As with the defendant's testimony, it was within the province of the jury to credit Adlam's testimony and to accept or reject any claim of bias she may have had against the defendant. In support of his assertion that the state failed to prove that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor while operating his motor vehicle, the defendant relies largely on State v. DeCoster , 147 Conn. 502, 162 A.2d 704 (1960). DeCoster , however, is readily distinguishable from the present case.

Additionally, the plaintiff failed one field sobriety test before refusing to submit to any additional tests. The plaintiff cites State v. DeCoster, 147 Conn. 502, 162 A.2d 704 (1960), for the proposition that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of a temporal nexus between liquor and operation on the basis of the evidence presented in his hearing. In DeCoster, the defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

The defendant objects to the state's assertion that he partially turned the key in the ignition, an assertion that he characterizes as "conjectural . . . ." The defendant instead analogizes the facts of this case to those of State v. DeCoster, 147 Conn. 502, 162 A.2d 704 (1960), a decision that, according to the defendant, establishes "beyond question that simply having a key in the ignition is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of operating [a motor vehicle] under the influence." As such, the defendant argues, the evidence is insufficient to establish that he was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

State v. Foord, 142 Conn. 285, 294, 113 A.2d 591. Moreover, the inference which the jury in the present case obviously drew had to be wholly consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion. State v. DeCoster, 147 Conn. 502, 505, 162 A.2d 704. Emphasis needs to be placed on the distinction between the word "reasonable" and the word "possible.

That element is not satisfied merely by showing that he was intoxicated when he was found by the officer. See State v. DeCoster, 147 Conn. 502, 505, 162 A.2d 704 (1960). The relevant inquiry, here, is what constitutes operation within the meaning of § 14-227b.

We conclude, however, that the state did not factually support its allegation of operation by presenting evidence that a key was in the motor vehicle's ignition, while such key was neither in the "on" nor "start" positions of the ignition, even when the motor vehicle's headlamps were illuminated. The defendant in State v. DeCoster, 147 Conn. 502, 162 A.2d 704 (1960), was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. In DeCoster, the evidence supported a finding that a police officer found the defendant, who was intoxicated, slumped over the steering wheel of his motor vehicle.

" (Citations omitted.) State v. DeCoster, 147 Conn. 502, 504, 162 A.2d 704 (1960). Although the defendant was not behind the wheel of the car when Madden came upon the scene of the accident, he later told the officer that he was the driver of the car.

Finally, we note that this court has frequently referred to a conviction under § 14-227a as a crime or a criminal prosecution. See State v. Singleton, 174 Conn. 112,115, 384 A.2d 334 (1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947, 99 S. Ct. 1425, 59 L. Ed. 2d 635 (1979); State v. Englehart, 158 Conn. 117, 119, 256 A.2d 231 (1969); State v. DeCoster, 147 Conn. 502, 504, 162 A.2d 704 (1960); State v. McDonough, 129 Conn. 483, 484, 29 A.2d 582 (1942). Indeed, in 1980, the Appellate Session of the Superior Court squarely considered and rejected an argument by the state that "operating under the influence is not a crime because it falls within the exception to the definition of 'offense' in § 53a-24, a provision of the [P]enal [C]ode.

In this appeal the plaintiff has not challenged the finding of the adjudicator that he was operating his motor vehicle. See State v. DeCoster, 147 Conn. 502, 504, 162 A.2d 704 (1960). I

State v. Smith, 138 Conn. 196, 200, 82 A.2d 816." State v. Morrill, 193 Conn. 602, 610-11, 478 A.2d 994 (1984); see State v. Payne, 186 Conn. 179, 184, 440 A.2d 280 (1982); State v. Englehart, 158 Conn. 117, 121-22, 256 A.2d 231 (1969); State v. DeCoster, 147 Conn. 502, 505, 162 A.2d 704 (1960); State v. Foord, 142 Conn. 285, 295, 113 A.2d 591 (1955). Throughout the trial, "the burden remained with the state to persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, in spite of any intoxication, had the capacity to, and did, form the [specific] intent to cause [Oliver's] death when he shot him."