 Procedural Due Process. A driver's license is a property interest protected by the due process clauses of the United States and Washington Constitutions. State v. Dolson, 138 Wn.2d 773, 776-77, 982 P.2d 100 (1999) (citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1971)). Thus, before a driver's license may be revoked, the government must provide the licensee with "`notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.'"
An important corollary to this rule is that a driver cannot be convicted of driving while his or her license is suspended or revoked if the suspension or revocation violates due process. State v. Dolson, 138 Wn.2d 773, 783, 982 P.2d 100 (1999). Though the procedures may vary according to the interest at stake, "[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'"
We disagree. SMC 11.56.320(B) ("A person found to be an habitual traffic offender under Chapter 46.65 RCW, who violates this section while an order of revocation issued under Chapter 46.65 RCW prohibiting such operation is in effect, is guilty of driving while license suspended or revoked in the first degree. . . ."); State v. Dolson, 138 Wn.2d 773, 777, 982 P.2d 100 (1999) ("In a prosecution for driving with a revoked license, the State has the burden to prove that the revocation of the defendant's license complied with due process."). Whether O'Connor's license was revoked at the time of her traffic citation turns on whether the Department's July 30, 2002 decision effectively cancelled the stay of revocation.
It is well-established that the legislature may effectively overrule our decisions interpreting statutory terms by prospectively amending a statute. See Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d at 215-16 n. 6 (acknowledging that the legislature may enact a prospective SRA amendment that alters the definition of "'[s]ame criminal conduct,'" in spite of the court's construction of the term in a former version of the SRA); Windust v. Dep't of Labor Indus., 52 Wn.2d 33, 37-38, 323 P.2d 241 (1958) (holding that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply when the legislature amends a statutory term that the court has previously interpreted); State v. Dolson, 138 Wn.2d 773, 779, 982 P.2d 100 (1999) (noting that the legislature "implicitly overruled" State v. Baker, 49 Wn. App. 778, 745 P.2d 1335 (1987) by amending RCW 46.20.205). In both Cruz and Smith, we reached our decisions by construing the statutory terms of the SRA in effect at that time.
A revocation that does not comply with due process is void. State v. Dolson, 138 Wn.2d 773, 777, 982 P.2d 100 (1999). The Legislature has codified constitutional due process requirements that provide in relevant part:
The Supreme Court has also held that under that legislative scheme, due process is not satisfied if the notice of revocation is sent to the licensee's last known address rather than the address of record. State v. Dolson, 138 Wn.2d 773, 779, 982 P.2d 100 (1999). Because the legislature put control over the notification process in the hands of the licensee, the Department's repudiation of this procedure in favor of another violated due process.
see also State v. Varga, 151 Wn.2d 179, 191-92, 86 P.3d 139 (2004) ("It is well-established that the legislature may effectively overrule our decisions interpreting statutory terms by prospectively amending a statute." (citing State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 215-16, 216 n.6, 743 P.2d 1237 (1987); Windust, 52 Wn.2d at 37-38; State v. Dolson, 138 Wn.2d 773, 779, 982 P.2d 100 (1999))).