Opinion
P2-2019-4361AG
08-18-2020
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. CHARLES DODSON
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff: Gregory L. Abilheira, Esq. For Defendant: Christopher T. Millea, Esq.
DECISION K. RODGERS , J. The issue presently before this Court arises from a traffic stop conducted by a member of the Rhode Island State Police on February 17, 2019. The Defendant, Charles Dodson, challenges the search of the motor vehicle he was operating as being illegal and has moved to dismiss the two counts in this criminal information.
Defendant's "Motion to Dismiss" is more appropriately considered as a Motion to Suppress Evidence, premised upon an alleged illegal search. In the absence of any legal authority entitling Defendant to an outright dismissal of the charges, this Court will treat the motion as a Motion to Suppress Evidence.
A hearing before this Court was conducted on June 16, 2020, during which the sole witness was the arresting trooper. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion is denied.
I
Facts
The following facts were gleaned from the testimony and/or exhibits offered into evidence.
On February 17, 2019, Trooper Thomas Davis, a seven-year veteran of the Rhode Island State Police, was operating his marked cruiser in the area of Route 6 in Johnston, Rhode Island. Upon exiting a designated turnaround area on Route 6, Trooper Davis travelled east and soon thereafter observed a black Ford Taurus, bearing Connecticut passenger registration 4AEPU6, veer from the third lane of travel, crossing over the dotted line into the second lane of travel, and then correct itself without the use of a turn signal. In response to what he considered a lane-roadway violation, Trooper Davis conducted a motor vehicle registration check of the vehicle using his Division-issued computer in his cruiser and learned that the license plate displayed on the Ford Taurus was registered to a 2005 Nissan Altima. Trooper Davis then initiated a motor vehicle stop based upon the mismatch between the registration and the vehicle.
Trooper Davis described this type of motor vehicle enforcement action as necessary and requiring a "deeper look" into the status of the registration because the registration provides no information related to the subject vehicle. Trooper Davis also testified to instances when he would exercise his discretion and not initiate a motor vehicle stop, such as when a registration on a motor vehicle has only recently expired or if he is aware that no other troopers would be available for backup if needed.
Trooper Davis approached the vehicle's passenger side and requested the operator's license, registration, and proof of insurance. The operator was identified as Defendant and was the only occupant. Trooper Davis did not recall any satisfactory explanation offered by Defendant why Connecticut passenger registration 4AEPU6 was registered to a Nissan Altima rather than the black Ford Taurus. While at the passenger side of the vehicle, Trooper Davis observed two knives on the front passenger seat: a fixed blade knife and a folding knife. For officer safety, Trooper Davis asked Defendant if there was anything else in the vehicle that he should be aware of, to which Defendant replied in the negative. Trooper Davis next asked if Defendant had ever been arrested before, to which Defendant replied that he was arrested for disorderly conduct long ago.
Having determined that Defendant would not be permitted to continue to operate the unregistered Ford Taurus because the registration affixed to the car has never been registered to the Ford Taurus, Trooper Davis called for a tow truck to retrieve the vehicle. Additionally, because he viewed the knives on the front passenger seat and would need to conduct an inventory search safely, he called a fellow trooper, Trooper Lisa Hanley, to the scene for backup. While awaiting Trooper Hanley's arrival, he learned that Defendant had misrepresented his past arrests inasmuch as Defendant also had a prior firearm charge in Massachusetts.
G.L. 1956 § 31-3-1 makes the operation of an unregistered vehicle on any highway a civil violation.
Trooper Davis identified situations in which an inventory search would not be conducted, including: if a motor vehicle is locked on private property; if a motor vehicle is abandoned and locked; if conducting an inventory search would create a hazard or a safety risk; if the operator was present and requested a tow at his/her expense; and in the event of inclement weather or emergency conditions. The policy of the Rhode Island State Police governing motor vehicle inventories, General Order 54D (Gen. Order 54D), was introduced as evidence and enumerates the same circumstances to which Trooper Davis testified regarding when a motor vehicle inventory would not be conducted. Gen. Order 54D, at IV. Trooper Davis also stated that if there was an inadequate number of troopers available as backup or if there were multiple occupants who would have to be removed from a vehicle in order to effectuate an inventory search, then, for officer's safety, an inventory search would not be conducted on scene. According to Trooper Davis, none of these circumstances applied.
