Opinion
I.D. No. 0310004348.
Submitted: February 20, 2004.
Decided: March 3, 2004.
Upon Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings. Denied.
Robert J. O'Neill, Jr., Esquire and Christopher R. Parker, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware; attorneys for the State of Delaware.
Paul S. Swierzbinski, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Dover, Delaware; attorneys for Defendant.
ORDER
Introduction
Before this Court is Defendant's Motion to Stay the trial on Attempted Robbery First Degree and other misdemeanor charges until after his trial for First Degree Murder. The State opposes the motion. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion is denied.
Background
On November 3, 2003, William Devonshire was charged by indictment with numerous offenses, including Attempted Robbery First Degree, which allegedly occurred on October 1, 2003. On January 5, 2004, Defendant was charged by Indictment with Murder First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, as a result of an incident which allegedly occurred on April 3, 2003.Defendant is now requesting that the trial on the attempted robbery charge be postponed until after the trial on the murder charge; currently the trial is scheduled to begin on March 15, 2004. Defendant argues that if he is convicted of attempted robbery, the conviction would be used to impeach his testimony if he chooses to testify at the later murder trial.
In the motion, Defendant waived his right to a speedy trial on the attempted robbery charge, as well as the other charges in connection with it, so that the murder trial can be held first.
Parties' Contentions
Defendant bases his motion on Superior Court Criminal Rule 50 which states, "The court may provide for placing criminal proceedings upon appropriate calendars," as well as Superior Court Criminal Rule 2, which states that the rules are "to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding," and "be construed to secure fairness in administration." Defendant further contends that the equities lie in favor of staying his attempted robbery trial until after the murder trial. The Defendant is primarily concerned with the fact that on cross-examination, in an attempt to impeach his testimony, the Prosecutor can ask him questions regarding previous crimes of which he has been convicted and where and when the conviction occurred. If the jury hears that the Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery in the same court less than one year prior to the murder trial, this could result in substantial prejudice to the Defendant if he chooses to testify at the criminal trial.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 50(1).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 2.
See Archie v. State, 721 A.2d 924, 925 (Del. 1998) ("We hold that the cross-examination [pursuant to D.R.E. 609(a)] may inquire into what those crimes were, and where and when those convictions occurred.").
However, the State argues that it will be prejudiced by the delay of the attempted robbery trial, because witnesses may be unable to remember details or may become unavailable. In addition, the victim of the attempted robbery would be forced to wait for justice. Finally the State points to Superior Court Criminal Rule 50(2) which refers to the Court's continuing study of the administration of criminal justice and preparation of plans for achieving the prompt disposition of criminal cases.
Discussion
This does not appear to be an issue which has been discussed by this Court. A search of other jurisdictions indicates that other courts have not discussed the issue either. Upon examining Superior Court Criminal Rules 2, 50 and 14, it appears that the decision to delay the trial on the attempted robbery charge until after the trial on the murder charge would be within the discretion of this Court. Based upon this, the Court must weigh the competing interests of the State and the Defendant, as well as the Court's interest in promoting judicial economy and efficiency. The Defendant would have the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice. That is, the Defendant must establish that there is a reasonable probability that substantial injustice may result if the attempted robbery trial is conducted prior to the murder trial. It is not sufficient for the Defendant to establish mere hypothetical prejudice.
Rule 14 allows for relief from prejudicial joinder and is only used as an analogy in analyzing Defendant's motion.
Cf. Bates v. State, 386 A.2d 1139, 1142 (Del. 1978) (relief from joinder under Del. Super. Ct. R. 14 is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case).
Bates, 386 A.2d at 1141.
Cf. Bates, 386 A.2d at 1142 (defendant bears the burden of persuasion when seeking relief under Del. Super. Ct. R. 14).
The Defendant claims that he will suffer prejudice if he is convicted on the attempted robbery charge before the trial on the murder charge, because the attempted robbery conviction could be raised in cross-examination if he chooses to testify. However, as defense counsel conceded during arguments on this motion, the Defendant has a prior criminal record which also could be brought out in cross-examination. His contention is that a conviction so close in time to the murder trial and in the same court would result in more prejudice than his previous convictions. When asked about the consequences that would result in the attempted robbery trial if he was convicted of murder, defense counsel explained that because the Defendant would receive an automatic life sentence for a murder conviction, there would be less at stake during the attempted robbery trial if it was held after the murder trial.
The State argues that the prejudice it would suffer if the trial was delayed outweighs the prejudice the Defendant would suffer if the attempted robbery trial proceeded as scheduled, because witnesses might not be available to testify or might not remember the events as clearly. In addition, the State contends that the victim has an interest in seeing her alleged attacker convicted as soon as possible.
Finally, the Court has an interest in promoting judicial economy and efficiency. This means the Court has a duty to see that criminal defendants are brought to trial in a timely manner, because it is in everyone's interest to conduct trials as soon as practicable — witnesses' memories are fresh and the defendant is not forced to deal with the stress of facing trial or being incarcerated prior to trial for longer than necessary. In addition, the Court must consider the Defendant's Constitutional right to a speedy trial. However, in this case Defendant has waived his right to a speedy trial, with respect to the armed robbery charge and other related charges, to permit the murder case to be tried first.
The Defendant's only argument is that he may be prejudiced if he is convicted in the attempted robbery trial and if he then decides to testify in the murder trial. This is all pure speculation. The Defendant may not be convicted in the attempted robbery trial or he may choose not to testify at the murder trial. Therefore, this Court concludes that the Defendant has failed to meet his burden of establishing to a reasonable probability that substantial prejudice will result if the attempted robbery trial is held prior to the murder trial.
Conclusion
Because Defendant has not established that actual prejudice would result, Defendant's motion to stay the attempted robbery trial is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED.