State v. Diamond

10 Citing cases

  1. Broadbent v. Gibson

    105 Utah 53 (Utah 1943)   Cited 33 times
    In Broadbent, this Court held unconstitutional what purported to be a general Sunday closing law because the statute had so many exceptions to the general rule that the statute actually constituted "a grant of a special privilege to the excepted classes" without a legal excuse for not granting the same privilege to others.

    Such statutes have been uniformly upheld. State v. Sopher, supra; Strand Amusement Co. v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 48, 43 S.W.2d 321; State v. Haining, 131 Kan. 14 854, 293 P. 952; Stollenwerck v. State, 201 Ala. 392, 78 So. 454; State v. Medlin, 170 N.C. 682, 86 S.E. 597; Ness v. Ennis, 162 Md. 529, 160 A. 8; State v. Diamond, 56 N.D. 854, 219 N.W. 831; State v. Nicholls, 77 Or. 415, 151 P. 473; see also collection of cases in Elliott v. State, 29 Ariz. 389, 242 P. 340, 46 A.L.R. 290, and Mt. Vernon v. Julian, 369 Ill. 447, 17 N.E.2d 52, 119 A.L.R. 752. Although these statutes had their origin in religious observance of the Sabath, they are not now to be so regarded. Their purpose is to protect society by establishing a compulsory day of rest. The cases last cited uphold 15 this as a valid exercise of the police power.

  2. McGowan v. Maryland

    366 U.S. 420 (1961)   Cited 2,665 times
    Holding that appellants fined $5 plus costs had standing to assert an Establishment Clause challenge

    Norfolk Western R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 93 Va. 749, 24 S.E. 837 (1896) (statute prohibiting operation of railroads held sustainable as exercise of police power); State v. Nichols, 28 Wn. 628, 69 P. 372 (1902); City of Seattle v. Gervasi, 144 Wn. 429, 258 P. 328 (1927) (comprehensive ordinance found authorized by police power). See also Kreider v. State, 103 Ark. 438, 440, 147 S.W. 449, 450 (1912); State v. Miller, 68 Conn. 373, 377-378, 36 A. 795, 796 (1896); State v. Diamond, 56 N.D. 854, 857-858, 219 N.W. 831, 832-833 (1928); Rich v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 445, 449, 453, 94 S.E.2d 549, 552, 555 (1956). Compare Pacesetter Homes, Inc., v. Village of South Holland, 18 Ill.2d 247, 163 N.E.2d 464 (1960), admitting legislative power to prohibit Sunday activity disturbing to the community, but striking down a blanket closing ordinance with virtually none of the usual exceptions as too extreme to be justified under this rationale.

  3. State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc.

    144 N.W.2d 749 (N.D. 1966)   Cited 42 times
    In Gamble Skogmo, a discount store charged with selling merchandise in violation of the Sunday closing law, identified other violators and argued that the failure to prosecute those offenders proved selective enforcement against it. 144 N.W.2d at 765.

    While I fully concur in the well-written opinion of the majority in this case, and although I realize that the appellant has not urged that the designation of a day of rest is not a proper exercise of the police power of the State, I do believe it is well to point out, in addition to what has been said by the majority, that the principle which permits the doing of certain work and business on the first day of the week, and which prohibits the doing of other work on that day, is that the State, as the sovereign and in the exercise of its police power, does have the absolute right to prescribe a day of rest in the interests of the health and morals of its people. State v. Diamond, 56 N.D. 854, 219 N.W. 831. It may be true that any other day would be as suitable as the first day of the week as such day of rest. But the State of North Dakota, through its Legislative Assembly, has the right to designate which day shall be observed as the day of rest.

  4. State v. Shuster

    145 A.2d 196 (Conn. 1958)   Cited 7 times

    The defendant can be adversely affected only if his competitors are granted privileges he does not have. The statute is uniform in its operation and does not, in this respect, violate constitutional requirements. State v. Hurliman, supra, 508; Gundaker Central Motors, Inc. v. Gassert, 23 N.J. 71, 80, 127 A.2d 566; State v. Grabinski, 33 Wash.2d 603, 607, 206 P.2d 1022; State v. Diamond, 56 N.D. 854, 858, 219 N.W. 831. The defendant claims that the classification excluding the sale of antiques from the bar of the statute is unreasonable. He argues that there is no substantial difference between the merchandise of an antique dealer and modern household furnishings, whether or not they are reproductions of antiques, which is germane to the subject and purposes of the legislation and could conceivably constitute a valid reason for permitting the sale of an antique on Sunday while prohibiting the sale of its modern counterpart.

