Opinion
ID No. 0210013335A-FSS.
Submitted: August 25, 2003.
Decided: November 26, 2003.
Upon Defendant's Motion in Limine To Exclude Evidence — DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, without prejudice
ORDER
This is the ruling on Defendant's motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence in a capital murder case. The issue is whether the court will admit two Protection From Abuse Orders (PFAs), obtained by the victim against Defendant before the alleged murder. The PFAs themselves are admissible because, as discussed below, they are relevant and the risk of unfair prejudice does not override their probative value. The actual allegations contained in the PFAs, however, are inadmissible in the State's case. Depending on the defense presented, the PFAs' contentions may be admissible in rebuttal.
I.
On December 16, 2002, the Grand Jury charged Defendant with eight crimes: two counts of Murder First Degree, three counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, Kidnapping First Degree, and Endangering the Welfare of a Child. The offenses allegedly occurred on October 21, 2002. The indictment also charges Defendant with Assault Third Degree on September 27, 2002. With the exception of the Endangering the Welfare of a Child offense, Defendant allegedly performed all crimes against Stacey Dawkins, his estranged wife.
The court severed the assault charge. See State v. Dawkins, Del. Super., ID# 0210013335A, Silverman, J. (Aug. 12, 2003) (ORDER).
During discovery, the State produced two PFAs filed by Dawkins against Defendant. The first was dated June 5, 2002, and the second September 30, 2002. In addendums to the PFAs, Dawkins detailed encounters she had with Defendant. Dawkins explained that Defendant would get "mad" at her and punch her head, face and back. The addendums reveal further abuse that Defendant allegedly inflicted on Dawkins. After the attacks, Defendant would tell Dawkins that she made Defendant act this way. On at least one occasion, Defendant told Dawkins that he would kill her. As Dawkins wrote in the September 30, 2002 PFA:
[H]e looks at me and says that he is going to have to kill me because my face looks too bad. He said he was going to stab me to death with a screwdriver he had in his hands. . . .
As mentioned, Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the PFAs at trial, both their existence and their contents. Defendant argues that they are inadmissible under three rules of evidence: D.R.E. 403, because their prejudicial effect outweighs their probative value; D.R.E. 404(b), because other crimes, wrongs or acts cannot be admitted to show action in conformity therewith; and D.R.E. 801, because they are hearsay not falling under any exception to the hearsay rule. The State counters: under D.R.E. 403, the PFAs' probative value outweighs their prejudicial effect; they are admissible under D.R.E. 404(b) because they are offered for a purpose other than to show action in conformity with other crimes, wrongs or acts; and they are admissible under D.R.E. 801 because they fall under Rule 803(3)'s state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.
II.
The balancing required by Rule 403 begins with the PFAs' relevance. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Here, the PFAs are relevant. The State argues that the PFAs tend to prove that the victim and Defendant were estranged; that she was afraid of Defendant, which goes to an element of the kidnapping charge; and Defendant's state of mind and motive. As to the latter, for example, the fact, if it is a fact, that Defendant was with Dawkins, despite a court order's demand that he stay away, tends to show that he was out of control.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 Del. C. § 783A (1974). "A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when the person unlawfully restrains another person . . . (5) [t]o terrorize the victim. . . ." Id.
Rule 403 states that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. . . ." Defendant obviously will be prejudiced if the PFAs are introduced, but the risk of unfair prejudice will not substantially outweigh the PFAs' probative value. The court understands from prior proceedings that the State has evidence tending to show that after a foot chase, Defendant stabbed Dawkins to death. Once the jury hears all about that, the PFAs will lose much of their emotional impact. Meanwhile, they may put Defendant's alleged conduct in perspective by providing context.
Although they concern prior bad acts, the PFAs are also admissible under Rule 404(b). The rule states that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes. . . ." Getz v. State establishes the test in Delaware for admissibility of 404(b) evidence. Paraphrasing Getz:
D.R.E. 404(b). See Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 730 (Del. 1988) (evidence of prior misconduct admissible when it has "independent logical relevance").
538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988).
