Opinion
No. COA12–1353.
2013-05-7
STATE of North Carolina v. Walter Franklin DICKENS.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General John A. Payne, for the State. Russell J. Hollers III for Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 25 April 2012 by Judge Howard E. Manning in Superior Court, Alamance County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 April 2013. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General John A. Payne, for the State. Russell J. Hollers III for Defendant.
McGEE, Judge.
Walter Franklin Dickens (Defendant) was convicted of two counts of solicitation to commit first-degree murder, and one count of solicitation to commit arson. Defendant's wife, Audrey Dickens (Ms. Dickens), checked into a hospital on 28 May 2009 to undergo heart surgery. Ms. Dickens remained in the hospital for about five weeks due to complications resulting from her surgery. Ms. Dickens' sister, Nola Morrison (Ms. Morrison), visited her at the hospital every day. Defendant only visited Ms. Dickens twice during her stay in the hospital. Ms. Morrison testified that Defendant “had an [a]version to hospitals.”
Ms. Morrison testified that Defendant called the hospital on 1 June 2009 and told Ms. Dickens that if she did not come home the next day, he would come to the hospital and kill her. Ms. Morrison then informed hospital staff, who took security measures to ensure that Defendant could not enter the wing of the hospital where Ms. Dickens convalesced. According to Ms. Morrison, Defendant called the hospital a few more times that same day and threatened hospital employees, who then had Defendant arrested. Ms. Morrison testified that Defendant was released on the same day.
Ms. Morrison testified that on 10 June 2009, she took Defendant to an appointment with his psychiatrist, Dr. Jolanta Pucilowska (Dr. Pucilowska), an attending psychiatrist at Alamance Regional Medical Center. Defendant was allowed to visit Ms. Dickens on 24 June 2009, but had to have a security escort with him. Ms. Morrison testified that on 2 July 2002, Defendant's daughter-in-law informed her that Defendant wanted to commit suicide. Defendant's daughter-in-law called the Sheriff's Office. The Sheriff's Office then transported Defendant to Alamance Regional Medical Center where he remained until 4 July 2009.
Ms. Morrison testified that Ms. Dickens was released from the hospital on 6 July 2009, and went to Ms. Morrison's house for rehabilitation. Defendant came to Ms. Morrison's house that same day. Ms. Dickens testified that, during a conversation with Defendant, he told her he wanted her to come home. She replied that she would do so when she could care for herself. Defendant responded by saying, “if you're not coming home, I don't want to live, and if I'm not going to live, neither are you.” Ms. Dickens testified that she never resumed living with Defendant after she got out of the hospital.
Dr. Pucilowska testified that on 4 August 2009, she wrote a letter to Ms. Dickens regarding Defendant. The letter explained that Defendant had become angry with Ms. Dickens because he believed Ms. Dickens and her family were conspiring to “stay away from him.” Though Dr. Pucilowska believed Defendant had resolved his anger towards Ms. Dickens, Dr. Pucilowska encouraged Ms. Dickens to maintain her distance and avoid any direct contact with Defendant.
James Earl Torain (Mr. Torain), Defendant's former coworker, testified that Defendant began contacting him in August 2009 about killing Defendant's wife. Defendant knew that Mr. Torain had served in the Marine Corps as a sniper, and had been in combat in Vietnam. Defendant offered Mr. Torain $10,000.00 to kill Defendant's wife. In order to “brush[ ] [Defendant] off a little longer,” Mr. Torain told Defendant that he would need “to have some help.” Defendant later informed Mr. Torain that he would give him $20,000.00 to kill both Ms. Dickens and Ms. Morrison.
After Defendant visited Mr. Torain's house and called him numerous times, Mr. Torain called the Alamance County Sheriff's Department. He met with Sergeant Jason Payne (Sergeant Payne), who gave him a device to record his conversation with Defendant. Mr. Torain met with Defendant on 20 August 2009, while wearing the concealed recording device. During the meeting, Defendant repeated his request that Mr. Torain kill both Ms. Dickens and Ms. Morrison for $20,000.00. Mr. Torain responded that he needed to bring help and that he would be in contact with Defendant.
A few days later, Mr. Torain brought Sergeant Kenneth Horton (Sergeant Horton) to meet with Defendant, telling Defendant that Sergeant Horton was a friend he had met while in the armed services. Mr. Torain introduced Sergeant Horton as his “trigger man.” Sergeant Payne had fitted both Sergeant Horton and Mr. Torain with concealed recording devices for the meeting. Sergeant Horton testified that during the meeting Defendant asked to have both Ms. Dickens and Ms. Morrison killed, to have Ms. Morrison's house burned down, and to have three cars burned. According to Sergeant Horton, Defendant stated during the meeting that he would pay $20,000.00, along with an additional $3,000.00, if Sergeant Horton needed to purchase a weapon. Sergeant Horton also testified that Defendant offered his entire social security check, worth $1,200.00, in payment. Two or three days later, Sergeant Payne arrested Defendant.
