Opinion
No. CR07-0223089-T
December 30, 2010
CONSOLIDATED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE AMENDED MOTION TO SUPPRESS TANGIBLE EVIDENCE (#43) MOTION TO SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY (#3) AMENDED MOTION TO SUPPRESS DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS (#44)
The defendant, Christopher DiMeo, stands accused of capital felony and related charges arising out of the murder of the two proprietors of a Fairfield jewelry store on February 2, 2005. The state is seeking the death penalty. Two days after the crime, on February 4, 2005, the defendant was arrested in Atlantic City, New Jersey. At that time, he was interviewed by members of the Fairfield police department as well as the Nassau County New York police department, the Clarkstown New York police department and the Atlantic City police department. The defendant gave statements to all four departments. As part of their investigation, Fairfield police officers conducted an identification procedure with an eyewitness to the crime — William Burke. In addition, Nassau County detectives executed a search warrant for (1) 89-51 121st Street, Richmond Hill, Queens County, New York and (2) a 1999 Honda Passport vehicle, and seized items of evidence.
In the present motions, the defendant seeks to suppress the admission at trial of his statements, William Burke's identification testimony and the items seized pursuant to the New York search warrant. An evidentiary hearing was held on the motions on December 13 and 14, 2010.
Following the hearing, the defense filed a brief in support of the motion to suppress Dimeo's statements. The defense brief does not address either the motion to suppress the identification testimony or the motion to suppress the fruits of the search warrant. The state filed a brief in opposition to the motion to suppress statements.
I
AMENDED MOTION TO SUPPRESS TANGIBLE EVIDENCE (#43)
BACKGROUND
On February 4, 2005 at 7:40 p.m. a New York judge issued a search warrant for premises described as 89-51 121st Street, Richmond Hill, Queens County, New York and a 1999 Honda Passport vehicle. The warrant authorized the police to search for and seize: handguns; ammunition; jewelry; U.S. currency; notes pertaining to the commission of assault, murder or weapons possession; clothing; footwear and biological evidence. The warrant was based on the affidavit of Detective Edward Hoctor of the Nassau County New York police department.
As relevant to the present motion, the affidavit may be summarized as follows: Robert Badalou is the owner of Robert's Jewelry Store 869 Old Country Road, Westbury, New York. He told police that on December 5, 2004 a robbery occurred at his store. The perpetrator was described as a white male in his early twenties who was armed with a handgun. The robber stole a tray of rings and attempted to leave. When he realized that he was locked in the store, he pointed the gun at an employee threatening to kill him if he did not open the door. The perpetrator fled the scene in a dark colored SUV.
Barbara Christenson is an employee of JJ Jewelers, 62 Glen Head Road, Glen Head, New York. She stated that on December 21, 2004, a robbery occurred at the store during which another employee, Thomas Renison, was shot and killed. The perpetrator was described as a white male in his early twenties who fled the store with in excess of $100,000 worth of jewels and diamonds.
On February 3, 2005, police interviewed Mary Taylor who is the mother of Christopher Dimeo. Mary Taylor stated that Dimeo contacted her in November 2004 and told her that he would be arriving from California. She stated that after seeing a television report about the robbery on Old Country Road in Westbury, she asked Dimeo if he was involved and he ultimately admitted involvement. He told her that he threatened them and cocked his gun because they locked him in the store. In late December, Mary Taylor asked Dimeo about his involvement in the Glen Head robbery and he stated "something bad had happened."
Mary Taylor stated that in December 2004, Dimeo and his girlfriend, Nicole, were staying at an apartment in Brooklyn. There she saw a lot of jewelry and a box of large bullets. In December 2004, she pawned a ring for Dimeo for $200. On January 1, 2005, Dimeo and Nicole moved to 89-51 121st Street, Richmond Hill, Queens. Mary Taylor stated that she had been in the Queens apartment three times and discussed with Dimeo his involvement in the robberies and how to get rid of the proceeds. On one occasion, Dimeo told her that he had a flyer printed in order to sell some of the rings and posted it in Brooklyn and Queens. Mary Taylor pointed out the apartment for Detective Hoctor.
Mary Taylor stated that for the past two months Dimeo had been driving a black Honda Passport with California plates that he had stolen from his grandmother. Police determined that on October 9, 2004 a stolen car report was filed for this vehicle.
