State v. Acuna, 103 N.M. 279, 705 P.2d 685 (Ct.App. 1985); State v. Aguilar, 98 N.M. 510, 650 P.2d 32 (Ct.App. 1982). In State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977), this court stated: "The order placing the child on probation being void, the situation is as if no probation order had been entered. [Citation omitted.] There being no probation order, the order revoking probation was without legal effect.
Inasmuch as the statute requires a specific finding, and none was made, the transfer order is invalid because not entered in compliance with the statute. See State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). An implicit finding is insufficient when the statute requires a specific finding.
Under the Children's Code, a final judgment contemplates a determination that the child committed a delinquent act and that the child is in need of care or rehabilitation. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-18 (1996); Rule 10-230 NMRA 2000; see also State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). Thus, appeals are permitted from disposition of an adjudicated delinquent child as that is the final act that the trial court must complete to dispose of the case.
The statute defined a delinquent child as a child who has committed a delinquent act and who is in need of care and rehabilitation. State v. Doe, 95 N.M. 90, 619 P.2d 194 (Ct.App. 1980); State v. Doe, 93 N.M. 206, 598 P.2d 1166 (Ct.App. 1979); State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). The applicable statute in the present case, NMSA 1978, Section 32-1-3(P) (Cum.
"`The order placing the child on probation being void, the situation is as if no probation order had been entered. * * * There being no probation order, the order revoking probation was without legal effect.'" State v. Dennis F., 104 N.M. at 622, 725 P.2d at 598 (quoting State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 251, 561 P.2d 948, 950 (Ct.App. 1977)). Since the children's court had no authority to place the child on probation for one year, the sentence of probation was void.
She contends that the court did not specifically find that she was in need of care or rehabilitation when it adjudged her a CHINS in its judgment and order of February 8, 1984. She contends that, absent this finding, the court was powerless to order any disposition, and that any orders entered after the purported dispositional order were of no effect under State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). She is incorrect.
. . . Inasmuch as the statute requires a specific finding, and none was made, the transfer order is invalid because not entered in compliance with the statute. See State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). An implicit finding is insufficient when the statute requires a specific finding.
Since the statute requires a specific finding, and none was made, the transfer order is invalid because it was not entered in compliance with the statute. Heckathorn v. Heckathorn; State v. Doe, 93 N.M. 481, 601 P.2d 451 (Ct.App. 1979); State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). Our holding in this case also accords with the stated legislative purpose of the Children's Code, NMSA 1978, § 32-1-2(A), (C), (G) (Repl.
The cause is reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the petition and all subsequent orders following the petition. State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). IT IS SO ORDERED.
A similar provision appears in the Children's Code, § 32-1-43, N.M.S.A. 1978. State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct.App. 1977). While § 32-1-28 N.M.S.A. 1978 of the Children's Code provides a time limit different from Rule 46, the rule controls.