Second, we leave for another day whether the filing of a pro se motion to reconsider a sentence should ever constitute a procedural default. The court of appeals relied on its decision in State v. Devore, 416 S.C. 115, 784 S.E.2d 690 (Ct. App. 2016). In Devore, the court of appeals found a post-trial motion filed pro se by a convicted defendant represented by counsel was a procedural default, and dismissed a subsequent appeal as untimely.
Second, we leave for another day whether the filing of a pro se motion to reconsider a sentence should ever constitute a procedural default. The court of appeals relied on its decision in State v. Devore, 416 S.C. 115, 784 S.E.2d 690 (Ct. App. 2016). In Devore, the court of appeals found a post-trial motion filed pro se by a convicted defendant represented by counsel was a procedural default, and dismissed a subsequent appeal as untimely.
, the Court surmises the denial was based on that court's disallowance of “substantive documents, with the exception of motions to relieve counsel, filed pro se by a party who is represented by counsel.” State v. Devore, 784 S.E.2d 690, 693 (S.C. Ct. App. 2016).
See Mangal v. State, 805 S.E.2d 568, 576 (S.C. 2017) (“All applicants are entitled to a full and fair opportunity to present claims in one PCR application.”) (citations omitted); State v. Devore, 784 S.E.2d 690, 692 (S.C. Ct. App. 2016) (reciting state rule that convicts must serve notice of appeal within ten days of sentencing, and stating appellate courts have no jurisdiction over any appeal not served within that deadline). Petitioner attempted both avenues.
Appellant also submitted into evidence transcript excerpts from unrelated court proceedings and described in detail how her involvement in numerous litigation endeavors has disrupted her life.Miller v. State, 388 S.C. 347, 347, 697 S.E.2d 527 (2010) ( "Since there is no right to ‘hybrid representation’ that is partially pro se and partially by counsel, substantive documents, with the exception of motions to relieve counsel, filed pro se by a person represented by counsel are not to be accepted unless submitted by counsel.") (citing State v. Stuckey, 333 S.C. 56, 508 S.E.2d 564 (1998) ; Foster v.State, 298 S.C. 306, 379 S.E.2d 907 (1989) ); State v. Devore, 416 S.C. 115, 120–21, 784 S.E.2d 690, 693 (Ct. App. 2016) (observing there is no right to hybrid representation under either the United States or South Carolina constitution and explaining substantive documents submitted pro se by litigants who are represented by counsel should not be accepted by the clerk of court for filing); see also Jones v. State, 348 S.C. 13, 14, 558 S.E.2d 517, 517–18 (2002) (holding "counsel cannot serve as a mere conduit for pro se documents in an effort to avoid the prohibition against hybrid representation and the displeasure of his client"); id. ("Tails should not wag dogs. Merely because an appellant believes that the irrelevant is relevant is no reason to turn the system on its head and solemnly contemplate the wisdom of a person who does not have the sense to be guided by experts in an area where he himself possesses no expertise.
Accordingly, we dismiss Husband's appeal as to these issues. See State v. Devore, 416 S.C. 115, 123-24, 784 S.E.2d 690, 694-95 (Ct. App. 2016) (dismissing appellant's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction because a proper and timely notice of appeal was not filed). 2.
Accordingly, we dismiss 3 Husband's appeal as to these issues. See State v. Devore, 416 S.C. 115, 123-24, 784 S.E.2d 690, 694-95 (Ct. App. 2016) (dismissing appellant's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction because a proper and timely notice of appeal was not filed). 2.
Nancy Bloodgood, of Bloodgood & Sanders, LLC, of Mount Pleasant, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General John Benjamin Aplin, both of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Daniel Hieronymus appeals the circuit court's dismissal of his appeal from magistrate court, arguing the circuit court erred by (1) ruling a ticket issued by the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) was criminal in nature and (2) dismissing his appeal as untimely. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Fairey, 374 S.C. 92, 106, 646 S.E.2d 445, 452 (Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing "an unchallenged ruling, right or wrong, is the law of the case"); State v. Devore, 416 S.C. 115, 119, 784 S.E.2d 690, 692 (Ct. App. 2016) ("The requirement of service of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional, i.e., if a party misses the deadline, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal and has no authority or discretion to 'rescue' the delinquent party by extending or ignoring the deadline for service of the notice." (quoting USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clegg, 377 S.C. 643, 651, 661 S.E.2d 791, 795 (2008))); S.C. Code Ann. § 18-3-30(A) (2014) ("The appellant, within ten days after sentence [in the magistrate court], shall file notice of appeal with the clerk of circuit court and shall serve notice of appeal upon the magistrate who tried the case and upon the designated agent for the prosecuting agency or attorney who prosecuted the charge, stating the grounds upon which the appeal is founded.").
Daniel Hieronymus appeals the circuit court's dismissal of his appeal from magistrate court, arguing the circuit court erred by (1) ruling a ticket issued by the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) was criminal in nature and (2) dismissing his appeal as untimely. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Fairey, 374 S.C. 92, 106, 646 S.E.2d 445, 452 (Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing "an unchallenged ruling, right or wrong, is the law of the case"); State v. Devore, 416 S.C. 115, 119, 784 S.E.2d 690, 692 (Ct. App. 2016) ("The requirement of service of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional, i.e., if a party misses the deadline, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal and has no authority or discretion to 'rescue' the delinquent party by extending or ignoring the deadline for service of the notice." (quoting USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clegg, 377 S.C. 643, 651, 661 S.E.2d 791, 795 (2008))); S.C. Code Ann. § 18-3-30(A) (2014) ("The appellant, within ten days after sentence [in the magistrate court], shall file notice of appeal with the clerk of circuit court and shall serve notice of appeal upon the magistrate who tried the case and upon the designated agent for the prosecuting agency or attorney who prosecuted the charge, stating the grounds upon which the appeal is founded.").
PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Devore, 416 S.C. 115, 118-19, 784 S.E.2d 690, 692 (Ct. App. 2016) (holding defendant's pro se letter requesting a mistrial was a substantive document filed while he was represented by counsel, and thus letter was improper "hybrid representation" and a legal nullity that could not be accepted as a proper notice of appeal or a post-trial motion); Jackson v. Speed, 326 S.C. 289, 306, 486 S.E.2d 750, 759 (1997) ("[I]t is the responsibility of trial counsel to preserve issues for appellate review."). AFFIRMED.