DISCUSSION
In determining the adequacy of an affidavit in support of a search warrant, the information to establish probable cause must be found within the affidavit's four corners. State v. Colon, 230 Conn. 24, 34 (1994).
"Probable cause to search exists if: (1) there is probable cause to believe that the particular items sought to be seized are connected with criminal activity or will assist in a particular apprehension or conviction . . . and (2) there is probable cause to believe that the items sought to be seized will be found in the place to be searched . . . In determining the existence of probable cause to search, the issuing magistrate assesses all of the information set forth in the warrant affidavit and should make a practical, nontechnical decision whether . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at a particular place . . . Probable cause, broadly defined, [comprises] such facts as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to believe that criminal activity has occurred." State v. Grant, 286 Conn. 499, 510-11, cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 271, 172 L.Ed.2d 200 (2008).
Applying the above principles to the present case, the affidavit provided an adequate showing of probable cause. Specifically, the affidavit would reasonably permit the issuing judge to find the following:
Christopher Dimeo admitted his involvement in the two jewelry store robberies to his mother, Mary Taylor. Mary Taylor had seen a lot of jewelry and a box of large ammunition in the Brooklyn apartment that Dimeo occupied in December 2004. When Dimeo moved to the Queens apartment that was the subject of the search, he continued to discuss getting rid of the proceeds of the crimes — even to the point of posting flyers to sell the stolen rings. As to the Honda Passport, Dimeo drove that vehicle throughout the period when the robberies occurred. A witness described the getaway vehicle used in the Westbury robbery as a dark colored SUV.
From all of the above, there was a fair probability that at the time that the search warrant was issued evidence of the robberies would be at the apartment where Dimeo was residing as well as in the vehicle he was using.
One more point, to contest a search and seizure a defendant must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 (1978). Dimeo lacks standing to contest the search of the Honda vehicle. A person does not possess standing with respect to an illegally possessed or stolen vehicle. LaFave, Israel, King, Kerr, Criminal Procedure, Third Edition § 9.1(d) p. 408.
The motion is denied.
II
MOTION TO SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY (#3)
BACKGROUND
Findings of Fact:
On February 2, 2005, Attorney William Burke was in his office at 1432 Post Road, Fairfield. The office was located above Donnelly's Jewelry Store. While there, Burke heard two series of "pops" and a shriek or scream. Burke went downstairs and out on the sidewalk to investigate. He saw nothing unusual. He then looked inside the jewelry store. It was dark outside but the inside of the store was lit. Burke had a clear view into the store. He saw a man standing behind the counter. The person waved at Burke. Burke stood outside of the store until the man came out. The man did not lock the front door and Burke asked him "Who are you?" The man responded "I'm the uncle." He spoke with what Burke described as a New York accent. The man walked by Burke who was still on the sidewalk in front of the store. Burke then went inside the store and discovered the body of Timothy Donnelly. He then ran back to his office and called 911.
Burke described the suspect as a white male, 5-6" to 5-8" tall, curly hair, medium-stocky build, gray sweatshirt, New York accent. That evening, Burke worked with a police sketch artist and generated a sketch of the suspect. Ex. Q.
Later, Detective Frederick Caruso of the Fairfield police department showed Burke a photo array consisting of nine photos. Ex. R. Caruso did not prepare the photo array and while he presumed that a suspect was in the array, he did not know which photo it was. Caruso did not tell Burke who to pick. He also did not say that a suspect was in the array, and did not tell Burke that he had to pick someone. Caruso also did not tell Burke that a suspect may or may not be in the array.
Burke examined the array for about thirty minutes. He put his initials on the photos of each subject that he eliminated. Burke eliminated all of the photos except number 2 and number 6. Those two most closely resembled the suspect. Caruso said nothing to Burke about those two photos. Photograph number 2 is that of Christopher Dimeo.
After examining the photo array, Burke gave a statement to Caruso. This statement was taken at 12:40 a.m. approximately seven hours after the incident.
DISCUSSION
In examining the identification procedures used by law enforcement officers to determine if they comport with due process, the court's inquiry is two-pronged. State v. Marquez, 291 Conn. 122, 135 (2009). The first question is: was the identification procedure unnecessarily suggestive? If not, the inquiry is over. Id. The second question is: if the procedure was suggestive, was the identification reliable under the totality of the circumstances? Id.