Upon Trooper Hanley's arrival, Trooper Davis asked Defendant to exit the vehicle so an inventory search could be conducted. Defendant complied with the request to exit the vehicle and Trooper Davis then conducted a Terry pat down, which revealed a key chain on Defendant's waistband, attached to which was an item similar to brass knuckles with two sharp sides. Trooper Davis again inquired if there was anything else in the vehicle that he should be concerned about. Defendant responded in the negative, but then asked if the car was going to be searched. Trooper Davis testified that after he advised Defendant that the car would be inventoried, Defendant's demeanor changed, and he appeared nervous.
A Terry pat refers to a limited pat down search of a suspect's outer clothing for weapons when an officer has reason to believe the person may be armed and dangerous. See State v. Tavarez, 572 A.2d 276, 277-78 (R.I. 1990) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Here, after seeing knives on the front passenger seat, Trooper Davis had reason to believe Defendant may be armed and dangerous and was justified in conducting a limited pat down to search for additional weapons upon Defendant's exit from the vehicle.
While Trooper Hanley stood with Defendant at the rear of the vehicle, Trooper Davis began an inventory search of the car in the front passenger area from which he removed the previously observed folding knife and fixed blade knife and secured them on his person. Next, Trooper Davis turned his attention to the rear seat of the vehicle, specifically the middle seat area where a zippered, black bag was located on the rear, middle seat and within reach of the center console. Trooper Davis opened the zippered bag and located a leather blackjack, another fixed blade knife, an expandable baton, a five-prong object with protruding spears, and a black leather holster holding a .38 caliber revolver loaded with five hollow-point bullets. Trooper Davis then placed Defendant in handcuffs and had him remain with Trooper Hanley outside the Ford Taurus and the two marked police cruisers while he continued the inventory search.
Trooper Davis returned to the car to continue the inventory search and observed a leather vest on the rear, passenger side seat. In an inside pocket of the vest, Trooper Davis located a five-round speed loader, loaded with five hollow-point bullets. The vest itself was adorned with various patches, including at least one known to Trooper Davis through his training and experience as referring to an outlaw group.
Defendant was charged with carrying a Smith & Wesson .38 revolver on or about his person without a license, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-47-8(a), and carrying concealed weapons on his person, to wit, a blackjack and multiple knives more than three inches in length, in violation of § 11-47-42.
II
Analysis
Defendant contends that all the weapons seized by Trooper Davis were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore must be suppressed. See G.L. 1956 § 9-19-25 (prohibiting introduction at trial of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure). More specifically, Defendant argues that Trooper Davis did not have probable cause to search the black bag which contained, inter alia, the gun, blackjack, and at least one fixed blade knife. Defendant also maintains that because he was free to leave from the scene of the motor vehicle stop before the inventory search was conducted, Defendant had the right to remove the black bag himself, and Trooper Davis lacked the authority to search it. Finally, Defendant challenges the subjective nature of Trooper Davis' decision to tow the unregistered vehicle as further support that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.
A
Inventory Search
Defendant essentially asks this Court to turn all legal precedent on inventory searches—and policies and procedures derived therefrom—on their head and adopt a standard of probable cause before an inventory search can be performed. See, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990) (validating inventory searches conducted pursuant to standardized criteria or an established routine); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (routine inventory of lawfully impounded vehicle without warrant not unreasonable search and seizure); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (warrantless search of vehicle towed to private garage permitted without establishing probable cause to believe that vehicle contained contraband); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (Fourth Amendment not violated when evidence seized by officer to protect car while in police custody); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (allowing inventory search a week after a car was impounded under the state forfeiture statute); State v. Grant, 840 A.2d 541 (R.I. 2004) (search of defendant and his belongings prior to court appearance was permissible inventory search); State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138 (R.I. 1980) (routine inventory of contents of a car prior to impoundment consistent with Fourth Amendment). This Court will not stray from the overwhelming legal precedent offered by the United States Supreme Court and our own Rhode Island Supreme Court as Defendant asks this Court to do.