Defendant went to trial on 23 April 2012. Counsel for Defendant informed the trial court that Defendant underwent three evaluations at Dorothea Dix Hospital to determine his competency to stand trial. According to Defendant's counsel, Defendant was found incompetent after the first two evaluations; however, upon a third and more extensive evaluation, Defendant was determined to be competent to stand trial. The trial court entered an order on 10 February 2011, concluding that Defendant was “capable of proceeding herein within the contemplation of N.C.G.S. 15A–1001 et seq.” The trial court incorporated by express reference the report from Dorothea Dix Hospital regarding Defendant's competency to proceed. Defendant was convicted of two counts of solicitation to commit first-degree murder, and was also found guilty of solicitation to commit arson on Ms. Morrison's house. Defendant appeals.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by failing to, sua sponte, conduct a hearing on Defendant's competency to proceed. Though the trial court did hold a hearing on 10 February 2011 to determine Defendant's competency to proceed, Defendant contends the trial court should have conducted another competency hearing immediately before, or during, Defendant's trial. The State argues that the trial court was correct in choosing not to hold another hearing, as there was a lack of evidence to support such a hearing. We agree with the State and find that the trial court did not err when it failed to conduct an additional hearing to evaluate Defendant's competency to proceed.
“[A] person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 113 (1975).
Moreover, pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1001(a) (2011):
No person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner.
“The question of the capacity of the defendant to proceed may be raised at any time on motion by the prosecutor, the defendant, the defense counsel, or the court.” N.C.G.S. § 15A1002 (a) (2011). Indeed, “[w]hen the capacity of the defendant to proceed is questioned, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the defendant's capacity to proceed.” N.C.G.S. § 15A–1002(b) (emphasis added).
“ ‘Evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant’ to a bona fide doubt inquiry.” State v. McRae, 139 N.C.App. 387, 390, 533 S.E.2d 557, 559 (2000) (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 180, 43 L.Ed.2d. at 118). “ ‘There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.’ “ State v. Snipes, 168 N.C.App. 525, 529, 608 S.E.2d 381, 384 (2005) (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 180, 43 L.Ed.2d. at 118).
For example, in State v. Whitted, this Court found that the trial court erred when it failed to inquire, sua sponte, into the defendant's competency. State v. Whitted, 209 N.C.App. 522, 528, 705 S.E.2d 787, 792 (2011). In Whitted, the defendant responded with an “emotional outburst” after the trial court set a $75,000.00 cash bond, informing the trial court that she “did not care whether she got life in prison,” and told the trial court she was guilty, stating, “[t]hat's what you want.” Id. On the third day of trial, the defendant was brought forcibly into court, while handcuffed to a chair after having been tasered. Id. While in court, the defendant “chanted loudly and sang prayers and religious imprecations, refusing to be silent or cooperate with trial proceedings.” Id. When the defendant returned to court for sentencing, she was brought into the courtroom strapped to a gurney, again singing and chanting loudly. Id. This Court concluded that “[i]n light of [the defendant's] history of mental illness, including paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar disorder,” paired with her comments and behavior at trial, there was “substantial evidence” and “a bona fide doubt as to her competency.” Id.
In McRae, the defendant underwent six psychiatric evaluations to determine competency before his trial for first-degree murder. McRae, 139 N.C.App. at 389, 533 S.E.2d at 559. After the first evaluation, a doctor found the defendant competent to stand trial, but noted a risk of relapse. Id. at 390, 533 S.E.2d at 559. The defendant was then found incompetent to stand trial after two subsequent evaluations. Id. at 390, 533 S.E.2d at 560. After a fourth evaluation, doctors determined that the defendant was “currently competent to stand trial,” but recommended that another evaluation be conducted immediately before trial. Id. After the recommended hearing was conducted on the first day of his trial, the defendant was found competent. Id. at 391, 533 S.E.2d at 560. However, the trial ended in a mistrial, and a second trial was scheduled for 11 May 1998. Id. Though the defendant underwent a sixth competency evaluation on 6 May 1998, he was not evaluated again immediately before his second trial. Id. The defendant did not object to the trial court's failure to hold a competency hearing. Id.
The McRae Court opined that “the numerous psychiatric evaluations of defendant's competency that were conducted before trial [paired] with various findings and expressions of concern about the temporal nature of defendant's competency raised a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency at the time of his second trial.” Id. at 391, 533 S.E.2d at 560. Both the time-sensitive nature of the defendant's evaluations, as well as their number and inconsistency, informed this Court's determination that the defendant's failure to request a hearing did not bar him from seeking relief on appeal, even where the defendant did not request a competency hearing or object when the trial court failed to hold a competency hearing. Id. Consequently, this Court remanded the case for a determination of the defendant's competency at the time of trial. Id.
In the present case, neither Defendant's behavior nor his psychiatric evaluations required the trial court to sua sponte initiate a hearing regarding his competency. Though Defendant had difficulty remembering details during his testimony, stated that he was framed, and denied that his voice was on the tape-recording made by Mr. Torain, his behavior at trial did not rise to a level that would cause the trial court to halt proceedings sua sponte and begin a hearing as to Defendant's competency.
Furthermore, Defendant's past evaluations did not raise a bona fide doubt as to his competency to stand trial. Defendant underwent three evaluations, rather than six, as in McRae. McRae, 139 N.C.App. at 390–91, 533 S.E.2d at 560. Though the evaluations are not contained in the record, Defendant's counsel indicated at trial that Defendant underwent two preliminary evaluations where he was found not competent to proceed. Assuming, arguendo, that there actually were two prior evaluations finding Defendant incompetent to stand trial, Defendant's counsel indicated that, “upon a third time after [a] more extensive stay, the psychiatrist determined he wasn't incompetent. He was just kind of strange.” There is also no evidence that these evaluations were time-sensitive, meaning there was no indication that Defendant's condition was likely to change over time. Finally, Defendant's behavior at trial did not indicate that he had become incompetent between his psychiatric evaluation and his trial.
No error. Judges GEER and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).