Our Supreme Court has stated: "An out-of-court eyewitness identification should be excluded on the basis of the procedure used to elicit the identification only if the court is convinced that the procedure was so suggestive and otherwise unreliable as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." State v. Marquez, supra, 291 Conn. 142.
In determining whether an array is suggestive, the court should consider (1) the composition of the array and (2) the actions of the police in conducting the procedure. State v. Owens, 38 Conn.App. 801, 804-08 (1995); State v. Reid, 254 Conn. 540, 556-67 (2000). There should be a likeness in the pictures in the array and the suspect's photo should not be prominently displayed. Id. In addition, the police should remain neutral and not indicate that a suspect is in the array. State v. Marquez, supra, 291 Conn. 162-63.
As to the reliability prong, the court must examine the totality of circumstances including the witness's (1) opportunity to view the criminal, (2) degree of attention, (3) prior description, (4) level of certainty and (5) time gap between the crime and the identification. State v. Ledbetter, 275 Conn. 534, 554-56 (2005).
In general, absent a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, the issue of the weight to be given identification testimony is for the jury. State v. Reid, supra, 254 Conn. 555-56.
Applying the above principles to the present case, the court finds that the identification procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive. This court has examined the array (Ex. R) which consists of nine similar looking photographs of young white males. None of the pictures stand out from the others. In particular, the defendant's photo (#2) does not stand out. The photo array is not suggestive. Moreover, the police acted in a neutral fashion in showing the array to Burke. It is true that the police did not adopt the approach suggested by State v. Ledbetter, supra, that the witness be affirmatively told that a suspect may or may not be in the array. This identification procedure, however, was conducted before the release of the Ledbetter decision. Overall, the police did nothing to influence Burke's examination of the array. Significantly, the officer who showed the array to Burke did not prepare the array and did not know which photo depicted the suspect.
Even if the array is deemed suggestive, Burke's identification is reliable. He had a good opportunity to view the subject who initially was inside a well-lit store and later passed him on the sidewalk in front of the store. Burke's attention was focused on the subject because he was acting in a way inconsistent with Timothy Donnelly's business practice, seemed too young to be "the uncle" and left the store without locking the door. His description generally matched the defendant and the photo identification was made within seven hours of his observations. While he only made a resemblance identification that fact does not undermine its reliability.
The motion to suppress the out-of-court identification evidence is denied.
III
AMENDED MOTION TO SUPPRESS DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS (#44)
BACKGROUND
Findings of Fact:
On February 4, 2005, at approximately 11:00 a.m., Christopher Dimeo was located at the Ascot Motel in Atlantic City, New Jersey. He was arrested at approximately 2:45 p.m. on an outstanding New York Violation of Parole warrant and taken to the Atlantic City Police Department headquarters. At that location, Dimeo was interviewed and ultimately gave statements to detectives from the Nassau County New York Police Department, Fairfield, Connecticut Police Department, Clarkstown, New York Police Department and Atlantic City Police Department. At the time of all of these statements, Dimeo was in police custody.
Dimeo was first interviewed by Detective William Brosnan of the Nassau County New York Police Department (hereinafter Nassau County). After being advised of his so-called Miranda rights and waiving same, (Ex. 11) he gave a written signed statement wherein he admitted involvement in the robbery of a jewelry store in Glen Head, New York during which he shot a store employee. Ex. B. The interview concluded at approximately 6:10 p.m. Ex. 12.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
During the two-hour interview with Dimeo, Brosnan noted nothing remarkable about his appearance. Dimeo was responsive to Brosnan's questions and appeared to understand what was happening. In particular, he appeared to understand his right to silence and his right to counsel when they were read aloud to him. During his statement, he was articulate and asked questions pertinent to the situation
Following the interview by the Nassau County detectives, the Fairfield detectives attempted to interview Dimeo. After some brief preliminary conversation, Dimeo stated that he wanted to talk to an attorney. The Fairfield detectives immediately stopped the interview.