Two particular cases from the United States Supreme Court merit further discussion. In Cady, supra, the Court justified a warrantless inventory search of a towed vehicle as being incident to the community caretaking functions of the local police to protect the safety of the community. 413 U.S. at 436. In that case, a vehicle operated by an intoxicated off-duty police officer was involved in an accident and rendered disabled on a bridge abutment. Having reason to believe that the off-duty officer was required to carry his service weapon with him at all times, the responding officers searched the front seat and the glove compartment to secure the service weapon. That weapon was not located during the initial search at the scene of the accident. After the car was towed to a private garage, an officer responded to the private tow yard to continue to search for the driver's service weapon in accordance with standard procedure within the police department. During the search of the trunk of the car, numerous items were located with suspected blood. The off-duty officer was ultimately charged with murder and challenged, inter alia, the search of his vehicle.
The Cady Court considered that,
"[l]ocal police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.
. . . .
The Court further recognized that the disabled vehicle was obviously abandoned and represented a nuisance on the roadway, and that there was no evidence that having the car towed was unwarranted in terms of state law or sound police procedure. Id. at 447. The Court held that because the police reasonably believed that the towed vehicle contained a gun and was vulnerable to vandals, the warrantless search of the car, including the trunk, was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 447-48.
The constitutional difference between searches of and seizures from houses and similar structures and from vehicles stems both from the ambulatory character of the latter and from the fact that extensive, and often noncriminal contact with automobiles will bring local officials in 'plain view' of evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime, or contraband." 413 U.S. at 441-42 (emphasis added).
Citing the community caretaking functions discussed in Cady, the Opperman Court identified various situations in which the police are permitted to take vehicles into their custody: car accidents whereby the uninterrupted flow of traffic is impeded; where evidence of a disabled or damaged vehicle itself must be preserved; and where parking ordinance violations may jeopardize both public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368-69. The Court then considered the routine practice of securing and inventorying automobiles' contents as generally followed by local police:
"These procedures developed in response to three distinct needs: the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody . . . ; the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property . . . ; and the protection of the police from potential
danger . . . . The practice has been viewed as essential to respond to incidents of theft or vandalism." Id. at 369 (internal citations omitted).Citing the many state court cases upholding the community caretaking functions of police in conducting inventory searches as reasonable under a Fourth Amendment analysis, 428 U.S. at 369-71, the Opperman Court found that "[t]he decisions of this Court point unmistakably to the conclusion reached by both federal and state courts that inventories pursuant to standard police procedures are reasonable." Id. at 372.
The majority in Opperman also dismissed the probable cause analysis as being necessary for an inventory search to be conducted because it is a noncriminal, administrative caretaking function. "In view of the noncriminal context of inventory searches, and the inapplicability in such a setting of the requirement of probable cause, courts have held—and quite correctly—that search warrants are not required, linked as the warrant requirement textually is to the probable-cause concept." Id. at 370 n.5 (majority opinion). Ultimately, the Court concluded "that in following standard police procedures, prevailing throughout the country and approved by the overwhelming majority of courts, the conduct of the police [in conducting an inventory of an impounded vehicle] was not 'unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 376.
Beyond the holdings of the highest court in the land, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has also repeatedly held that inventory searches are an exception to the search warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See Grant, 840 A.2d at 550; State v. Bonin, 591 A.2d 38, 39 (R.I. 1991); State v. Louro, 589 A.2d 1197, 1198 (R.I. 1991). "To be valid, the inventory search must be conducted pursuant to standardized criteria, or as part of an established routine; it may not serve as a pretext for 'a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.'" Grant, 840 A.2d at 550 (quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (emphasis in original)).
