Opinion
H12MCR920127994S
11-05-2015
State of Connecticut v. Matthew Desvignes
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO OPEN and MOTION FOR MODIFICATION
LAURA F. BALDINI, JUDGE
On July 14, 2015, the defendant filed a " Motion for Modification" and " Motion to Open." In his motion to open, the defendant asks the court to " open the judgment so that the defendant can move to modify or vacate his sentence." In his motion for modification, the defendant asks that " the life-time registration on the sexual offender list be vacated."
The relevant facts are as follows: On May 31, 1994, the defendant appeared before the Honorable Christina G. Dunnell and was sentenced on the charge of sexual assault in the second degree, Gen. Stat. § 53a-71. He received a sentence of five years suspended after one year, three years probation.
The jurisdiction of a sentencing court terminates once that sentence has begun and, thus, that court may not take any action affecting the sentence unless it expressly has been authorized to act. State v. Bruno, 132 Conn.App. 172, 177, 30 A.3d 34 (2011); Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 30, 37, 779 A.2d 80 (2001). There are, however, circumstances where a court may have jurisdiction over a matter after a defendant has been sentenced.
The court will first address the defendant's motion to reopen. Gen. Stat § 54-95b provides, in relevant part:
Any judgment rendered in the Superior Court in any case involving prosecution for a motor vehicle violation or criminal offense adjudging the defendant to pay a fine only, may be reopened, provided a motion to reopen is filed within four months succeeding the date on which it was rendered.
The court lacks jurisdiction to consider the motion to reopen. The judgment of conviction was entered on May 31, 1994, well outside the four-month period set forth in Gen. Stat § 54-95b. The court also lacks jurisdiction to consider the motion as the sentence was not a " fine only" sentence. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to open is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The court has also considered the defendant's motion for modification. Courts have the authority, under General Statutes § 53a-39(b), to modify a sentence. General Statutes § 53a-39(b) provides, in relevant part:
(b) At any time during the period of a definite sentence of more than three years, upon agreement of the defendant and the state's attorney to seek review of the sentence, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to which the defendant could have been originally sentenced.
The court similarly lacks jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion for modification. The defendant in this case received a sentence of more than three years. There is nothing in the defendant's motion to indicate that the State has agreed to seek review of the defendant's sentence as is required by statute.
The defendant has also made reference in both of his motions that the sentence that was imposed was somehow illegal. Our Supreme Court has stated that courts have the power to correct an illegal sentence. State v. Smith, 150 Conn.App. 623, 634, 92 A.3d 975 (2014); State v. Koslik, 116 Conn.App. 693, 697, 977 A.2d 275, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 930, 980 A.2d 916 (2009); Practice Book § 43-22. In State v. McNellis, 15 Conn.App. 416, 443-44, 546 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809, 548 A.2d 441 (1988), the court explained that " [a]n 'illegal sentence' is essentially one which either exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant's right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory." By contrast, " [s]entences imposed in an illegal manner have been defined as being within the relevant statutory limits but . . . imposed in a way which violates defendant's right . . . to be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment . . . or his right to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the record, or his right that the government keep its plea agreement promises . . ." State v. Smith, 150 Conn.App. at 636 citing State v. McNellis at 444.
The judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an illegal manner.
The defendant's sentence on the sexual assault in the second degree charge--five years suspended after one year, three years probation--is a legal sentence. The requirement that the defendant register as a sexual offender is a collateral consequence of his conviction which is governed by the Gen. Stat. § 54-250 et seq. and overseen by the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection. Accordingly, even if the court were to construe the defendant's motions to open and modify as motions to correct an illegal sentence, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider them.
Gen. Stat. § 53a-71(b) provides: " Sexual assault in the second degree is a class C felony . . . and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which nine months of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court."
The court has carefully reviewed and considered the defendant's motions. The defendant's motions are DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.