State v. Doe

14 Citing cases

  1. State v. Dennis F

    104 N.M. 619 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 13 times
    Rejecting the child's argument that he should receive credit for time on probation against a disposition imposed because adults have a statutory right to probation credit, because of the absence of a statute granting the credit to juveniles and the resulting inconsistency with the statutory scheme

    State v. Acuna, 103 N.M. 279, 705 P.2d 685 (Ct.App. 1985); State v. Aguilar, 98 N.M. 510, 650 P.2d 32 (Ct.App. 1982). In State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977), this court stated: "The order placing the child on probation being void, the situation is as if no probation order had been entered. [Citation omitted.] There being no probation order, the order revoking probation was without legal effect.

  2. State v. Doe

    93 N.M. 481 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 16 times

    Inasmuch as the statute requires a specific finding, and none was made, the transfer order is invalid because not entered in compliance with the statute. See State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). An implicit finding is insufficient when the statute requires a specific finding.

  3. State v. Crystal B

    130 N.M. 336 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 8 times
    Recognizing that the lower standard applicable to "the legality of a search of a student . . . . only in furtherance of the school's education-related goals; that is in a situation where the student is on school property or while the student is under control of the school" and "depends on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search"

    Under the Children's Code, a final judgment contemplates a determination that the child committed a delinquent act and that the child is in need of care or rehabilitation. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-18 (1996); Rule 10-230 NMRA 2000; see also State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). Thus, appeals are permitted from disposition of an adjudicated delinquent child as that is the final act that the trial court must complete to dispose of the case.

  4. State v. Michael R

    107 N.M. 794 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 10 times

    The statute defined a delinquent child as a child who has committed a delinquent act and who is in need of care and rehabilitation. State v. Doe, 95 N.M. 90, 619 P.2d 194 (Ct.App. 1980); State v. Doe, 93 N.M. 206, 598 P.2d 1166 (Ct.App. 1979); State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). The applicable statute in the present case, NMSA 1978, Section 32-1-3(P) (Cum.

  5. State v. Michael V

    107 N.M. 305 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 4 times

    "`The order placing the child on probation being void, the situation is as if no probation order had been entered. * * * There being no probation order, the order revoking probation was without legal effect.'" State v. Dennis F., 104 N.M. at 622, 725 P.2d at 598 (quoting State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 251, 561 P.2d 948, 950 (Ct.App. 1977)). Since the children's court had no authority to place the child on probation for one year, the sentence of probation was void.

  6. State v. Julia S

    104 N.M. 222 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 8 times
    Distinguishing treatment of delinquent children from that of children in need of supervision under a former version of the Children's code

    She contends that the court did not specifically find that she was in need of care or rehabilitation when it adjudged her a CHINS in its judgment and order of February 8, 1984. She contends that, absent this finding, the court was powerless to order any disposition, and that any orders entered after the purported dispositional order were of no effect under State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). She is incorrect.

  7. Jaramillo v. Jaramillo

    103 N.M. 145 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 9 times
    Explaining that "[a]n award of joint custody ... may at times require the [district] court to adopt a specific finding indicating which parent, in the child's best interest and welfare, should be awarded primary physical custody of the child"

    . . . Inasmuch as the statute requires a specific finding, and none was made, the transfer order is invalid because not entered in compliance with the statute. See State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). An implicit finding is insufficient when the statute requires a specific finding.

  8. State v. Doe

    101 N.M. 214 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 1 times

    Since the statute requires a specific finding, and none was made, the transfer order is invalid because it was not entered in compliance with the statute. Heckathorn v. Heckathorn; State v. Doe, 93 N.M. 481, 601 P.2d 451 (Ct.App. 1979); State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). Our holding in this case also accords with the stated legislative purpose of the Children's Code, NMSA 1978, § 32-1-2(A), (C), (G) (Repl.

  9. State v. Doe

    95 N.M. 302 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 4 times

    The cause is reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the petition and all subsequent orders following the petition. State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). IT IS SO ORDERED.

  10. State v. Doe

    93 N.M. 621 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 11 times
    Stating that the time limit for petitions alleging delinquency applies to probation revocation proceedings by operation of Rule 51, the predecessor to Rule 10-232(C)

    A similar provision appears in the Children's Code, § 32-1-43, N.M.S.A. 1978. State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). While § 32-1-28 N.M.S.A. 1978 of the Children's Code provides a time limit different from Rule 46, the rule controls.