  5. Kirk v. Olgiati

    203 Tenn. 1 (Tenn. 1957)   Cited 12 times
    Banning classes of businesses

    Such statutes have been uniformly upheld. State v. Sopher, 25 Utah 318, 1 P. 482, 60 L.R.A. 468, 95 Am. St.Rep. 845; Strand Amusement Co. v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 48, 43 S.W.2d 321; State v. Haining, 131 Kan. 854, 293 P. 952; Stollenwerck v. State, 201 Ala. 392, 78 So. 454; State v. Medlin, 170 N.C. 682, 86 S.E. 597; Ness v. Ennis, 162 Md. 529, 160 A. 8; State v. Diamond, 56 N.D. 854, 219 N.W. 831; State v. Nicholls, 77 Or. 415, 151 P. 473; and many others that could be found, and particularly that of City of Mt. Vernon v. Julian, 369 Ill. 447, 17 N.E.2d 52, 119 A.L.R. 747, 752, to which we will hereinafter refer. The main question argued, and ably so, in this case is whether or not this ordinance is unreasonable and arbitrary so as to unconstitutionally discriminate between persons similarly situated.

  6. State v. Hurliman

    123 A.2d 767 (Conn. 1956)   Cited 23 times
    Upholding Sunday closing law drawing distinctions between type of items that may be sold

    In our statute all dealers in any particular item of merchandise are treated alike. Cases in which legislation similar to ours has been held valid are Petit v. Minnesota, supra; Ness v. Supervisors of Elections, 162 Md. 529, 538, 160 A. 8; People v. Friedman, 302 N.Y. 75, 80, 96 N.E.2d 184; State v. Diamond, 56 N.D. 854, 855, 219 N.W. 831; Seattle v. Gervasi, 144 Wash. 429, 433, 258 P. 328. The defendant also claims that 2492c is vague in its definition of the crime for which it imposes a penalty and therefore contravenes the due process of law clause in 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. It is, of course, true that due process requires that a penal statute "be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties."

  7. Humphrey Chevrolet, Inc. v. Evanston

    131 N.E.2d 70 (Ill. 1955)   Cited 17 times
    In Humphrey Chevrolet, this court approved an ordinance which excepted the sale of food and drink to be consumed on the seller's premises.

    (See City of Mt. Vernon v. Julian, 369 Ill. 447.) (3) That which prohibits all business activities but exempts the sale of certain commodities from the operation of the law, such as the instant ordinance which is commonly referred to as a "commodity type" ordinance. While this court has never been called upon to determine the validity of this "commodity type" legislation, such enactments have been consistently upheld in other jurisdictions. (See: State v. Diamond, 56 N.D. 854; City of Seattle v. Gervasi, 144 Wn. 429; Ness v. City of Baltimore, 162 Md. 529; State v. Justus, 91 Minn. 447; People v. Zimmerman, 95 N.Y. Supp. 136; Theisen v. McDavid, 34 Fla. 440; People v. Kratkiewicz, 238 Mich. 644; State v. Grabinski, 33 Wn.2d 603. Cf. Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53.) Actually, in some instances laws directed solely against automobile dealers have been sustained. Rosenbaum v. City of Denver, 102 Colo. 530; Irishman's Lot v. Cleary, 338 Mich. 662.

  8. State v. Grabinski

    33 Wn. 2d 603 (Wash. 1949)   Cited 17 times

    No agreement is to be expected between different individuals as to what items should be sold on the day of rest, and it is generally held that the legislature has the right to designate the articles which can be legally sold on that day. Seattle v. Gervasi, supra; State v. Diamond, 56 N.D. 854, 219 N.W. 831; State ex rel. Hoffman v. Justus, 91 Minn. 447, 98 N.W. 325, 64 L.R.A. 510, 103 Am. St. 521, 1 Ann. Cas. 91. Accord: Ness v. Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore, 162 Md. 529, 160 A. 8; Ex parte Johnson, 77 Okla. Crim. 360, 141 P.2d 599. See, also, annotations, 46 A.L.R. 290, 119 A.L.R. 752.

  9. Gronlund v. Salt Lake City

    113 Utah 284 (Utah 1948)   Cited 20 times

    The courts point out that any one can sell any one of the exempted commodities and that there is, therefore, no discrimination as long as the legislature stays within proper limits in providing for exceptions." State v. Diamond, 56 N.D. 854, 219 N.W. 831, 833; Theisen v. McDavid, 34 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321, 26 L.R.A. 234; City of Seattle v. Gervasi, 144 Wn. 429, 258 P. 328; State v. Dolan, 13 Idaho 693, 92 P. 995, 14 L.R.A., N.S., 1259. See note in 46 A.L.R. 292, and 119 A.L.R. 752.

  10. State v. Diamond

    219 N.W. 834 (N.D. 1928)

    PER CURIAM. It is stipulated that this case is controlled by the determination of the issues in the case of State v. Isaak Diamond, ante, 854, 219 N.W. 831, argued at this term. The information is based on the same statute, there was a demurrer which was sustained, and an appeal from the order.