Opinion
C.A. No. 0304012359A.
Date Submitted: February 23, 2007.
May 31, 2007.
Shane J. Deshields, Sussex Correctional Institute, Georgetown, DE.
James W. Adkins, Esquire, Department of Justice, Georgetown, DE.
E. Stephen Callaway, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Georgetown, DE.
James D. Nutter, Esquire Eric G. Mooney, P.A., Georgetown, DE.
Dear Mr. Deshields and Counsel:
This is my decision on Shane J. Deshields' ("Deshields") motion for postconviction relief. A jury found Deshields guilty of Murder in the First Degree, Murder in the Second Degree, Robbery in the First Degree, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony on August 11, 2004. The convictions arose out of the robbery of George Coverdale ("Coverdale") by Deshields and his co-defendant, Michael Smith ("Smith"), on April 17, 2003. Deshields and Smith planned to make some quick money by stealing cocaine from Coverdale, a drug dealer. They lured Coverdale to Deshields' grandmother's house on the pretext that they were going to buy cocaine from him. Coverdale and a friend, Shane Blackwell ("Blackwell"), arrived at the house in a van driven by Coverdale. Blackwell was in the front passenger seat. Deshields and Smith got in the van. Deshields sat behind Coverdale while Smith sat behind Blackwell. After a brief conversation, Deshields grabbed a paper bag containing cocaine from Coverdale. Coverdale then jumped out of the van, pulled out a pistol and shot at Deshields and Smith. Deshields and Smith pulled out pistols and shot at Coverdale. A bullet from Deshields' pistol killed Coverdale.
I sentenced Deshields to life plus 102 years at Supervision Level V. Deshields filed an appeal with the Supreme Court on November 10, 2004. The Supreme Court affirmed his convictions on July 15, 2005. Deshields filed his motion for postconviction relief on October 26, 2006. He was represented at trial by E. Stephen Callaway, Esquire ("Callaway") and James D. Nutter, Esquire ("Nutter"). The State of Delaware (the "State") was represented by Deputy Attorney General James W. Adkins, Esquire ("Adkins"). Callaway, Nutter, and Adkins filed affidavits in response to Deshields' motion.
The State charged Deshields with two counts of murder in the first degree. In the first count (the "Intentional Murder Count"), the State alleged that Deshields intentionally caused the death of Coverdale in violation of 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(1). In the second count (the "Felony Murder Count"), the State alleged that Deshields, in the course of and in furtherance of the offense of robbery in the first degree, recklessly caused the death of Coverdale in violation of 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(2). The Court instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of murder in the second degree on the Intentional Murder Count. Callaway and Nutter did not ask the Court to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. Deshields alleges in his motion for postconviction relief that (1) the Court erred because it did not instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, and (2) Callaway and Nutter were ineffective because they did not ask the Court to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter.
Callaway and Nutter did not ask the Court to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter because they thought the instruction had no basis in fact and, as such, would undermine their credibility with the jury and hurt arguments they planned to make. Deshields gave a videotaped confessio n to the pol ice, leaving Ca llaway and Nutter with virtually no basis to challenge the essential facts of the case. Given this, Callaway and Nutter focused their efforts on avoiding convictions on the two counts of murder in the first degree that could possibly lead to a death sentence for Deshields. Callaway and Nutter believed that, despite Deshields' confession, they could credibly argue that Deshields did not intentionally kill Coverdale. However, given the facts of the case, Callaway and Nutter did not believe that they could credibly argue that Deshields' decision to shoot at Coverdale as the robbery unraveled was anything other than "cruel, wicked and depraved." Thus, they believed that the best they could reasonably hope for on the Intentional Murder Count was a conviction of murder in the second degree. Therefore, Callaway and Nutter did not ask the Court to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter because they did not want to undermine their attack on the Felony Murder Count. They planned to attack the Felony Murder Count by arguing that Coverdale's murder did not occur "in the course of and in furtherance of" the robbery. Callaway and Nutter believed that asking the Court to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter would only undermine their credibility with the jury and make this argument less persuasive.
The United States Supreme Court has established the proper inquiry to be made by courts when deciding a motion for postconviction relief. In order to prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, the defendant must engage in a two-part analysis. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Further, a defendant "must make and substantiate concrete allegations of actual prejudice or risk summary dismissal." It is also necessary that the defendant "rebut a 'strong presumption' that trial counsel's representation fell within the 'wide range of reasonable professional assistance,' and this Court must eliminate from its consideration the 'distorting effects of hindsight when viewing that representation.'" There is no procedural bar to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 687.
State v. Coleman, 2003 WL 22092724 (Del.Super.Ct.).
Coleman, 2003 WL at *2, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Coleman, 2003 WL at *1, citing State v. Johnson, Del. Super. Ct., Cr. A. No. 97-10-0164(R1), Graves, J. (August 12, 1999) at 2; State v. Gattis, Del. Super. Ct., Cr. A. Nos. IN90-05-1017 to 1019, Barron, J. (December 28, 1995) at 7, aff'd, 637 A.2d 1174 (Del. 1997).
I conclude that Callaway and Nutter acted professionally and reasonable in this case. They had a strategy to deal with the two counts of murder in the first degree that was reasonable and appropriate given the facts of the case. If they had asked the Court to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, they may well have lost their credibility with the jury and undermined the other arguments they planned to make. Since Callaway and Nutter did not to ask the Court to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, I have also concluded that there was no reason for the Court to have given the instruction.
State v. Cox, 831 A.2d 1269, 1275 (Del. 2003).
CONCLUSION
Deshields' motion for postconviction relief is denied.IT IS SO ORDERED.