Syllabus In Godinez v. Moran ( 509 U.S. 389), the United States Supreme Court held that the standard for determining whether a defendant is competent to waive the right to counsel is no higher than the standard for determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial In State v. Day ( 233 Conn. 813), this court concluded that, under Godinez, it was bound to rule that a defendant who was found competent to stand trial as a matter of state law also was competent to waive the right to counsel. In Indiana v. Edwards ( 128 S. Ct 2379), a case that was decided after Godinez and Day, and after the defendant's trial in the present case, the United States Supreme Court held that the sixth and fourteenth amendments, which generally guarantee a criminal defendant the right to self-representation, do permit a state court to deny that right to a defendant, who, though minimally competent to stand trial with the assistance of counsel, lacks the mental capacity to represent himself at trial.
I believe that we must view § 54–84(b) through the lens of the constitutional right that it seeks to effectuate, namely, the right to a jury instruction embodied by Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. at 305, 101 S.Ct. 1112. See State v. Tatem, supra, 194 Conn. at 599, 483 A.2d 1087 (stating that “rationale [of Carter v. Kentucky, supra, at 305, 101 S.Ct. 1112 ] is fully appropriate to the application of the mandate of § 54–84 [b] to this case”); see also State v. Day, 233 Conn. 813, 851 n. 32, 661 A.2d 539 (1995) (describing “constitutional underpinnings of § 54–84 ”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Connor, 292 Conn. 483, 517–18, 973 A.2d 627 (2009). Put differently, although the legislature provided a greater protection for the right against self-incrimination than existed under this court's constitutional jurisprudence and, indeed, the United States Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. 288, 101 S.Ct. 1112, it only addressed the substantive right, rather than the appellate remedies available for the violation of that right.
Id., 525-26. The state and the defendant agree on the following pool of similar cases culled from the appropriate universe of cases:State v. Griffin, 251 Conn. 671, 741 A.2d 913 (1999); State v. Correa, 241 Conn. 322, 696 A.2d 944 (1997); State v. Day, 233 Conn. 813, 661 A.2d 539 (1995);State v. Roseboro, 221 Conn. 430, 604 A.2d 1286 (1992); State v. Steiger, 218 Conn. 349, 590 A.2d 408 (1991); State v. Wood, 208 Conn. 125, 545 A.2d 1026, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 895, 109 S. Ct. 235, 102 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1988); State v. Daniels, supra, 207 Conn. 374. The state and the defendant disagree, however, about whether Breton II, supra, 235 Conn. 206, and State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 183, should be included in the pool of similar cases.
This court also has recognized that the competency standards for standing trial and other parts of a criminal proceeding are equivalent. State v. Day, 233 Conn. 813, 825, 661 A.2d 539 (1995) (same competency standard applies to ability to stand trial as to waiving right to counsel). In Day, we interpreted the court's decision in Godinez as establishing that "any criminal defendant who has been found competent to stand trial, ipso facto, is competent to waive the right to counsel as a matter of federal constitutional law."
State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 240. As the defendant acknowledges in his brief, we have "interpreted the federal and state constitution[s] as providing essentially equivalent protections" with respect to a defendant's right to self-representation. Cf. State v. Day, 233 Conn. 813, 820-21, 661 A.2d 539 (1995); State v. Townsend, 211 Conn. 215, 218 n. 1, 558 A.2d 669 (1989). For reasons we discuss hereinafter, we conclude that the defendant's federal constitutional right to self-representation was not violated.
As discussed in more detail subsequently in this opinion, at the time of the defendant's criminal trial, our law dictated that "any criminal defendant who ha[d] been found competent to stand trial, ipso facto, [wa]s competent to waive the right to counsel as a matter of federal constitutional law." State v. Day, 233 Conn. 813, 824, 661 A.2d 539 (1995) overruled in part by Connor I, 292 Conn. 483, 528 n.29, 973 A.2d 627 (2009). Accordingly, upon determining that the defendant was competent to stand trial, the trial court did not undertake any additional inquiry before concluding that he was also competent to represent himself.
13. The petitioner was represented at his trial by Attorneys Patrick Culligan, the Chief of the Public Defender's Capital Crimes Division, and William Holden, one of the attorneys assigned to the staff of the Public Defender's office in the judicial District of Fairfield. 14. The appeal of this conviction was denied by the Supreme Court in a decision entitled: State v. Day, 233 Conn. 813 (1995). Attorney Richard Emmanuel represented the petitioner on his appeal.
I believe that we must view § 54-84 (b) through the lens of the constitutional right that it seeks to effectuate, namely, the right to a jury instruction embodied by Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. 305. See State v. Tatem, supra, 194 Conn. 599 (stating that "rationale [of Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 305] is fully appropriate to the application of the mandate of § 54-84 [b] to this case"); see also State v. Day, 233 Conn. 813, 851 n.32, 661 A.2d 539 (1995) (describing "constitutional underpinnings of § 54-84"), overruled on other grounds by State v. Connor, 292 Conn. 483, 517-18, 973 A.2d 627 (2009). Put differently, although the legislature provided a greater protection for the right against self-incrimination than existed under this court's constitutional jurisprudence and, indeed, the United States Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 288, it only addressed the substantive right, rather than the appellate remedies available for the violation of that right.
Courts in several other jurisdictions interpreted Godinez similarly to California courts, holding self-representation required no greater or different competence than standing trial with counsel. (See U.S. v.Hernandez (9th Cir. 2000) 203 F.3d 614, 620, fn. 8; State v. Day (1995) 233 Conn. 813 [ 661 A.2d 539, 547-548]; State v. Thornblad (Minn.Ct.App. 1994) 513 N.W.2d 260, 262-263; Dunn v. State (Miss. 1997) 693 So.2d 1333, 1340; State v. Shafer (Mo. 1998) 969 S.W.2d 719, 728-729; State v. Tribble (2005) 179 Vt. 235 [ 892 A.2d 232, 240, fn. 2].) Only Wisconsin and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals appear to have understood Godinez as allowing the state to maintain a higher standard for competence to represent oneself than for competence to stand trial.
. State v. Day, 233 Conn. 813, 828, 661 A.2d 539 (1995), quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975)." State v. Diaz, supra, 274 Conn. 833-34.