In the instant case, Trooper Davis executed a proper motor vehicle stop based upon the mismatch between the Ford Taurus and the car to which Connecticut license plate 4AEPU6 was registered. Further, law enforcement's community caretaking responsibilities required Trooper Davis to remove the unregistered Ford Taurus from the roadway until it came into compliance with Rhode Island law. Although Defendant was not then suspected of nor charged with a criminal offense but rather a civil violation for operating an unregistered motor vehicle, Trooper Davis was required to inventory the Ford Taurus before it was removed from the roadway by a tow truck. Trooper Davis' description of the manner in which he conducted the inventory complied with the procedures set forth in Gen. Order 54D. Moreover, the scope of the inventory that he conducted mirrored the policy in that it included "[t]he passenger compartment, including the glove compartment, of the vehicle and any containers found therein for any valuable property or dangerous instrumentalities." Gen. Order 54D, at V.E.1. Finally, the search of the black bag on the rear seat also complied with the State Police policy, which states:
"Any containers that are closed may be opened taking into consideration the nature of the search and characteristics of the container itself. This examination will allow the Division member to determine the container's contents, thus fulfilling the goal of a thorough inventory for the protection of the owner and the Division." Gen. Order 54D, at V.F.1.
Trooper Davis complied in all respects with the standard procedure adopted by the State Police and set forth in Gen. Order 54D in conducting the inventory search in the case at bar. The black bag was not locked, and it was opened in order to fulfill the goal of a thorough inventory for the protection of the owner and the State Police. There was no credible evidence offered to demonstrate that the inventory conducted was a pretext for a general rummaging to discover incriminating evidence. See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4; Grant, 840 A.2d at 550. Trooper Davis properly effectuated his community caretaking function by ordering that Defendant's unregistered car be impounded and properly conducted an inventory search in compliance with the standard procedure of the State Police, including the search of the black bag on the rear seat in which a loaded firearm was located. See Grant, 840 A.2d at 550. The inventory search was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376. Defendant's motion is denied.
B
Defendant Did Not Request to Remove the Black Bag
Next, Defendant contends that because he was not under arrest and was free to leave the scene of the motor vehicle stop, then he was also free to remove his belongings before that inventory search was conducted. Without deciding if and how Defendant would have been permitted to extricate himself from the traffic stop on Route 6, Defendant is incorrect that he also was free to remove his belongings from the vehicle before an inventory search could be conducted.
The State Police policy provides:
"Unless probable cause to seize items exists an operator and/or owner may request to remove or entrust their possessions to another person as long as it doesn't impede the towing or impoundment process." Gen. Order 54D, at V.G.4 (emphasis added).The subsection in which this policy is found is entitled "Impounded Items or Valuables," and is the seventh of eight procedures listed in Section V, entitled "Motor Vehicle Inventory Procedures." These eight procedures appear to be listed in the order in which they are to be followed. See generally Gen. Order 54D at V.A-V.H. In addition to the above-cited policy, Subsection V.G addresses procedures for storing impounded items or valuables seized for evidentiary purposes; for returning impounded items or valuables not seized for evidentiary purposes to their rightful owner; and for storing all remaining impounded items within the vehicle, with items of value being stored in the trunk. Gen. Order 54D, at V.G.1-3. The context of the above-cited policy demonstrates that, along with storing impounded items or returning impounded items to the rightful owner as set forth in the balance of that subsection, the items that may be requested to be removed or entrusted to a third party must have first been part of the inventory. Accordingly, this Court disagrees that Defendant had the right to remove the black bag from the rear seat of the car prior to the inventory search being conducted.
Additionally, to allow an operator of an impounded vehicle to remove belongings prior to an inventory being completed contravenes one of the stated purposes of an inventory being conducted: to protect the police from potential danger. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369 (citing Cooper, 386 U.S. at 61-62); Grant, 840 A.2d at 550. If a container with a dangerous weapon were permitted to be removed from a vehicle before being inventoried, that very weapon could be used to inflict harm on the police officer conducting the inventory. Such a result runs afoul of legal precedent and the State Police policy derived therefrom.
Notably, Defendant never requested to remove the black bag from the vehicle—before, during, or after the inventory was conducted. Once the black bag was unzippered and properly inventoried in accordance with established procedures and revealed the loaded firearm, probable cause existed to seize the weapon and effectuate Defendant's arrest. The black bag and its contents thus could not be entrusted to another person pursuant to Subsection V.G.4 of Gen. Order 54D.
