Opinion
No. 25359-7-III.
August 7, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 06-1-00196-7, Jerome J. Leveque, J., entered July 10, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Stephens, J., concurred in by Schultheis, A.C.J., and Kulik, J.
Robert J. Day appeals his convictions for one count of first degree possession of stolen property and one count of attempting to elude a police vehicle. He contends the court erred by admitting hearsay testimony of the "blue book" value of the vehicle and the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm.
Facts
On January 9, 2006, Officer Brad Moon was on patrol in an unmarked vehicle when he received a general broadcast message on his radio indicating that a stolen truck was stopped at a light. Officer Moon followed the truck for six or seven blocks until he was joined by Officer Terry Preuninger, who pulled behind the truck in a marked patrol car and activated his emergency lights.
Mr. Day looked in his rearview mirror and began speeding up. He abruptly turned onto a side street and began accelerating through a neighborhood, traveling at approximately 40 miles per hour. Mr. Day made another abrupt turn and continued speeding down various streets. He then turned onto a busy street. Officer Preuninger accelerated his patrol car up to the side of the truck and pushed the truck off of the road. When the truck stopped, Mr. Day got out of the truck and started running. Officer Preuninger parked his car and started chasing after Mr. Day. Another patrol car approached Mr. Day, and the officers eventually stopped him.
Mr. Day was charged with one count of first degree possession of stolen property and one count of attempting to elude a police vehicle. The matter was tried to a jury.
At trial, the State called Lora Wagner to testify. Ms. Wager said that she was the owner of the 1988 Toyota truck Mr. Day was driving. She testified that on the night of December 31, 2005, she parked the truck in front of her home. The next morning, however, the truck was gone. She said that she did not know Mr. Day and she had not loaned the truck to him. Ms. Wagner said she owned the truck for five or six years. She testified that she paid $2,300 for the truck and that it was in excellent condition. She said she used the truck to get to and from her two jobs and also hauled farm equipment, fence posts, salt blocks and rolls of wire and wood with the truck. She said that the truck was a four-wheel drive vehicle, but had no other extras or options. Ms. Wagner stated the truck had approximately 100,000 miles on it. She said that she had no problems with the truck, and if she sold the truck, she would sell it for at least $2,200.
The State also called Detective Harlin Harden to testify. Detective Harden testified that he was responsible for determining the value of the truck. He said that in order to get a vehicle's "blue book" value through the National Auto Dealer's Association (NADA) database, he input the type of vehicle and its year. Mr. Day objected to this testimony. He argued that the detective's testimony constituted hearsay and that the detective did not have any expertise in valuing vehicles. The court determined that, "market reports and such have an independent kind of inherent quality to them regarding admissibility," but that no foundation had yet been established for the value of the particular vehicle at issue. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 95. The court then allowed the State to continue questioning Detective Harden.
Detective Harden testified that he did not have any specific training on how to use the NADA database; however, he said he had been trained that NADA was the industry standard for determining the value of vehicles in relation to the charging of crimes. He said he did not receive any training on how to use NADA, because it only required him to input numbers pertinent to a vehicle. The detective said he did not input the mileage of the truck or any additional options into the NADA database. He testified that he never inputs additional vehicle options into NADA, because he wants the vehicle's value to reflect a price as if it had no options.
Detective Harden testified that the only information he inputted into the NADA database for Ms. Wagner's vehicle was: "[t]wo-wheel drive, 1988 Toyota pickup." RP at 99. The State then asked the detective, "[a]nd when you entered that information what did NADA tell you?" Id. Mr. Day objected and the court asked the State to voir dire the witness on the subject, because it was unsure as to the specific type of truck involved in the case. Detective Hardin said that he used the generic term for a 1988 two-wheel drive Toyota pickup for purposes of NADA. When direct examination resumed, the State asked the detective, "[a]nd what did the NADA tell you about a generic pickup of that year in this case?" RP at 105. Overruling Mr. Day's objection, the court allowed the detective to testify that the retail value of such vehicle was between $1,550 and $2,325.
The jury convicted Mr. Day as charged. Mr. Day appeals.
Analysis
Mr. Day contends the court improperly admitted Detective Harden's testimony regarding the value of the truck, and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him.
A person is guilty of first degree possession of stolen property if he or she possesses stolen property that exceeds $1,500 in value. RCW 9A.56.150. Value is the "market value of the property . . . at the time and in the approximate area of the criminal act." RCW 9A.56.010(18)(a). "Market value is the `price which a well-informed buyer would pay to a well-informed seller, where neither is obliged to enter into the transaction.'" State v. Shaw, 120 Wn. App. 847, 850, 86 P.3d 823 (2004) (quoting State v. Kleist, 126 Wn.2d 432, 435, 895 P.2d 398 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Market value is based on an objective standard, not on the value to any particular person. Shaw, 120 Wn. App. at 850.
A. Admissibility of "blue book" value of vehicle
Mr. Day argues Detective Harden's testimony as to the value of the truck constituted inadmissible hearsay. We review the trial court's admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d 628, 648, 904 P.2d 245 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1026 (1996). "`A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.'" State v. Perrett, 86 Wn. App. 312, 319, 936 P.2d 426 (quoting Havens v. C D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wn.2d 158, 168, 876 P.2d 435 (1994)), review denied, 133 Wn.2d 1019 (1997).
