Opinion
110,866.
06-05-2015
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Tyler P.T. DEVANEY, Appellant.
Sean M.A. Hatfield and Carl F.A. Maughan, of Maughan Law Group LC, of Wichita, for appellant. Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Sean M.A. Hatfield and Carl F.A. Maughan, of Maughan Law Group LC, of Wichita, for appellant.
Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before POWELL, P.J., McANANY, J., and BUKATY, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Tyler P.T. Devaney appeals the district court's denial of his request for jail time credit in a case in which he had pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. He had been in custody on other charges at the time he was charged with these two crimes. In the present case he requested he be granted credit from the time he was in custody on the other charges. Because the law provides that a defendant is entitled to jail credit only for the jail time served for the crime for which he or she is being sentenced, the district court correctly denied Devaney credit for the time served on other charges prior to being charged in the current case. We affirm.
In May 2013, the State charged Devaney in case 13CR1237 (the case on appeal), with possession of methamphetamine, under K.S.A.2012 Supp. 21–5706(a), (c)(1), a severity level 5 nonperson felony, and an aggravated weapons violation by a convicted felon, under K.S.A.2011 Supp. 21–6305(a)(l), (b)(1), a severity level 9 nonperson felony.
Prior to the filing of 13CR1237, Devaney had been in custody since January 2013 on case 12CR1108. The State subsequently charged Devaney in four other cases prior to the filing of 13CR1237. Those four included 13CR868, 13CR957, 13CR1004, and 13CR1231.
In June 2013, by virtue of one plea agreement, Devaney pled guilty to numerous counts in all six cases. In 13CR1237, the case on appeal, he was sentenced to 42 months in prison to run concurrent with sentences from 12CR1108 and 13CR868. However, Devaney objected to the district court's jail credit calculations, arguing that because he had been in custody from January 2013 until sentencing in August 2013 on case 12CR1108, he should receive jail credit in all six cases for that time period. The State requested a hearing to resolve the matter. Following the hearing, the district court overruled Devaney's objection holding: “[T]he defendant is only entitled in each individual case to credit for each day spent in jail solely on account of the offense(s) for which the defendant was sentenced in those individual cases.”
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of K.S.A.2011 Supp. 21–6615 formerly K.S.A. 21–4614. This court exercises unlimited review over issues of statutory interpretation. State v.. Prebble, 37 Kan.App.2d 327, 328, 152 P.3d 1245 (2007).
Devaney claims the district court erred when it denied his request for jail credit for the entire time he spent in the Sedgwick County Jail, starting January 2013 until his sentencing in August 2013, for all six of his cases even though five cases were charged at later dates. In contrast, the State argues credit “can only be granted for the time spent in jail solely on account of the offenses in a single case; duplicate credit is not authorized.” The State apparently calculated Devaney's jail credit time in each case based on the time he was in custody after the date the case was filed.
Under K.S.A. 21–4614, a sentencing court is required to give a defendant credit for time spent in jail while the defendant awaits the disposition of the case. State v. Wheeler, 24 Kan.App.2d 616, 617, 949 P.2d 634 (1997), rev. denied 264 Kan. 824 (1998). However, under K.S A. 21–4614, a defendant earns such credit only for jail time incurred solely on the account of the charge for which the defendant is being sentenced. State v. Calderon, 233 Kan. 87, 98, 661 P.2d 781 (1983) (“[A] defendant is entitled only to credit for the time held in custody solely on account of, or as a direct result of, those charges for which he is now being sentenced.”).
In State v. Baringer, No. 106,525, 2012 WL 2476994, at *1 (Kan.App.2012) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 296 Kan. 1131 (2013), the defendant pled no contest to one of his charges and then filed a motion for jail time credit. Baringer argued “that because he was incarcerated at the time of his burglary arrest and his burglary sentence was later ordered to run concurrent with ‘any sentence now being served,’ he should be entitled to credit for that time.” 2012 WL 2476994, at *1. The district court denied his motion, and this court affirmed on appeal. 2012 WL 2476994, at *1. The Baringer court held that Baringer's jail term was not incurred solely because of the charge for which he was sentenced. So because Baringer was also jailed on a prior charge, the district court correctly denied his motion. 2012 WL 2476994, at *1. While the unpublished decision in Baringer is not binding precedent, we find it persuasive.
Here, Devaney seeks jail time credit for the time he spent in jail from January 2013, the date his custody began in case 12CR1108, to August 2013, his sentencing date in the current case. However, the record indicates this jail term from January to August 2013 was not served solely on the charges from case 13CR1237. That case was not even filed until May 2013, at which time Devaney was in jail on other charges. Because his jail term resulted from additional charges to the ones for which he had been sentenced in case 13CR1237, the district court did not err in overruling his objection.
Affirmed.