Following the initial Fairfield interview, Dimeo was interviewed by the Clarkstown New York (hereinafter Clarkstown) detectives. After executing a Miranda waiver form, he provided a written statement wherein he admitted involvement in a jewelry store robbery in Nanuet, New York. Ex. 16. This statement was completed at approximately 7:16 p.m. Ex. 16.
Detective Sergeant Bernard Cummings from Clarkstown was present during the interview. He described Dimeo as nervous, resigned to his fate and lucid in his thinking. Clarkstown detective William Fritz conducted the actual interview of Dimeo. Dimeo was cooperative and spoke in a matter-of-fact fashion about the robbery. During the interview, Dimeo consumed food and showed no signs of distress. At the time he signed the statement, he expressed no lack of understanding.
At approximately 8:00 p.m., Dimeo was interviewed by members of the Atlantic City New Jersey Police Department (hereinafter Atlantic City). He executed a waiver of his Miranda rights (Ex. 16) and gave the officers an oral statement regarding the narcotics and cash found in the room at the Ascot Motel. Dimeo told the officers that the drugs were his and the $6,640 found hidden in the wall was money he had received from selling jewelry in New York. Ex. D.
At the conclusion of the interview with the Atlantic City officers, Dimeo requested to talk to "the Connecticut cops." Ex. D. The Atlantic City officers left the interview room at 8:28 p.m.
Atlantic City detective Kevin Burrows interviewed Dimeo. Dimeo had no problem talking to him. Dimeo described his heroin habit and showed Burrows bruising on his inner arms. During the interview, Dimeo was upset but oriented. He answered all questions and was cooperative. Dimeo did not exhibit symptoms of heroin withdrawal.
At approximately 8:44 p.m. officers to the Fairfield Connecticut Police Department (hereinafter Fairfield) returned to the interview room pursuant to Dimeo's request. Dimeo signed a waiver of rights form that stated he was willing to answer questions and make a statement. Ex. 17. Thereafter, Dimeo gave a twelve-page signed written statement wherein he admitted robbing a jewelry store in Fairfield, Connecticut during which the shopkeeper tried to grab the gun from him. Ex. J. The statement was completed at 9:55 p.m. Ex. 17.
Fairfield detective Bruce Peterson interviewed Dimeo along with Sergeant Edward Greene. During the question and answer statement, Dimeo knew and understood what he was saying. After the statement was written out, Dimeo made two corrections. He revised the portion of the statement that described the moments just before the shooting and added a remark about his heroin use. He did not appear sick, lethargic or under the influence of drugs. At no time during the interview did Dimeo ask for medical attention.
Each police department asked about the specific crime that each was investigating. That is, Nassau County asked about the Glen Head, New York murder/robbery; Clarkstown asked about the Nanuet robbery; Atlantic City asked about the cash and drugs in the hotel room and Fairfield asked about the Fairfield robbery. Dimeo's admissions were specific as to each of the four departments. At no time was he asked about the parole violation that was the subject of his arrest.
DISCUSSION
It is clear that the defendant was in police custody during all of the February 4, 2005 interviews. It is also clear that he was subjected to custodial interrogation. The court finds that as to each of the four interviews he was advised of and waived his Miranda rights, See State v. Stanley, 223 Conn. 674, 686 (1997) (to be valid, a waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent).
In addition to a waiver of Miranda rights, a statement must also be voluntary to be admissible. The prosecution bears the burden to prove that the defendant's statements were voluntary by a fair preponderance of the evidence. State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 411-26 (1996); State v. Lawrence, 282 Conn. 141, 158-77 (2007) (declining to overrule State v. James). Connecticut law does not require the state to prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
In State v. Pinder, 250 Conn. 385, 418 (1999), our Supreme Court summarized the factors for the court to consider in assessing whether a confession is voluntary. Unlike the federal rule, in Connecticut voluntariness is judged based on the totality of the circumstances. State v. James, supra, 411. Compare Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (exclusionary rule only applies where an involuntary statement is the result of coercive police activity).
The court finds that all of the statements given by Dimeo on February 4, 2005 at the Atlantic City, New Jersey Police Department were voluntary. Indeed, the defense makes no argument that they were not. Dimeo was alert, responsive and gave every indication of understanding what he was doing and voluntarily choosing to speak. There is no indication in the record that his will was overborne by police interrogation tactics, or mistreatment of him. Moreover, as to the Fairfield statement, Dimeo made a correction as to the crucial time just prior to the shooting. This demonstrates his awareness of the impact of the statement and his ability to control what was included.