For these additional reasons, Defendant's motion is denied.
C
Trooper Davis' Established Routine
Defendant next maintains that the discretion used by Trooper Davis to not impound vehicles with expired registrations demonstrates that he was not acting within a standardized procedure and, indeed, had violated Rhode Island State Police policy. Defendant's focus on Trooper Davis' discretion is misplaced and mischaracterizes Trooper Davis' testimony. Trooper Davis testified to instances in which Trooper Davis exercised discretion and elected not to impound certain vehicles, such as when a vehicle registration had only recently expired or if an operator offered a reasonable explanation why a vehicle was not properly registered. He was steadfast, however, that he would not exercise such discretion but instead would have towed from a roadway any vehicle that does not match the registration displayed, such as in the instant case. He also testified to exceptions that exist, in accordance with State Police policy, and allow a trooper to forego inventorying a vehicle on scene when, for instance, a back-up trooper is not available; when there are multiple occupants who would have to be removed from the car during an inventory search, thus placing the trooper's safety in jeopardy; and if another urgent call from dispatch was received or if there was inclement weather. None of those exceptions applied here.
The impound of Defendant's vehicle and the subsequent inventory search was part of an established routine for this Trooper to tow vehicles when the vehicle and its registration do not match. Moreover, Trooper Davis adhered to the standardized procedure of the State Police once the decision was made to impound Defendant's vehicle. It is inconsequential that there are other circumstances under which Trooper Davis may not impound a vehicle, none of which apply here. There was no evidence which established or even suggested that Trooper Davis conducted the inventory search as a pretext for '"a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence."' Grant, 840 A.2d at 550 (quoting Wells, 495 U.S. at 4). As such, this Court finds that Trooper Davis conducted a permissible inventory search in accordance with State Police policy.
D
Protective Search of Vehicle
Beyond conducting a permissible inventory search, Trooper Davis was further justified in searching the car as a protective-search for weapons. Officers may search a vehicle without a warrant under the protective-search doctrine when they have a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous and may gain control of weapons. State v. Milette, 727 A.2d 1236, 1239-40 (R.I. 1999). In determining the constitutionality of a protective-search, the facts need not establish probable cause, but must only rise to the level of reasonable belief. State v. Santos, 64 A.3d 314, 319-20 (R.I. 2013).
During the instant stop, Trooper Davis observed two knives on the front passenger seat; Defendant misrepresented his criminal history; Defendant told Trooper Davis that there was nothing else in the vehicle, although a subsequent Terry pat revealed a brass knuckle-like weapon on a key chain on his waist band; and Defendant appeared visibly nervous when advised that an inventory search would be conducted. Taken together, the circumstances in this case gave Trooper Davis reasonable belief that Defendant may have been armed and had the ability to retain weapons which entitled Trooper Davis to conduct a protective-search. During the resulting search, Trooper Davis located a black bag in the middle of the back seat that was in close proximity to the center console and within reach of a driver. When Trooper Davis unzippered the bag, he found a leather blackjack, another fixed blade knife, a baton, a five-pronged object with protruding spears, and a holster holding a .38 caliber revolver loaded with five hollow-point bullets. Trooper Davis subsequently handcuffed Defendant and continued his protective-search—with what then surpassed reasonable belief to probable cause to believe that the vehicle held contraband or evidence of a crime—and found a five-round speed loader loaded with five hollow-point bullets.
In addition to properly conducting an inventory search of Defendant's vehicle, Trooper Davis was justified in conducting a protective-search of the vehicle. The search was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
III
Conclusion
For all these reasons, the inventory search of Defendant's vehicle comported in all respects with the standard adopted by the State Police and was otherwise permitted under the circumstances as a protective-search as there was reason to believe that Defendant was armed and dangerous and may gain control of weapons. The search was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of the search is denied.
Counsel for the State shall prepare an order consistent with this Decision.
ATTORNEYS:
For Plaintiff: Gregory L. Abilheira, Esq.
For Defendant: Christopher T. Millea, Esq.