State v. Diaz

30 Citing cases

  1. State v. Rushing

    103 N.M. 333 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that double jeopardy principles did not prevent resentencing in part because the defendant had made misrepresentations at the original sentencing and in part because the defendant had not commenced serving the original, oral sentence

    The trial judge had authority to change the orally-pronounced sentence prior to entry of written judgment and sentence. State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501 (1983). An oral pronouncement is not a final judgment and is subject to change until reduced to writing.

  2. Pritchard v. Halliburton Services

    104 N.M. 102 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 8 times
    In Pritchard, the court held that introduction of supplemental medical bills in a second hearing should be prima facie evidence of the reasonableness and necessity of those bills, so long as they relate to the same injury at issue in the prior hearing.

    The trial court may change its mind. State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 429, 83 L.Ed.2d 356 (1984). The same can be said of a prepared but unsigned decision.

  3. State v. Enfinger

    222 Mont. 438 (Mont. 1986)   Cited 10 times
    In Enfinger, this Court relied on and quoted from a New Mexico case that held "[i]t is well established that an oral ruling by the trial court is not a final judgment, and that the trial court can change such ruling at any time before the entry of written judgment."

    "It is well established that an oral ruling by the trial court is not a final judgment, and that the trial court can change such ruling at any time before the entry of written judgment." State v. Diaz (1983), 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501, 502. This Court has never explicitly adopted the Diaz rule but we implicitly stated the same rule in Wilkinson v. State (Mont.

  4. State v. Bernal

    106 N.M. 117 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 11 times
    Discussing question in terms of double jeopardy

    See SCRA 1986, 5-111. Defendant contends that a sentence is not final unless reduced to writing and cites State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 429, 83 L.Ed.2d 356 (1984). We agree.

  5. State ex Rel. Rivera v. Conway

    741 P.2d 1380 (N.M. 1987)   Cited 1 times

    Those cases which relied on statutory provisions or case law recognizing oral or written memoranda rulings or unfiled, non-documentary, decisions simply do not apply to our long-standing requirements for filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, followed by a filed written judgment to establish a judicial determination that then becomes a final judgment. See State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501 (1983); Navajo Development Corp. v. Ruidoso Land Sales Co., 91 N.M. 142, 571 P.2d 409 (1977). Until that is done, intervening circumstances may require the judge to reconsider and change the tentative decision.

  6. State v. Miranda

    108 N.M. 789 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that when presentence confinement relates to more than one pending case, when those cases yield consecutively imposed sentences, any presentence confinement credit given is "not to be multiplied by the number of different sentences imposed"

    This determination is because defendant's confinement ceased to be pre-sentence confinement once the original judgment and sentence was filed on November 30 and became final. See State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 429, 83 L.Ed.2d 356 (1984). Confinement Due To "Bind Over" in Case Two

  7. State v. Watchman

    111 N.M. 727 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 12 times
    Explaining that whether to order a diagnostic commitment is within the trial court's discretion

    Any question regarding the court's intention on this issue was resolved by the court's written judgment. State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501 (1983) (oral pronouncement of sentence is not a final judgment; in reviewing sentence appellate court guided by written judgment), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 429, 83 L.Ed.2d 356 (1984). See also State v. Bernal, 106 N.M. 117, 739 P.2d 986 (Ct.App. 1987) (oral statement of court contained in record indicating reasons for alteration of basic sentence may suffice to permit meaningful appellate review); State v. Muzio, 105 N.M. 352, 355, 732 P.2d 879, 882 (Ct.App. 1987) (written order or judgment signed by the court is legally effective to implement the court's ruling).

  8. State v. Mason

    253 Mont. 419 (Mont. 1992)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that defendant was not placed in double jeopardy when he was later returned to the courtroom on the same day for the trial court to amend its oral pronouncement and designate him as a dangerous offender because the oral judgment was not a final, valid judgment

    "It is well established that an oral ruling by the trial court is not a final judgment, and that the trial court can change such ruling at any time before the entry of written judgment." Enfinger, 722 P.2d at 1174 (quoting State v. Diaz (N.M. 1983), 673 P.2d 501, 502). The oral sentence pronounced by the District Court was not a final or valid judgment.

  9. State v. Graveley

    275 Mont. 519 (Mont. 1996)   Cited 11 times

    In Enfinger, this Court relied on and quoted from a New Mexico case that held "[i]t is well established that an oral ruling by the trial court is not a final judgment, and that the trial court can change such ruling at any time before the entry of written judgment." Enfinger, 722 P.2d at 1174 (quoting State v. Diaz (N.M. 1983), 673 P.2d 501, 502, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 429, 83 L.Ed.2d 356). Montana is the only state that has cited Diaz.

  10. State v. Lane

    288 Mont. 286 (Mont. 1998)   Cited 64 times
    Holding that when there is a conflict between an orally pronounced sentence and its written manifestation, the oral pronouncement controls

    We relied on and quoted from a New Mexico case that held "[i]t is well established that an oral ruling by the trial court is not a final judgment, and that the trial court can change such ruling at any time before the entry of written judgment." Enfinger, 222 Mont. at 444, 722 P.2d at 1174 (quoting State v. Diaz (1983), 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501, 502, cert. denied (1984), 469 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 429, 83 L.Ed.2d 356). ΒΆ 25 In State v. Wirtala (1988), 231 Mont. 264, 752 P.2d 177, we relied on Enfinger and held that "[t]he oral sentence first pronounced by the District Court did not constitute a final judgment.