Mr. Day argues there was no foundation for admitting the NADA report, because the detective failed to input any information specific to the truck. Mr. Day asserts the detective only knew the value of a generic 1988 Toyota truck, and did not know the condition of this specific truck, except that it was driveable. The State responds that the detective's testimony as to the NADA value was properly admitted under ER 803(a)(17). Both parties rely on Shaw, 120 Wn. App. 847.
In Shaw, the defendant was arrested and charged with first degree possession of stolen property after police observed him get into and try to start a stolen 1987 Honda Accord using a screwdriver. Id. at 849. At trial, the investigating detective testified that he used the Kelley Blue Book Internet site to research the car's value. Id. Overruling a defense hearsay objection, the trial court allowed the detective to testify that the value of the car was $2,520. Id.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the court erred by admitting the Kelley Blue Book evidence. Id. at 850. The court ruled that the evidence was properly admitted under ER 803(a)(17). Id. at 851.
ER 803(a)(17) states in pertinent part:
(a) Specific Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
. . . .
(17) Market Reports, Commercial Publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations.
Mr. Day contends Shaw is distinguishable, because the detective in that case "took the time to provide the Kelley Blue Book with information specific to the vehicle at issue including the odometer reading, the general condition of the car, and other information." Appellant's Br. at 23. But the court in Shaw did not affirm the trial court's admission of the evidence based on the specific information inputted by the detective into the Kelley Blue Book database. Instead, the court determined that the foundation laid by the detective's testimony showed that the Kelley Blue Book was a publication used to determine what a person might expect to pay when buying or selling a used car. Shaw, 120 Wn. App. at 852. Relying on authority from other jurisdictions, the court held that the Kelley Blue Book was a standard and reliable reference for the valuation of vehicles and thus admitted the evidence under ER 803(a)(17). Id.
This case presents a similar situation. Here, Detective Harden testified that he had received training that the NADA database was the current industry standard for determining the value of vehicles. He input basic information to identify the vehicle's value, without regard to any options. Under Shaw, the NADA value of the truck here was admissible under ER 803(a)(17). The court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence.
B. Sufficiency of the evidence to convict
Mr. Day next contends the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we must view the evidence at trial in a light most favorable to the State and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). "Credibility determinations are within the sole province of the jury and are not subject to review." State v. Myers, 133 Wn.2d 26, 38, 941 P.2d 1102 (1997) (citing State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990)). Assessing discrepancies in trial testimony and weighing the evidence are also within the sole province of the fact finder. State v. Longuskie, 59 Wn. App. 838, 844, 801 P.2d 1004 (1990).
Mr. Day first argues the evidence was insufficient to support the first degree possession of stolen property conviction. He argues that a jury could not value the truck at more than $1,500, because it had 100,000 miles on it, was used for farming purposes and to transport Ms. Wagner between two jobs.
But at trial, Detective Harden testified that the base value of a two-wheel drive truck without regard to additional options, such as four-wheel drive, as was on Ms. Wagner's truck, was between $1,550 and $2,325. Moreover, Ms. Wagner testified that the truck was in excellent condition. She said that if she sold the truck, she would sell it for at least $2,200, basing her valuation on the fact that a neighbor had recently wanted to buy the truck. State v. Hammond, 6 Wn. App. 459, 461, 493 P.2d 1249 (1972) (stating that an owner is presumed to know the value of her property based on inquiries, comparisons, purchases and sales and the owner may testify to value whether she is generally familiar with such values or not). Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably find that the stolen truck was worth at least $1,500. The evidence was sufficient to support Mr. Day's conviction for first degree possession of stolen property.
Mr. Day also argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempting to elude a police vehicle. To convict Mr. Day of attempting to elude a police vehicle, the State was required to prove that (1) Mr. Day willfully failed or refused to immediately bring the truck to a stop after a police officer gave him a visual or audible signal to stop by hand, voice, emergency light or siren; (2) Mr. Day drove his vehicle in a reckless manner while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle; and (3) the officer giving such a signal was in uniform and the vehicle was equipped with lights and sirens when the officer signaled Mr. Day to stop. RCW 46.61.024. Mr. Day only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that he drove in a reckless manner.
Here, the jury was instructed that "[t]o operate a vehicle in a reckless manner means to drive in a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences." Clerk's Papers at 39; State v. Hickman, 135 Wn.2d 97, 102, 954 P.2d 900 (1998). Officer Preuninger testified that Mr. Day drove through residential neighborhoods at approximately 40 miles per hour. He made abrupt turns, sped down various side streets and failed to yield to a stop sign. He pulled onto a busy street, where he was stopped only after Officer Preuninger forced his vehicle off the road. Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Day drove recklessly while attempting to elude Officer Preuninger. The evidence was sufficient to support the attempting to elude a police vehicle conviction.
Conclusion
We conclude the NADA "blue book" evidence of the value of the stolen truck was properly admitted by the trial court under ER 803(a)(17). We further conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Mr. Day's convictions for first degree possession of stolen property and attempting to elude a police vehicle.
Affirmed.
SCHULTHEIS, A.C.J., KULIK, J., concur.