Defendant in Heflin cites several cases for the proposition that should require an instruction regarding involuntary manslaughter. People v Clark, 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 381-382; 181 Cal.Rptr. 682 (1982); State v Denny, 27 Ariz. App 354; 555 P.2d 111 (1976). However, a review of these cases illustrates that in each case, the defendant not only argued self-defense, but also "accidental killing."

¶ 10 Precisely because the mens rea of recklessness is incompatible with the justification defense, a jury should be guided in reaching a legally correct verdict. See State v. Noriega, 187 Ariz. 282, 284, 928 P.2d 706, 708 (App.1996) (purpose of jury instructions to inform jury of applicable law in understandable terms; “instructions are, in essence, a guide to the proper verdict”); State v. Denny, 27 Ariz.App. 354, 359, 555 P.2d 111, 116 (1976) (jury should be given both self-defense and manslaughter instruction so it may choose one theory). Although a jury may reach inconsistent verdicts, it is the trial court's obligation to instruct it correctly on the applicable legal principles.

Furthermore, the incident was not too remote from the offence charged to be relevant. In State v. Denny, 27 Ariz. App. 354, 555 P.2d 111 (1976), this court held that the trial court properly admitted evidence that the defendant attempted to assault her husband with a car five months prior to the time she killed him. In Denny the prior bad act was admissible because we concluded that it showed "malice and intent and motive" of the defendant.

We assess the totality of circumstances in the present case, State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 537, 633 P.2d 335, 346 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S.Ct. 180, 74 L.Ed.2d 147 (1982). In doing so, we acknowledge the low intelligence of the accused, State v. Drury, 110 Ariz. 447, 455, 520 P.2d 495, 503 (1974); the arguably coercive environment of the police interrogation room, Cruz-Mata, 138 Ariz. at 373, 674 P.2d at 1371; the clear focus of the investigation on the defendant, Perea, 142 Ariz. at 355, 690 P.2d at 74; the fingerprinting and police transportation to the station, State v. Riffle, 131 Ariz. 65, 67, 638 P.2d 732, 734 (App. 1981); and the initial police deception used to induce defendant to go to the police station. State v. Denny, 27 Ariz. App. 354, 555 P.2d 111 (1976). On the other hand, we note Carrillo's prior extensive contacts with the law enforcement system, the patient explanation of the Miranda rights, and the manner in which he invoked his constitutional rights to stop the final interrogation.

Evidence of prior trouble between the victim and the accused derives its relevance from the fact that the existence of prior ill will toward the victim not only renders the commission of the crime more probable, but tends to show the malice, motive or premeditation of the accused. Leonard v. State, supra; State v. Denny, 27 Ariz. App. 354, 555 P.2d 111 (1976). Evidence of this prior bad act, taken together with the expression in Jeffers' intercepted jail note of his desire to kill Penny by heroin overdose, shows a continuing state of mind from which the jury could properly infer that Jeffers carried out his desire.

We find a few cases which consider police deception as a factor in determining voluntariness. State v. Denny, 27 Ariz. App. 354, 555 P.2d 111 (1976); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal.3d 101, 127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272 (1976); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 774 (1965). Some courts have indicated that in determining whether there has been a voluntary waiver of Miranda rights under the totality rule one factor may be whether the defendant was ever advised initially of the nature of the charge against him. E.g., Carter v. Garrison, 656 F.2d 68, 70 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 1981); Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735, 739 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 877, 95 S.Ct. 14 42 L.Ed.2d 116, (1974); Schenk v. Ellsworth, 293 F. Supp. 26, 29 (D. Mont. 1968).

HAYS, Justice. After a jury trial, appellant Cynthia Maria Denny was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for the September 28, 1974 shooting death of her husband, Gary Denny. This is the second appeal in the case; the conviction and sentence resulting from the first trial were overturned by the Court of Appeals in State v. Denny, 27 Ariz. App. 354, 555 P.2d 111 (1976). After the second conviction, appellant was sentenced to three to five years in the Arizona State Prison. Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 17A A.R.S. Rules of Supreme Court, rule 47(e).

While not relied upon by the ruling court, we note that prior acts of violence against Decedent were also admissible as evidence of Gilliam's malice, intent and motive. See State v. Williams, 183 Ariz. 368, 377, 904 P.2d 437, 446 (1995); State v. Denny, 27 Ariz. App. 354, 359, 555 P.2d 111, 116 (App. 1976). Finally, as with the other evidence, this evidence was admissible to rebut Gilliam's claims of justification and the claim that he was without fault in provoking the incident.

The trial court did give a voluntariness instruction following the language of RAJI Criminal Standard No. 7. There was no error in refusing to give appellant's instruction. State v. Denny, 27 Ariz. App. 354, 555 P.2d 111 (1976). Instruction No. 21 submitted by appellant tells the jury that the crime of robbery includes the less serious crime of burglary.

The matter is squarely presented for decision. The threshold question is: should they ever be presented to the jury, or are they too relevant, like similar bad acts; State v. Denny, 27 Ariz. App. 354, 555 P.2d 111 (1976); the presence of insurance or workmen's compensation insurance; Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary and Chapel, Inc., 93 Ariz. 60, 378 P.2d 741 (1963); E.L. Jones Construction Company v. Noland, supra; Stroud v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., supra; State v. Juengel, 15 Ariz. App. 495, 489 P.2d 869 (1971); Myers v. Rollette, 6 Ariz. App. 43, 429 P.2d 677 (1967), vacated on other grounds, 103 Ariz. 225, 439 P.2d 497 (1968), appeal after remand, 13 Ariz. App. 72, 474 P.2d 196 (1970); and thus prima facie prejudicial. Cf. Egurrola v. Szychowski, 95 Ariz. 194, 388 P.2d 242 (1964).