The general rule in New Mexico is that an oral ruling by a trial court is not final and, with only limited exceptions, it is not binding. State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 525, 673 P.2d 501, 502 (1983) ("It is well established that an oral ruling by the trial court is not a final judgment, and that the trial court can change such ruling at any time before the entry of written judgment."). There are limited exceptions to this general rule, such as for oral declarations of mistrial, State v. Reyes-Arreola, 1999-NMCA-086, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 528, 984 P.2d 775, and the oral granting of a new trial, State v. Ratchford, 115 N.M. 567, 570-71, 855 P.2d 556, 559-60 (1993).

It cannot be appealed from and is subject to change until reduced to writing and filed with the clerk.State v. Diaz, 673 P.2d 501, 502 (N.M. 1983). As discussed above, the state district judge made and retracted the initial sentence of two-and-a-half years after Knotts signed the Plea Agreement. The sentence was not part of the Plea Agreement, and therefore raises a question of state law: namely, was the sentence lawfully imposed? The state district judge's oral pronouncement on June 4, 2012, did not constitute a final judgment and could be changed at any time before the entry of written judgment.

We relied on and quoted from a New Mexico case that held "[i]t is well established that an oral ruling by the trial court is not a final judgment, and that the trial court can change such ruling at any time before the entry of written judgment." Enfinger, 222 Mont. at 444, 722 P.2d at 1174 (quoting State v. Diaz (1983), 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501, 502, cert. denied (1984), 469 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 429, 83 L.Ed.2d 356). ¶ 25 In State v. Wirtala (1988), 231 Mont. 264, 752 P.2d 177, we relied on Enfinger and held that "[t]he oral sentence first pronounced by the District Court did not constitute a final judgment.

We recognize that some New Mexico precedent invokes the "well[-]established" rule that "the trial court can change [an oral sentence] at any time before the entry of written judgment." State v. Diaz , 1983-NMSC-090, ¶ 4, 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501. But cf. 6 LaFave, supra , § 26.4(d) ("Unfortunately, it is not unusual for a trial judge to announce one sentence and enter another.

In Enfinger, this Court relied on and quoted from a New Mexico case that held "[i]t is well established that an oral ruling by the trial court is not a final judgment, and that the trial court can change such ruling at any time before the entry of written judgment." Enfinger, 722 P.2d at 1174 (quoting State v. Diaz (N.M. 1983), 673 P.2d 501, 502, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 429, 83 L.Ed.2d 356). Montana is the only state that has cited Diaz.

"It is well established that an oral ruling by the trial court is not a final judgment, and that the trial court can change such ruling at any time before the entry of written judgment." State v. Diaz (1983), 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501, 502. This Court has never explicitly adopted the Diaz rule but we implicitly stated the same rule in Wilkinson v. State (Mont.

C. Defendant's Remaining Argument {15} Citing State v. Diaz , 1983-NMSC-090, ¶ 4, 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501, Defendant also contends that the district court lacked authority to amend the sentence because he had an "expectation of finality" in the original sentence and the district court amended it after he had served two years of it. Diaz does not help Defendant's cause. While it holds that an oral ruling, including an oral pronouncement of sentence, is not a final judgment and can be changed at any time before entry of final judgment, id. ¶ 6, it does not address at all, much less hold, that a clerical error in a final judgment cannot be corrected pursuant to Rule 5-113(B).

We see no basis on which to conclude that the district court abused its discretion. See State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 525, 673 P.2d 501, 502 (1983); State v. Rushing, 103 N.M. 333, 335, 706 P.2d 875, 877 (Ct.App.1985). CONCLUSION

We see no basis on which to conclude that the district court abused its discretion. See State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 525, 673 P.2d 501, 502 (1983); State v. Rushing, 103 N.M. 333, 335, 706 P.2d 875, 877 (Ct. App. 1985). CONCLUSION

State v. House, 2001-NMCA-011, ¶ 10, 130 N.M. 418, 25 P.3d 257. In contrast, while a matter is pending before the district court, a district court may change its mind at any time prior to entry of the final ruling. State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 525, 673 P.2d 501, 502 (1983); State v. Doe, 99 N.M. 460, 463, 659 P.2d 912, 915 (Ct.App. 1983). Thus, the fact that the trial court initially entered a stipulated order allowing Brown access to "all services" did not preclude it from reversing that ruling upon full briefing and argument when the matter was later contested.