1. The evidence of other crimes must be material to an issue or ultimate fact in dispute in the case . . .;
2. The evidence must be introduced for a purpose sanctioned by Rule 404(b) or any other purpose not inconsistent with the basic prohibition against evidence of bad character or criminal disposition;
3. The other crimes must be proved by "plain, clear and conclusive" evidence;
4. The other crimes must not be too remote in time;
5. The court must balance the probative value of the evidence against its unfairly prejudicial effect, as required by D.R.E. 403; and
6. The jury should be instructed concerning the purpose for its admission as required by D.R.E. 105.
Renzi v. State, 320 A.2d 711, 712 (Del. 1974).
Getz, 538 A.2d at 734.
The PFAs are material and they will be offered for a proper purpose, whether Defendant murdered Stacey Dawkins, and both Defendant's and Dawkins's state of mind. The PFAs are "plain, clear and conclusive." They are court documents that speak for themselves. There is no actual dispute that the PFAs exist, that Stacey Dawkins asked for them and that they are against Defendant. Next, the PFAs were filed approximately four months and one month before the alleged offenses. And, most significantly, they were in force when Dawkins was killed. So, they are not too remote in time. The court has addressed its balancing through its Rule 403 analysis prescribed above. The PFAs' probative value is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Finally, the court will provide a proper limiting instruction at trial. The PFAs are admissible under Rule 404(b).
See Thiede v. People, 159 U.S. 510, 517 (1895) (jury should hear evidence of past discord between husband and wife, even if circumstantial); Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808, 818 (Del. 1994) (evidence of previous discord between victim and defendant material in prosecution for homicide arising out of marital or romantic relationship); People v. Illgen, 583 N.E.2d 515, 520 (Ill. 1991) (evidence showing event not caused accidentally tends to show it was caused intentionally).
Defendant's hearsay argument is his best. Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Essentially, hearsay is any out-of-court statement offered as truth. The PFAs contain out of court statements made by Stacey Dawkins, offered as true and to prove that Defendant had threatened and physically abused her before he allegedly killed her. They clearly are hearsay.
Rule 803(3), however, provides a "state of mind" exception to the bar on hearsay's admissibility. The rule deems admissible "[a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind . . . but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed. . . ." Derrickson v. State sets out the requirements for admitting evidence under this exception:
321 A.2d 497 (Del. 1974).
1. The statement must be relevant and material;
2. It must relate an existing state of mind when made;
3. It must be made in a natural manner;
4. It must be made under circumstances dispelling suspicion; and
5. It must contain no suggestion of sinister motives.State v. Porter adds four additional requirements for admitting victims' statements in homicide prosecutions:
Id. at 503 (citing State v. Long, 123 A. 350 (Del.Ct.O. T., 1923)).
587 A.2d 188 (Del.Super.Ct. 1990).
1. This evidence may only be admitted in rebuttal after evidence of accident, self-defense, suicide or extreme emotional distress has been presented by the defense;
2. It may only then be admitted if the trial court makes, upon balance, a determination on the record that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice;
3. The deceased's statement, when made, must not have been too remote in time from the charged offense; and
4. Because such evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, a limiting instruction should be given contemporaneously with the admission of such evidence and as part of the jury instructions at the close of the case.
Id. at 193.
The contents of the PFAs are inadmissible in the State's case-in-chief because the reasons for Dawkins's state of mind are irrelevant. Her general state of mind is largely beside the point. The State must establish Defendant's mind set and it seeks to introduce Dawkins's hearsay to prove Defendant's state of mind and his prior conduct toward Dawkins. Thus, Dawkins's statements about Defendant in the PFAs' paperwork are inadmissible under D.R.E. during the State's case-in-chief.
If Defendant raises a defense based on his lack of intent or, more likely, extreme emotional distress, then the court will revisit the PFAs' content upon the State's application during rebuttal. Generally, it appears that at least some of Dawkins's statements will meet D.R.E. 803(3)'s and Porter's requirements. As rebuttal evidence, the PFAs preliminarily seem to be relevant and material. They relate to Dawkins's existing state of mind. Moreover, she filed the PFAs intentionally, in the ordinary way. So far, the court is not suspicious about her motives. Again, the court will consider admitting the PFAs' contents during rebuttal. If any hearsay comes in under Rule 803(3), the court will instruct the jury as Porter requires.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion in Limine To Exclude Evidence is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, without prejudice.