Decided January 18, 2007. Appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, 383 N.J.Super. 205, 891 A.2d 633, affirmed. Joseph P. Conner, Jr., Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant ( Michael M. Rubbinaccio, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney).
We consider next defendant's contention that his Miranda rights were ineffective and required renewal after he was handcuffed and presumably placed under arrest. We recently addressed when Miranda rights are necessitated in State v. Dispoto, 383 N.J.Super. 205, 891 A.2d 633 (App.Div.), certif. granted, 186 N.J. 358, 895 A.2d 448 (2006).
Defendants did not arrest Plaintiff pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, in which case this Court would afford "substantial deference" to the neutral magistrate's probable cause determination. See State v. Dispoto, 383 N.J. Super. 205, 216 (App. Div. 2006) aff'd as modified, 189 N.J. 108 (2007); Rasmussen v. United States, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173257, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2015). Instead, Defendants made a warrantless arrest of Plaintiff and subsequently prepared a criminal Complaint Warrant.
See Docket No. 73-2, 7. Defendants did not arrest Plaintiff pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, in which case this Court would afford "substantial deference" to the neutral magistrate's probable cause determination. See State v. Dispoto, 383 N.J. Super. 205, 216 (N.J. App. Div. 2006) aff'd as modified, 189 N.J. 108 (N.J. 2007); Rasmussen v. United States, 2015 WL 9581874, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2015). If Plaintiff had been arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant, his § 1983 action for false arrest could only succeed by demonstrating that "(1) that the police officer 'knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant;' and (2) that 'such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.'" Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000).
A magistrate's decision to issue a warrant, especially one valid on its face, should be afforded substantial deference. State v. Dispoto, 383 N.J. Super. 205, 216 (App. Div. 2006) aff'd as modified, 189 N.J. 108 (2007).
ng and change its ruling); Thompson v. Steptoe, 179 W.Va. 199, 202, 366 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1988) (trial court has discretion to reopen hearing on motion to suppress “regardless of whether the evidence is newly discovered or merely omitted at the initial proceeding”); City of Fargo v. Casper, 512 N.W.2d 668, 670 (N.D.1994) (“A trial court's decision to suppress evidence is an interlocutory order and may be reconsidered by the trial court on its own motion or upon motion by the parties.”); State v. Haycock, 139 N.H. 610, 611, 660 A.2d 1115, 1115–16 (1995) (trial court's “discretionary powers are continuous” and it may reconsider earlier ruling on motion to suppress); State v. McClure, 74 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn.Crim.App.2001) (motion to reconsider or reopen proof at suppression hearing is matter of trial court's discretion); State v. Simoneau, 176 Vt. 15, 28, 833 A.2d 1280, 1290 (2003) (trial court has “broad discretion in deciding whether to reopen” hearing on pretrial motion to suppress); State v. Dispoto, 383 N.J.Super. 205, 215, 891 A.2d 633, 639 (App.Div.2006) (pretrial ruling on motion to suppress is interlocutory and trial court has “inherent power” to revise it any time before final judgment in the case); State v. Bozung, 245 P.3d 739, 742–43 (Utah 2011) (trial court has “broad discretion” to revisit pretrial rulings on motions to suppress and should do so liberally). Cf. State v. Herrin, 323 Or. 188, 197, 915 P.2d 953, 958 (1996) (trial court did not abuse its discretionary authority by declining to reopen suppression hearing at State's request); People v. Jackson, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1202–05, 920 P.2d 1254, 1273–75, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 68–70 (1996) (though statute prohibits trial court from revisiting pretrial ruling granting motion to suppress, statute does not speak to trial court's authority to reopen hearing to admit additional evidence in support of its pretrial ruling denying motion to suppress). Our holding that a trial court has the authority to reopen the hearing on a motion to suppress evidence even after trial has begun is
"Abuse and neglect cases 'are fact-sensitive.'" Dep't of Child. & Fams., Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. E.D.-O., 223 N.J. 166, 180 (2015) (quoting Dep't of Child. & Fams., Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. T.B., 207 N.J. 194, 309 (2011)). "An appellate court is not in a good position to judge credibility and should not make new credibility findings." State v. Dispoto, 383 N.J.Super. 205, 217 (App. Div. 2006). "A trial judge has the opportunity to judge the demeanor of the witnesses.
"When reviewing the issuance of a search warrant by another judge, the [motion judge] is required to pay substantial deference to the [issuing] judge's determination." State v. Dispoto, 383 N.J.Super. 205, 216 (App. Div. 2006), affd as modified on other grounds, 189 N.J. 108 (2007)
Where the challenge is to information included in the warrant affidavit, the defendant's burden is significant. See State v. Dispoto, 383 N.J.Super. 205, 216-17 (App. Div. 2006) (explaining that to "be afforded an evidentiary hearing," a defendant must first "'make a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant, either deliberately or with reckless disregard of the truth, failed to apprise the issuing judge of material information which, had it been included in the affidavit, would have militated against issuance of the search warrant'" and "then establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the circumstances giving rise to the hearing did in fact occur" (quoting State v. Sheehan, 217 N.J.Super. 20, 25-26 (App. Div. 1987))), aff'd as modified, 189 N.J. 108 (2007).
"When reviewing the issuance of a search warrant by another judge, the [motion] judge is required to pay substantial deference to the [issuing] judge's determination." State v. Dispoto, 383 N.J.Super. 205, 216 (App. Div. 2006). Where a defendant challenges the veracity of a search warrant affidavit,