Such an allocation of risk is peculiarly within the competence of the legislature. The allocation through ORS 652.335 is reasonable as an exercise of the police power or an implementation of Article I, Sec. 39. An incidental regulation in aid of major regulation of a proper subject is valid where it is of reasonable service to the accomplishment of the objects sought to be attained: State v. Dickstein, 1938, 89 N.H. 546, 3 A.2d 115; Perry v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, supra, note 2. The grounds adopted below for a finding of unconstitutionality do not suffice here.
State v. Roberts, 74 N.H. 476, 478. This general rule has been consistently applied in this state in considering the constitutionality of various types of statutes enacted under the police power. Chung Mee v. Healy, 86 N.H. 483, 484; State v. Dickstein, 89 N.H. 546; Chronicle c. Pub. Co. v. Attorney General, 94 N.H. 148. The view that redevelopment projects constitute a valid public purpose for which public funds may be appropriated and the power of eminent domain granted is approved by the overwhelming weight of authority.
The chief issue raised by the plaintiffs is whether the statute "may be found to be of reasonable service towards accomplishing the object sought to be attained." State v. Dickstein, 89 N.H. 546, 547; Richardson v. Beattie, 98 N.H. 71, 77. They contend that the statute is invalid as to them because there is no reasonable connection between the imposition of minimum length requirements on lobster meat from without the state as packaged by them and the enforcement of those requirements as to lobsters from local waters.
On the other hand, if dangerous contamination or a threat thereof exists, there must be a reasonable connection between the regulation and the ends mentioned in the statute, namely protection against the contamination. State v. Ramseyer, 73 N.H. 31, 36; State v. Dickstein, 89 N.H. 546. The prohibition of all human activity in Back Pond as a means of preventing contamination, at best only remotely connected with the activity prohibited, appears to us to be "clearly unreasonable." Carter v. Craig, 77 N.H. 200, 206. It cannot be doubted on the evidence that the private rights of the owners of shore properties would be substantially restricted by the regulation.