It cannot be appealed from and is subject to change until reduced to writing and filed with the clerk.State v. Diaz, 673 P.2d 501, 502 (N.M. 1983). As discussed above, the state district judge made and retracted the initial sentence of two-and-a-half years after Knotts signed the Plea Agreement. The sentence was not part of the Plea Agreement, and therefore raises a question of state law: namely, was the sentence lawfully imposed? The state district judge's oral pronouncement on June 4, 2012, did not constitute a final judgment and could be changed at any time before the entry of written judgment.

Under New Mexico law, an "oral pronouncement is not a final judgment and is subject to change until reduced to writing." State v. Rushing, 103 N.M. 333, 334, 706 P.2d 875, 876 (N.M.App.) (citing State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1016 (1984)), cert. denied, 103 N.M. 344, 707 P.2d 552 (1985). As of December 1, 2000, Judge Mark Maracon was assigned both of the cases.

In Enfinger, this Court relied on and quoted from a New Mexico case that held "[i]t is well established that an oral ruling by the trial court is not a final judgment, and that the trial court can change such ruling at any time before the entry of written judgment." Enfinger, 722 P.2d at 1174 (quoting State v. Diaz (N.M. 1983), 673 P.2d 501, 502, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 429, 83 L.Ed.2d 356). Montana is the only state that has cited Diaz.

Until entry of a final judgment, the district court judge was not precluded from changing his mind [MIO 23], as he did, and concluding that O'Brien was entitled to an award of costs as the prevailing party. See State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 525, 673 P.2d 501, 502 (1983) (recognizing that while a matter is pending before the district court, a district court may change its mind at any time prior to entry of the final ruling); see also Levenson v. Haynes, 1997-NMCA-020, ¶ 10, 123 N.M. 106, 934 P.2d 300 (providing that orders entered before a final judgment are interlocutory and as such the district court may revise or rescind such orders at any time before entry of final judgment). We again take notice of the proceedings from O'Brien I [RP Vol.26/6251], and refer to the district court's September 16, 2010, final judgment, which provides that "[t]he issue of costs based on Rule 1-068 [NMRA] Offers of Settlement shall be determined by separate motion and/or cost bill."

We see no basis on which to conclude that the district court abused its discretion. See State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 525, 673 P.2d 501, 502 (1983); State v. Rushing, 103 N.M. 333, 335, 706 P.2d 875, 877 (Ct.App.1985). CONCLUSION

We see no basis on which to conclude that the district court abused its discretion. See State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 525, 673 P.2d 501, 502 (1983); State v. Rushing, 103 N.M. 333, 335, 706 P.2d 875, 877 (Ct. App. 1985). CONCLUSION

State v. House, 2001-NMCA-011, ¶ 10, 130 N.M. 418, 25 P.3d 257. In contrast, while a matter is pending before the district court, a district court may change its mind at any time prior to entry of the final ruling. State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 525, 673 P.2d 501, 502 (1983); State v. Doe, 99 N.M. 460, 463, 659 P.2d 912, 915 (Ct.App. 1983). Thus, the fact that the trial court initially entered a stipulated order allowing Brown access to "all services" did not preclude it from reversing that ruling upon full briefing and argument when the matter was later contested.