Opinion
I.D. No. 0102003108
Submitted: December 17, 2001
Decided: December 20, 2001
Upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
DENIED.
William L. George, Jr., Deputy Attorney General.
Anthony A. Figliola, Jr., Attorney for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is presently before the Court on defendant's motion to suppress evidence. For the reasons that follow, the motion is
DENIED.
I. FACTS
On the evening of February 3rd, 2001, Corporal Dennis Spillan of the Delaware State Police responded to a report of a fight between security personnel and two males at Macy's Department Store at the Christiana Mall. When Corporal Spillan arrived at Macy's, plain clothes security officers employed by Macy's reported that they saw the defendant and another individual remove merchandise from a display, take it to a checkout counter, and purchase the merchandise for substantially less than its value. After witnessing this transaction on a video monitor, two plain clothes security officers followed the defendant and his companion, Wesley Monroe, out of Macy's and into the mall. The security officers approached Mr. Deputy and Mr. Monroe and asked them to come back into the store. Reluctantly, Mr. Deputy and Mr. Monroe came back into the store with the security officers.
As they re-entered the store, Mr. Deputy and Mr. Monroe asked the officers whether they could simply go back to the register and pay for the merchandise. The officers told Mr. Deputy and Mr. Monroe they must accompany them to the security office. At that point, Mr. Deputy and Mr. Monroe started moving toward the north exit doors of Macy's. Because Macy's has a "hands off policy" with respect to detention of individuals suspected of shoplifting or retail theft, the security officers did not attempt to restrain either suspect. Rather, the two security officers stood in their paths in an attempt to block their exit from the store. During their attempt to exit the store, Mr. Deputy and Mr. Monroe either struck or pushed the two security officers and propelled them into store displays and display cabinets. Both security officers were injured.
When Corporal Spillan and another officer arrested and searched Mr. Deputy and Mr. Monroe, they found car keys in Mr. Deputy's pocket. Mr. Deputy told Corporal Spillan that he had driven to the mall in his sister's car. The police informed Mr. Deputy that they intended to search the vehicle and have it towed. While alone with Corporal Spillan, Mr. Monroe asked Corporal Spillan if he could "help himself," and told Corporal Spillan that Mr. Deputy had crack cocaine on his person and in the vehicle. The police then conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and discovered a bag of what was later determined to be crack cocaine.
At the suppression hearing held on December 17th, 2001, Corporal Spillan testified that it is the standard procedure of the State Police, after making an arrest for alleged retail theft or shoplifting, to locate the suspect's vehicle, conduct an inventory search of that vehicle, and have the vehicle towed from the retail premises. This testimony was unrebutted.
Corporal Spillan testified that the purpose of conducting an inventory search is to protect the owner's property and to protect the police from subsequent claims of lost and stolen property.
During the inventory search, Corporal Spillan testified that the police found a bag containing a substance later determined to be crack cocaine in the handle on the driver's side door.
II. DISCUSSION
On a motion to suppress, the State bears the burden of establishing that the challenged search or seizure comported with the rights guaranteed Mr. Deputy by the United States Constitution, the Delaware Constitution, and Delaware statutory law. The burden of proof on a motion to suppress is proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Hunter v. State, Del. Supr., No. 279, 2000, Steele, J. (August 22, 2001) (Mem. Op. at 5-6)
State v. Bien-Aime, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IK92-08-326, Toliver, J. (March 17, 1993) (Mem. Op.) (citations omitted)
The State claims that the search of the vehicle was lawful because it was a "classic inventory search." The State also claims that the search of the vehicle was lawful because it was a search incident to arrest under Belton. The defendant claims that the search was unlawful because at the time of the arrest, the defendant was not near the vehicle, in control of the vehicle, or attempting to gain access to the vehicle.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
Furthermore, argues defendant, there is no evidence to suggest that the defendant went near or in the vehicle between the time of the alleged theft and his arrest. Finally, the defendant argues that the police did not obtain the defendant's consent to search the vehicle and there were no exigent circumstances that would have permitted a warrantless search.
The Court will address the inventory search first.
A. INVENTORY SEARCH
Inventory searches are a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The policies behind the warrant requirement are not implicated in an inventory search, nor is the related concept of probable cause. It is well established that an inventory search may be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment even though it is not conducted pursuant to a warrant based upon probable cause. The purpose of an inventory search is to (a) protect an owner's property while it is in the custody of the police, (b) insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and (c) protect the police from danger.
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987)
Id. (citations omitted)
Id.
Id. at 372.
The underlying rationale for allowing an inventory exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is that police officers are not vested with discretion to determine the scope of an inventory search. This absence of discretion insures that the police will not use inventory searches as a means of discovering evidence of a crime. The issue for the Court to decide with respect to the inventory search conducted here is whether the State established by a preponderance of the evidence that the police followed standardized procedures and acted in good faith in conducting the inventory search.
See California v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 376-77 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
See California v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987).
It is clear from the testimony of Corporal Spillan that the police performed the inventory search pursuant to a well-established, standard State Police procedure. The evidence establishes that whenever the State Police make an arrest on retail theft or shoplifting charges, State Police procedures require that the arresting or investigating officer conduct an inventory search and tow the suspect's vehicle. The question of whether to conduct an inventory search is not left to the discretion of the arresting or investigating officer. It is mandatory under these circumstances. Corporal Spillan testified that while conducting the inventory search, the police discovered the bag of crack cocaine in the handle of the driver's side door. His testimony established that anyone who opened or closed the driver's side door would have discovered the bag in question. Defendant chose not to cross-examine him on this point. Corporal Spillan's testimony makes clear that the discovery of the bag containing the illicit drugs was inevitable given its location in the vehicle and the State Police procedure requiring the arresting or investigating officer to conduct an inventory search of a vehicle driven by a suspect arrested for alleged retail theft or shoplifting. It is well established that the police may open closed containers, such as a bag, during an inventory search. There was no evidence presented to suggest that the police exceeded the scope of the inventory search to discover the bag of crack cocaine. To the contrary, the unrebutted evidence establishes that the bag was recovered during a routine inventory search designed to document the contents of the vehicle. There was also no evidence to suggest that the police, who the Court finds were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation. The Court is satisfied that the police did not deviate from their standard inventory search, even though they had reason to suspect, given Mr. Monroe's comment, that there might be crack cocaine in the vehicle.
See Id. at 370.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the inventory search was conducted according to standardized procedures and in good faith and was therefore lawful.
B. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
Because the Court upholds the constitutionality of the inventory search, it need not address this issue.
C. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that the State met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the inventory search was conducted in good faith according to standardized procedures and was therefore constitutional. Accordingly, defendant's motion to suppress the crack cocaine seized pursuant to that search is DENIED.