Opinion
ID 85002087DI
04-13-2022
STATE OF DELAWARE, v. RICHARD DAVIS, Defendant.
Date Submitted: February 28, 2022
ORDER
JAN R. JURDEN, PRESIDENT JUDGE
Upon consideration of the Defendant's Second Motion for Postconviction Relief, Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, statutory and decisional law, and the record in this case, IT APPEARS THAT:
D.I. 55.
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61.
1. On October 30, 1985, the Defendant was found guilty of Murder First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony ("PDWDCF"). By Order dated October 31, 1985, the Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment beginning April 1, 1985. 1
D.I. 28.
D.I. 29. The Defendant was sentenced as follows: for Murder First Degree, I85-04-1654, life imprisonment beginning April 1, 1985; for PDWDCF, I85-04-1655, 3 years to begin at the completion of the sentence for Murder First Degree. The Murder First Degree sentence is a mandatory sentence not subject to probation, suspension or parole. The PDWDCF sentence is a minimum mandatory sentence not subject to probation, suspension or parole.
2. The Defendant filed a direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.On March 18, 1987, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
D.I. 27.
Davis v. State, 522 A.2d 342 (Del. 1987).
3. On January 20, 1999, the Defendant filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Criminal Rule 61. The motion was denied by the Court on September 20, 1999.
D.I. 40. The Defendant argued four grounds for relief in his first Motion for Postconviction Relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) verdict against the weight of the evidence; (3) involuntary confession used against the Defendant; and (4) the State allegedly withholding testimony at the suppression hearing. The Court denied the motion, rejecting all four counts offered by the Defendant as without merit.
D.I. 42.
4. The Defendant filed a Motion for Transcripts on July 31, 2014. The motion was denied by the Court on October 28, 2014.
D.I. 53.
D.I. 54. In the Defendant's Motion for Transcripts, the Defendant argued that he required the transcripts in order to prepare a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief. The Court denied the motion, finding that absent a showing of good cause, the Defendant was not entitled to transcripts as a matter of right. The Court determined that the Defendant had failed to provide specific allegations of constitutional infirmity, and therefore, was not entitled to free transcripts.
5. On February 28, 2022, the Defendant, pro se, filed his second motion for postconviction relief. The Defendant claims he is entitled to relief and a new trial on following grounds: (1) trial counsel failed to raise a Miranda rights defense, (2) the Court abused its discretion "by making the decision to instruct the jury of the 2 defendants potential sentencing, " (3) the Court abused its discretion by not including the lesser offense of voluntary intoxication in the jury instructions, (4) the Court abused its discretion by admitting the State's evidence of prior bad acts, (5) the Court abused its discretion by admitting a pocket knife into evidence, and (6) trial counsel failed to raise a self-defense argument.
D.I. 55.
Id. at 5.
Id.
6. Before addressing the merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether any of the procedural bars under Rule 61 are applicable. Having done so, the Court finds that the Defendant's second motion must be summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 61(d)(2).
Dollard v. State, 2020 WL 2393353, at *1 (Del. May 11, 2020) (TABLE) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990)).
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2).
7. The instant motion is the Defendant's second motion for postconviction relief. Rule 61(d)(2) requires the Court to summarily dismiss a second or subsequent motion for postconviction relief unless the movant was convicted after a trial and the motion
D.I. 40.
(i) pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted; or
(ii) pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States3
Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant's case and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid.
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i), (ii).
8. The Defendant filed, and the Court denied, his first motion for postconviction relief in 1999. The Defendant does not argue that a retroactive new rule of constitutional law applies, nor does he argue the existence of new exculpatory evidence. Rather, the Defendant's grounds for relief in the instant motion stems from facts known to him at the time of his trial and sentencing in 1985. The claims the Defendant raises now were presented on direct appeal and in his first motion for postconviction relief.
See D.I. 40.
9. In the Defendant's direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, the Defendant argued that the Court erred as a matter of law when instructing the jury that "voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any criminal act." The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court on March 18, 1987, finding that the Court neither abused its discretion nor erred as a matter of law. Upon consideration of the nine claims raised by the Defendant, the Supreme Court found them all to be without merit. Regarding his first motion for postconviction relief, the Defendant raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during trial, 4 insufficient evidence to support his conviction, an involuntary confession, and withheld testimony by the State during his suppression hearing. The Court rejected all four claims as without merit, and reemphasized that the Defendant waived his right to claims not asserted in his direct appeal.
Davis v. State, 522 A.2d 342, 343 (Del. 1987).
Id. at 346.
Id.
D.I. 42.
10. The Defendant's instant motion for postconviction relief fails to meet the exceptions to summary dismissal under Rule 61(d)(2). Rule 61(d)(2)(ii) does not apply because the Defendant's motion does not claim that a new rule of constitutional law applies. Rule 61(d)(2)(i) does not apply because the Defendant does not plead with particularity a claim that newly discovered evidence exists. The Defendant's remaining claims that his constitutional rights have been violated are unsubstantiated. These conclusory claims repeat the Defendant's previous arguments which have been denied by this Court in the past. The Defendant does not offer any new information or arguments for this Court to consider. As such, the Defendant's motion does not satisfy Rule 61(d), and is procedurally barred. Accordingly, the Defendant's second motion for postconviction relief must be summarily dismissed.
11. Additionally, the Defendant's motion fails to overcome the other procedural bars under Rule 61. Under Rule 61(i), a Rule 61 motion can be 5 procedurally barred for time limitations, successive motions, procedural defaults, and former adjudications.
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i).
12. The Defendant's motion is time-barred under Rule 61(i)(1). Rule 61(i)(1) provides that a motion for postconviction relief is untimely if it is filed more than one year after a final judgment of conviction. The Defendant proffers the instant motion nearly 34 years following the final judgment.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
13. Rule 61(i)(2) further precludes the Court from considering the Defendant's motion, as he has failed to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(i) or (ii).
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2)(i) ("No second or subsequent motion is permitted under this Rule unless that second or subsequent motion satisfies the pleading requirements of subparagraphs (2)(i) or (2)(ii) of subdivision (d) of this rule."). Because the Defendant has not satisfied either exception to second or subsequent motions under Rule 61(d)(2), Rule 61(i)(2) bars the Defendant's motion.
14. Rule 61(i)(3) bars the Court from considering any claim raised by the Defendant "that was not asserted in proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction." A defendant may defeat procedural default only if they show "[c]ause for relief from the procedural fault" and "[p]rejudice from violation of the movant's rights." The Defendant was aware of and had the opportunity to raise the claims presented in the instant motion in a timely filed motion. The Defendant fails to show 6 any cause for relief from procedural default or that he was prejudice from a violation of his rights.
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3)(A), (B).
15. Finally, Rule 61(i)(4) precludes the Defendant's claims as formally adjudicated. NOW THEREFORE, the Defendant's Second Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) ("Any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred.").
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7