Whether a Blakely error has occurred is a legal question which this court reviews de novo. State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 648-49 (Minn. 2006).
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930) (affirming a defendant's right to waive a trial by jury), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970); State v. Pietraszewski, 283 N.W.2d 887, 889–90 (Minn.1979) (citing Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(2)(a)). A defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial on the elements of an offense must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 651 (Minn.2006). The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure further provide:
We review the validity of a Blakely-hearing waiver de novo. See, e.g., State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 651-52 (Minn. 2006) (applying de novo review to purported Blakely waiver).
Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(1)(a); see also State v. Weltzin, 630 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Minn.2001). Defendants may waive their right to a jury trial, but the waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 651 (Minn.2006) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)). Absent such a waiver, a criminal defendant must be tried by a jury.
Appellate courts review the validity of a Blakely-hearing waiver de novo. State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 648-49 (Minn. 2006).
"Blakely reformulated the definition of 'statutory maximum' as the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 647 (Minn. 2006) (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S. Ct. at 2537). The presumptive sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines is the "statutory maximum" for Blakely purposes.
In fact, the right to a jury trial attaches to every element of every charged offense, including any fact (other than a prior conviction) necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the guilty plea or verdict. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 303-04, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536, 2537 (2004); State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 651 (Minn. 2006).
We review this question de novo. State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 651-52 (Minn. 2006) (applying de novo review to purported Blakely waiver).
And although Svec testified that he possessed a firearm at the time of the offense, this testimony cannot be the basis for sentencing enhancement because Svec did not waive his right to a jury determination of this factor. See State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 646 (Minn. 2006) ("An express, knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right to a jury determination of facts supporting an upward sentencing departure is required before a defendant's statements at his guilty-plea hearing may be used to enhance his sentence beyond the maximum sentence authorized by the facts established by his guilty plea."). The district court erred in imposing an enhanced sentence without a jury finding that Svec possessed or used a weapon.
Whether a Blakely error occurred is a legal question, which this court reviews de novo. State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 648-49 (Minn. 2006). In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court held that a sentencing judge may not impose a sentence greater than "the maximum sentence [that may be imposed] solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."