The defense argument for suppression does not focus on custodial interrogation, Miranda waiver or voluntariness but rather on four different claims: First, that the Nassau County detectives were precluded from interviewing Dimeo under the so-called New York rule. Second, that suppression of the statement given to the Clarkstown detectives and the Atlantic City officers is required under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Third, that the statement to the Fairfield detectives must be suppressed because (1) Dimeo did not reinitiate conduct with them and (2) the "cat was already out of the bag" based on the earlier interviews with Clarkstown and Atlantic City. Fourth, that the failure to electronically record the defendant's statements violated Article 1, § 8 of the Connecticut constitution. Each of these claims will be discussed in turn.
A.
Nassau County
Notwithstanding the defendant's waiver of his rights to counsel and to remain silent, the defense asserts that Dimeo's statement to the Nassau County detectives must be suppressed because his right to counsel had "indeliby" attached. The defendant claims that based on the so-called New York rule, Dimeo could not waive his right to counsel. Accordingly, the defense asserts that the defendant's written admissions regarding the robbery/murder in Glen Head, New York must be suppressed.
The defendant's position in this regard is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, even assuming that Dimeo's statement would be inadmissible in New York based on the interpretation of its own constitution, the defense cites no authority for the proposition that the New York exclusionary rule should apply in Connecticut. Indeed, the case cited by the defense stands for the opposite proposition. See, United States v. Gerena, 667 F.Sup. 911, 925-26 (D.Conn. 1987) (courts look to the law of the place where the conduct occurred to determine its legality, they nevertheless apply their own exclusionary standards in deciding whether or not to suppress the fruits of the illegal conduct).
Second, and more importantly, the Nassau County detectives did not violate New York laws. It is true that, under New York practice, formal proceedings commence upon the issuance of an arrest warrant and a waiver of the right to counsel will not be recognized unless made in the presence of counsel. People v. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d 517, 521 (1990). At one time, New York law provided that a person arrested not only could not waive counsel and answer questions about the arrest charge, but also could not be questioned on any new unrelated charges. People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981). In 1990, however, the New York Court of Appeals overruled Bartolomeo and held that suppression did not apply where defendants had knowingly and voluntarily waived their Miranda rights and police questioned solely on matters unrelated to the prior pending charge. People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 350 (1990).
In the present case, the Nassau County detectives asked Dimeo no questions regarding his parole violation. Their sole focus was on the robbery/murder in Glen Head, New York. As to that matter, Dimeo voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and gave a written statement. Neither the exclusionary rules of New York or Connecticut require suppression of this statement.
B.
Clarkstown, New York
Atlantic City, New Jersey
As stated above, after the defendant was arrested at the Ascot Motel, he was taken to an interview room at the Atlantic City police station. There he was interviewed five times by four police departments. The first interview was by the Nassau County detectives. Thereafter, he was briefly interviewed by officers from Fairfield. This interview was terminated when Dimeo stated that he did not want to talk to the officers and he wanted to talk to an attorney. The Fairfield officers then left the interview room. Following the first Fairfield interview, Dimeo was interviewed by officers from the Clarkstown and the Atlantic City. He was then interviewed a second time by Fairfield officers.
The defense asserts that the statements given to Clarkstown and Atlantic City must be suppressed because they were given after Dimeo stated that he wanted to talk with a lawyer but prior to his initiation of further contact with the Fairfield police. It is noted that (1) there is no evidence that the Clarkstown or Atlantic City officers knew of Dimeo's request for a lawyer, (2) Dimeo voluntarily waived his rights prior to both the Clarkstown and Atlantic City interviews and (3) neither department used any coercive tactics. Despite these facts, the statements must be suppressed.
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Supreme Court held that, "an accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police." Id., 484-85. The fact that Clarkstown and Atlantic City were asking about an investigation separate from Fairfield and did not know of Dimeo's statement about a lawyer does not remove their interviews from the reach of Edwards. In Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), the Supreme Court stated that, "the presumption raised by a suspect's request for counsel — that he considers himself unable to deal with the pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance — does not disappear simply because the police have approached the subject, still in custody, still without counsel, about a separate investigation." Id., 683. The opinion in Roberson further stated that "We attach no significance to the fact that the officer who conducted the second interrogation did not know that respondent had made a request for counsel." Id., 687.
