Opinion
NO. COA12-314
10-16-2012
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMAS RAY DAWSON, JR.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Kathleen M. Waylett, for the State. Anne Bleyman for Defendant.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Lenoir County
Nos. 09 CRS 54123-24
09 CRS 54149-50, 54153
09 CRS 54171-72, 54402
11 CRS 897-99, 1073
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 11 August 2011 by Judge Benjamin G. Alford in Lenoir County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 October 2012.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Kathleen M. Waylett, for the State.
Anne Bleyman for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Defendant Thomas Ray Dawson, Jr., was indicted on three counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, on three counts of possession of stolen goods, and on one count each of second-degree kidnapping, armed robbery, first-degree burglary, resisting a public officer, possession of a controlled substance, and having attained habitual felon status. The charges were joined for trial, and Dawson was tried before a jury in Lenoir County Superior Court, the Honorable Benjamin G. Alford presiding.
The evidence presented at trial tended to show the following: On 1 December 2009, a young woman knocked on the door of Daniel McCowin's apartment and asked to use the phone. When McCowin opened the door, two armed men in masks entered the apartment, beat McCowin, and took several items from the apartment, including a flat screen television, a .357 handgun, a lever-action rifle, a .22 rifle, ammunition, a wristwatch, and keys.
McCowin recognized the voice of one of the men and identified Dawson as one of his assailants. McCowin also identified Dawson in a photographic lineup conducted after the incident. A few days before the 1 December 2009 incident, Dawson sold McCowin the .357 handgun and a hunting rifle. The .357 handgun and the hunting rifle had previously been reported stolen. McCowin stored the hunting rifle in his daughter's home and later gave it to the police. On 5 December 2009, Dawson was arrested and transported to the courthouse; Dawson fled, but was apprehended again a few blocks from the courthouse.
Dawson lived intermittently with Latoya Mumford from October 2009 until the time of his arrest. Mumford testified that only she and Dawson had keys to her apartment. Several days after the McCowin incident, a law enforcement officer spoke with Mumford and searched her residence. Mumford told the officer that Dawson had given her the flat screen television in her living room three or four days earlier. During the search, the officer found ammunition like that taken from McCowin, a ski mask, and a .357 handgun. A safe under Mumford's bed, which Mumford said Dawson opened with a key that was later found in Dawson's father's apartment, contained crack cocaine.
Following the presentation of evidence, the jury found Dawson guilty of the charges, and Dawson pled guilty to having attained habitual felon status. The trial court consolidated the convictions into two judgments imposing consecutive terms of 96 to 125 months imprisonment. Dawson appeals.
On appeal, Dawson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State's motion for joinder. We disagree.
Two or more offenses may be joined in one pleading or for trial when the offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are based on the same act or transaction or on a series of acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts ofN.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-926(a) (2011).
a single scheme or plan.
Public policy favors the consolidation of offenses because it "expedites the administration of justice, reduces the congestion of trial dockets, conserves judicial time, lessens the burden upon citizens who must sacrifice both time and money to serve upon juries, and avoids the necessity of recalling witnesses who would otherwise be called upon to testify only once." State v. Williams, 355 N.C. 501, 531, 565 S.E.2d 609, 627 (2002) (quoting State v. Boykin, 301 N.C. 87, 91-92, 296 S.E.2d 258, 261 (1982)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1125, 154 L. E. 2d 808 (2003). The decision to consolidate cases having a transactional connection is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed without the showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. at 529-30, 565 S.E.2d at 626. "In determining whether [a] defendant has been prejudiced [by joinder of offenses], the question posed is whether the offenses are so separate in time and place and so distinct in circumstances as to render a consolidation unjust and prejudicial to an accused." State v. Clark, 301 N.C. 176, 181, 270 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1980). Another relevant consideration is whether "it would be difficult to separate proof of one charge from proof of the others." State v. Wood, 185 N.C. App. 227, 231, 647 S.E.2d 679, 683, disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 703, 655 S.E.2d 402 (2007).
In this case, Dawson contends that because there were numerous alleged offenses that occurred over a seven-month time period and involved several different victims, the charges were not sufficiently connected to warrant consolidation. However, in Williams, our Supreme Court held that the offenses were sufficiently related where there were multiple victims and numerous charges spread over a fifteen- or sixteen-month time period. 355 N.C. at 531, 565 S.E.2d at 627. Thus, consolidation in this case was not an abuse of discretion based on the number of charges or victims, or the length of time involved.
In addition, McCowin's testimony, Mumford's testimony, and a law enforcement officer's description of evidence collected during the searches of Mumford's home and Dawson's father's apartment relate to several of the charges against Dawson. Thus, multiple witnesses offered proof of more than one offense, illustrating the difficulty that would arise from trying each offense separately. See Wood, 185 N.C. App. at 231, 647 S.E.2d at 683. Given the nature of the evidence, consolidating the offenses into one trial also advanced judicial efficiency.
Finally, Dawson argues that joinder of the offenses was prejudicial because the trial court presented the jury with a single substantive instruction for multiple charges of possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of stolen goods. However, the trial court properly identified each separate offense and informed the jury that the substantive law relating to each offense was identical. See State v. Bracey, 303 N.C. 112, 118, 277 S.E.2d 390, 394 (1981) (holding no prejudice where the evidence was not complicated, the jury instruction clearly separated the offenses, and the offenses were not so separate in time and place and so distinct in circumstance as to be unfair or prejudicial to the defendant). Accordingly, Dawson's argument is overruled.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Dawson received a fair trial, free of error.
NO ERROR.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).