It cannot be appealed from and is subject to change until reduced to writing and filed with the clerk.State v. Diaz, 673 P.2d 501, 502 (N.M. 1983). As discussed above, the state district judge made and retracted the initial sentence of two-and-a-half years after Knotts signed the Plea Agreement. The sentence was not part of the Plea Agreement, and therefore raises a question of state law: namely, was the sentence lawfully imposed? The state district judge's oral pronouncement on June 4, 2012, did not constitute a final judgment and could be changed at any time before the entry of written judgment.

Under New Mexico law, an "oral pronouncement is not a final judgment and is subject to change until reduced to writing." State v. Rushing, 103 N.M. 333, 334, 706 P.2d 875, 876 (N.M.App.) (citing State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1016 (1984)), cert. denied, 103 N.M. 344, 707 P.2d 552 (1985). As of December 1, 2000, Judge Mark Maracon was assigned both of the cases.

"It is well established that an oral ruling by the trial court is not a final judgment, and that the trial court can change such ruling at any time before the entry of written judgment." Enfinger, 722 P.2d at 1174 (quoting State v. Diaz (N.M. 1983), 673 P.2d 501, 502). The oral sentence pronounced by the District Court was not a final or valid judgment.

{¶8} We first note that the general rule in New Mexico is that an oral ruling by a trial court is not final and, with only limited exceptions, it is not binding. See State v. Diaz, 1983-NMSC-090, ¶ 4, 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501 ("It is well established that an oral ruling by the trial court is not a final judgment, and that the trial court can change such ruling at any time before the entry of written judgment."); State v. Rushing, 1985-NMCA-091, ¶ 6, 103 N.M. 333, 706 P.2d 875 ("An oral pronouncement is not a final judgment and is subject to change until reduced to writing."). In this case, the tape logs reflect that the district court made an oral ruling indicating an intention to reduce Defendant's sentence, but the record is not clear as to why that did not happen. Defendant asserts that it is because trial counsel failed to timely submit a written order

This Court's calendar notice proposed to affirm on grounds that Defendant had effective assistance of counsel; the sentence imposed was not illegal because the plea agreement provided for the maximum allowable sentence for each charge; the plea agreement was entered into knowingly and voluntarily after a lengthy discussion with trial counsel of the consequences of his plea; and the sentence was legal because the trial court's indication that it was merely considering running the sentences concurrently was not a final judgment. See State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 525, 673 P.2d 501, 502 (1983) ("It is well established that an oral ruling by the trial court is not a final judgment[] and that the trial court can change such ruling at any time before the entry of written judgment."). Defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to the proposed disposition and also moved to amend the docketing statement.

State v. House, 2001-NMCA-011, ¶ 10, 130 N.M. 418, 25 P.3d 257. In contrast, while a matter is pending before the district court, a district court may change its mind at any time prior to entry of the final ruling. State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 525, 673 P.2d 501, 502 (1983); State v. Doe, 99 N.M. 460, 463, 659 P.2d 912, 915 (Ct.App. 1983). Thus, the fact that the trial court initially entered a stipulated order allowing Brown access to "all services" did not preclude it from reversing that ruling upon full briefing and argument when the matter was later contested.