Opinion
No. 37899-0-II.
Filed: September 3, 2009.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Pierce County, No. 06-1-05114-1, D. Gary Steiner, J., entered May 21, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Houghton, J., concurred in by Penoyar, A.C.J., and Becker, J.
Unpublished Opinion
Jeffrey Dean pleaded guilty to second degree robbery for snatching a woman's purse. During the incident, he injured his victim. Consequently, after sentencing him, the trial court ordered him to pay restitution. He appeals the restitution order, claiming that the victim's injuries were not a result of the robbery. He raises other issues pro se in his statement of additional grounds. We affirm.
RAP 10.10(a).
FACTS
In October 2006, Dean and an accomplice robbed Tonya Bates in a department store parking lot, knocking her to the ground and taking her purse. Before this incident, Bates had functional use of her legs despite possibly spraining or fracturing an ankle several weeks earlier. In January 2007, the police apprehended Dean.
The State charged Dean with, and he pleaded guilty to, second degree robbery. RCW 9A.56.190, RCW 9A.56.210. The trial court sentenced him to 43 months in prison. He waived all rights to be present at any restitution hearing.
Due to Bates' injuries, the trial court held a restitution hearing in May 2007 and ordered Dean to pay $1,284.28 and another $252.99 into the crime victims' compensation fund (fund) administered by the Washington Department of Labor and Industries. The initial restitution order noted that because Bates remained in treatment, the amount Dean owed was subject to change. Bates continued to suffer from a cyst and torn ligaments, injuries that she did not have before Dean robbed her. The fund compensated Bates an additional $10,277.72 for medical expenses and lost wages. The State filed a request to amend the restitution order accordingly in April 2008. The trial court granted the State's request and held a second restitution hearing in May 2008, more than a year after the first restitution hearing.
Several professionals provided information at the May 2008 hearing. All agreed that Bates' ailments, diagnosed after the purse snatching, resulted from Dean's attack. Due to their unanimous professional opinions, the trial court, over defense counsel's objections, granted the state's request to amend the restitution order to include the full $10,277.72. Dean appeals.
ANALYSIS
First, Dean claims that Bates' leg injuries existed before the purse snatching and were not the result of the robbery. Therefore, he asserts, the trial court lacked statutory authority to order restitution.
The trial court must order restitution wherever a convicted defendant's offense results in the victim's injury. RCW 9.94A.753(5). Establishing the appropriate amount of restitution need not be specifically accurate, but the loss claimed must be supported by substantial credible evidence. State v. Fleming, 75 Wn. App. 270, 275, 877 P.2d 243 (1994), overruled on other grounds, Washington v. Recuenco, 548, U.S. 212, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 165 L. Ed. 2d 466 (2006). Sufficient evidence affords a reasonable basis for the estimated loss and does not subject the fact finder to mere speculation or conjecture. State v. Griffith, 164 Wn.2d 960, 965, 195 P.3d 506 (2008).
RCW 7.68.070(2) and RCW 51.32.010 require that the "rights, duties, responsibilities, limitations, and procedures applicable to a worker" eligible for compensation from the Department of Labor and Industries apply to fund disbursements. With several exceptions not present here, the law governing the workers' compensation claims governs the fund. RCW 7.68.070(1), (2). Therefore, appellate decisions on worker's compensation apply in analyzing Bates' claims. RCW 7.68.070(2).
Our Supreme Court has noted that "'if the accident or injury complained of is the proximate cause of the disability for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the workman is immaterial and recovery may be had for the full disability independent of any preexisting . . . weakness.'" Bennett v. Dep't of Labor Indus., 95 Wn.2d 531, 533, 627 P.2d 104 (1981) (quoting Miller v. Dep't of Labor Indus., 200 Wash. 674, 683, 94 P.2d 764 (1939)). The State must prove compensable damages by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Kinneman, 155 Wn.2d 272, 285, 119 P.2d 350 (2005). It did so here.
Bates had sufficient use of her ankle to work regularly before Dean robbed her. At the May 2008 restitution hearing, an experienced fund manager testified that she did not request information on Bates' prior injury because numerous doctors and medical professionals had opined that Bates' injuries resulted from Dean's actions. This evidence comprises that necessary for the State to prove Bates' injuries by a preponderance of the evidence. Dean's argument fails.
Statement of Additional Grounds
In his statement of additional grounds, Dean claims that the trial court erred by accepting the State's request to amend the restitution order. He contends that the 2007 restitution order was a final order and that the statute prohibited any amendment. We disagree.
Dean waived his right to appear at any restitution hearing. Pro se, he claims that he expected any order to be final.
The original restitution order the trial court issued was not a final order. The order states that the "[v]ictim is still treating," rendering the amount "subject to change." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 31.
The trial court held the first restitution hearing on May 21, 2007, and a different trial court held the second hearing a year later. Statutory law limits the trial court's authority to order restitution, but we broadly construe its statutory authority. State v. Hennings, 129 Wn.2d 512, 519, 919 P.2d 580 (1996).
A trial court may hold the hearing more than 180 days after sentencing Dean where "good cause" requires it. RCW 9.94A.753(1). Courts generally find good cause where an external impediment, not resulting from a self-created hardship, prevents a party from complying with the statutory requirement. State v. Johnson, 96 Wn. App. 813, 817, 981 P.2d 25 (1999).
Here, the State sought the second hearing. It did not create the impediment prompting it to delay the final restitution hearing, namely, Bates' unhealed injuries. The trial court determined "good cause" in finding that the"[v]ictim is still treating," making the amount "subject to change." CP at 31. The trial court properly held a restitution beyond the 180-day time limit. Dean's pro se argument fails.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
PENOYAR, A.C.J. and BECKER, J., concur.