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State v. Doe

91 N.M. 356 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977)
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State v. Doe

7 Citing cases

  1. State v. Dennis F

    104 N.M. 619 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 13 times
    Rejecting the child's argument that he should receive credit for time on probation against a disposition imposed because adults have a statutory right to probation credit, because of the absence of a statute granting the credit to juveniles and the resulting inconsistency with the statutory scheme

    The amended judgment of January 30th imposes the identical disposition. The child relies on State v. Doe, 91 N.M. 356, 573 P.2d 1211 (Ct.App. 1977) in support of his argument. Doe quotes State v. Verdugo, 78 N.M. 372, 431 P.2d 750 (1967), as follows: "`When a sentence has been set aside, the defendant's presence is as necessary at resentencing as it was at the time of the original sentencing.'"

  2. Smith v. City

    142 N.M. 786 (N.M. 2007)   Cited 85 times
    Holding that a declaratory judgment action cannot be used “to circumvent established procedures for seeking judicial review of a municipality's administrative decisions” and recognizing “no sound judicial policy for allowing a party aggrieved by an administrative decision to forego an available avenue of judicial review only to allow that same party to initiate judicial review in another form at some future date that no one can predict or rely upon with any certainty. Indeed, the efficient administration of justice requires just the opposite”

    Therefore, when a jurisdictional claim is raised, the issue must be decided before a court can review the case. See State v. Doe, 91 N.M. 356, 357, 573 P.2d 1211, 1212 (Ct.App. 1977) ("`[L]ack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings is a controlling consideration which must be resolved before going further and an appellate court may raise the question of jurisdiction on its own motion.'") (quoting In re Doe III, 87 N.M. 170, 171, 531 P.2d 218, 219 (Ct.App. 1975)). To the extent that Taos could be read to suggest otherwise, it should not be followed.

  3. Com. v. Jones

    530 Pa. 536 (Pa. 1992)   Cited 19 times
    In Jones we expanded and broadened Passaro by unequivocally stating that "a defendant's voluntary escape acts as a per se forfeiture of his right of appeal, where the defendant is a fugitive at any time after post-trial proceedings commence."

    Several of our sister states follow the same procedure: Cline v. State, 571 So.2d 368 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990); Merry v. State, 752 P.2d 472 (Alaska App. 1988); State v. Fettis, 136 Ariz. 58, 664 P.2d 208 (1983); Lowery v. Arkansas, 297 Ark. 47, 759 S.W.2d 545 (1988); Hooks v. State, 429 A.2d 1312 (Del.Supr. 1981); Warrick v. United States, 551 A.2d 1332 (D.C. 1988); State v. Caraballo, 62 Haw. 309, 615 P.2d 91 (1980); State v. Webb, 242 Kan. 519, 748 P.2d 875 (1988); State v. Money, 109 Idaho 757, 710 P.2d 667 (1985); State v. Johnson, 222 N.W.2d 453 (Iowa 1974); Greenidge v. Greenidge, 571 So.2d 905 (La.App. 1990); Collins v. State, 69 Md. App. 173, 516 A.2d 1015 (1986); People v. Freybler, 173 Mich. App. 539, 434 N.W.2d 187 (1988); State v. Cooper, 712 S.W.2d 27 (Mo.App. 1986); State v. Doe, 91 N.M. 356, 573 P.2d 1211 (1977); State v. Walton, 66 Ohio App.3d 243, 583 N.E.2d 1106 (1990); State v. Verdugo, 78 N.M. 372, 431 P.2d 750 (1967); State v. Williams, 303 S.C. 410, 401 S.E.2d 168 (1991); Casias v. State, 503 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); State v. Germaine, 152 Vt. 106, 564 A.2d 604 (1989); Head v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 163, 348 S.E.2d 423 (1986); State v. Barefield, 47 Wn. App. 444, 735 P.2d 1339 (1987); State v. Eden, 163 W. Va. 370, 256 S.E.2d 868 (1979); Weddle v. State, 621 P.2d 231 (Wyo. 1980). Indeed, the requirement that the defendant be present at sentencing in Pennsylvania is plainly and clearly stated in Pa.R.Crim.P. 1117(a).

  4. Los Alamos County v. Beery

    101 N.M. 157 (N.M. 1984)   Cited 1 times
    Stating that an “order of remand simply returns the jurisdiction of the cause to the lower court in which it originated”

    The order of remand simply returns the jurisdiction of the cause to the lower court in which it originated. See State v. Doe, 91 N.M. 356, 573 P.2d 1211 (Ct.App. 1977). In this case, the district court's order of dismissal was, in effect, an affirmance of the magistrate court judgment.

  5. Smith v. Clark

    2011 NMCA 3 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 1 times

    {41} Although Synergy does not actually argue the issue of subject matter jurisdiction on appeal, we posed this question to the parties during oral argument. Jurisdiction is a controlling consideration to be resolved as a preliminary matter, and an appellate court may raise the question of jurisdiction on its own. See State v. Doe, 91 N.M. 356, 357, 573 P.2d 1211, 1212 (Ct. App. 1977). Moreover, "it is incumbent upon the appellate court to raise jurisdiction questions sua sponte when the Court notices them."

  6. Webb v. Fox

    105 N.M. 723 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 4 times
    In Webb, the court held that a permit applicant who had expressed interest in buying the property, but had entered into no contract, was not an "aggrieved person" for purposes of New Mexico's equivalent to section 462.361.

    We answer this contention by first noting that jurisdictional issues may be raised at any time during the pendency of a proceeding. See Sims v. Mechem, 72 N.M. 186, 382 P.2d 183 (1963); State v. Doe, 91 N.M. 356, 573 P.2d 1211 (Ct.App. 1977). Secondly, since Section 3-21-8(B) provides for appeal by an "aggrieved person," the question of whether F W Enterprises has such standing is a jurisdictional question.

  7. Dillard v. Dillard

    104 N.M. 763 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 14 times
    Reversing trial court's "establishing a trust which provided for the parties' children's post-minority education"

    Indeed, this court may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion. State v. Doe, 91 N.M. 356, 573 P.2d 1211 (Ct.App. 1977). To the extent that petitioner's standing argument goes to the question of whether respondent is an aggrieved party, we find that she has a "pecuniary interest" affected by the 1985 order.