It is true, as the state asserts, that a defendant may make a limited request for counsel that does not bar all further questioning by the police. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987). In Barrett, the accused stated that he would not give the police a written statement without his lawyer, but had no problem talking about the incident. Id., 525. In the present case, Dimeo stated that he did not wish to talk to the Fairfield officers without an attorney. The state argues that Dimeo's statements amounted only to an invocation of the right to counsel that was limited to the Fairfield inquiry. In light of above-quoted language from Arizona v. Roberson, however, a custodial defendant's request for counsel must be given broad interpretation and, unless expressly limited, applies to separate investigations.
The defendant's statements to Clarkstown and Atlantic City are ordered suppressed.
C.
Fairfield, Connecticut
The defense asserts that defendant's written statement to the Fairfield Police officers must be suppressed because (1) Dimeo did not reinitiate contact after his earlier invocation of counsel and (2) at the time he spoke with Fairfield, the "cat was out of the bag" based on his earlier statements to other police departments.
It is clear that an accused in custody who initially invokes the right to counsel may choose thereafter to re-initiate communication with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 486 U.S. 681. In the present case, Dimeo, on his own, told officers from Atlantic City that he wanted to talk to "the Connecticut cops." This re-initiation was confirmed by Fairfield when they spoke to Dimeo the second time. It was only after that, that Fairfield advised Dimeo of his Miranda rights, obtained his waiver of those rights and then took a statement from him.
The Supreme Court has found far less explicit statements to constitute initiation of further conversation. In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983), the defendant was arrested and questioned about a vehicular homicide. The defendant denied involvement and stated "I do want an attorney before it goes very much further." Id., 1041. On the trip from the police station to the county jail, the defendant inquired "What is going to happen to me now?" The court held that through this comment, the defendant initiated further conversation with the police.
In the present case, this court finds that the Fairfield officers scrupulously honored Dimeo's right to cut off questioning — until he re-initiated contact with them. Dimeo's statement to the Fairfield officers that he wanted to "hear what they had to say" represents "exactly the type of inquiry that can fairly be said to represent a desire on the part of the accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly to the investigation." State v. Canales, 281 Conn. 572, 591. The court further finds that following such initiation, Dimeo made a knowing and valid waiver of his right to counsel and right to silence prior to giving a written statement.
The defense assertion that the validity of Dimeo's statement to Fairfield is undermined by the interviews with Clarkstown and Atlantic City is not supported by the facts. First, those two interviews were narrowly focused on the matters under investigation by those departments. At no time was he asked anything about the Fairfield robbery/murders — nor did he volunteer any information on that matter. In other words, there was no "cat ever let out of the bag" as a result of their interviews. Second, while this court has ruled that the statements to Clarkstown and Atlantic City must be suppressed, Dimeo's statements to them were entirely voluntary. At no time did their questioning (which as noted above, was relatively brief and focused) exert coercive pressure on Dimeo to re-initiate contact with Fairfield. The court finds that Dimeo's re-initiation of contact with the Fairfield officers was of his own volition.
The motion to suppress the statement given to the Fairfield officers is denied.
D.
Electronic Recording
The defense claims that Dimeo's statements must be suppressed because the Connecticut constitution requires electronic recording of a custodial suspect's statements. This claim has been rejected by our Supreme Court. State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537, 546-77 (2010); State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 428-34 (1996); State v. LaPointe, 237 Conn. 694, 735, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 994 (1996). This court is bound by those decisions. State v. Warholic, 278 Conn. 354, 384 (2006).
This court notes that, in the present case, the Nassau County detectives provided Dimeo with the opportunity to have his statement recorded on video tape under questioning by an Assistant District Attorney. Dimeo declined to have his statement recorded in this manner. Ex. 12.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the New York search warrant is denied. The motion to suppress the identification testimony of William Burke is denied. The motion to suppress the defendant's statements to the Nassau County New York police and the Fairfield police is denied; the motion to suppress the defendant's statements to the Clarkstown New York police and the Atlantic City New Jersey police is granted.
So Ordered at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 30th day of December 2010.