Opinion
Cr. A. No: IN 80-01-0332 R2.
Date submitted: November 4, 1999.
Date decided: November 18, 1999. Order Denied: February 8, 2000.
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief: DENIED.
ORDER
Upon review of Defendant Elmer Daniels' third motion for postconviction relief and the record, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant Elmer Daniels was convicted by a jury of first-degree rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant appealed his conviction which was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Defendant subsequently filed unsuccessful petitions for federal habeas corpus relief and state postconviction relief. This Court denied the state postconviction relief motion and it was affirmed on appeal. In February 1997, Defendant moved a second time for state postconviction relief, and again the Supreme Court affirmed this Court's denial of Defendant's motion.
2. In this motion, Defendant requests postconviction relief upon the grounds that evidence was suppressed at trial that was favorable to the defense.
3. In reviewing motions for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether a defendant's claims are barred by procedural requirements prior to addressing the merits of the underlying claims. Rule 61(i)(1) provides, in part, that a motion for postconviction relief "may not be filed more than three years after the judgment of conviction is final. . . ." A criminal conviction does not become final until the issuance of the Supreme Court's order affirming the conviction.
4. In this case, Defendant filed his third motion for postconviction relief on November 4, 1999, more than eighteen years after an August 13, 1981 mandate was issued affirming his conviction. Consequently, because Defendant's Rule 61 motion was filed "more than three years" after his conviction became final, this Court finds that his claims are procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(1).
Daniels v. State, Del. Supr., No. 173, 1980, McNeilly, J. (Aug. 13, 1981) (ORDER).
Daniels v. State, Del. Supr., No. 91, 1983, Moore, J. (July 25, 1983) (ORDER).
Daniels v. State, Del. Supr., 702 A.2d 925 (1997).
In Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, two inconsistent claims are made regarding an FBI latent fingerprint report. Defendant repeatedly contends that the defense was prejudiced because the report was not produced until May 21, 1980, two days into the trial. However, Defendant also refers to the report as "newly discovered evidence of an extraordinary circumstance" which he claims was discovered sixteen years after trial.
In order to warrant a new trial, newly discovered evidence must have been discovered since the proceedings leading to the judgment and could not have been discovered before the proceedings by the exercise of due diligence. From the Defendant's motion and the record in this case, it is clear that the report has been available to Defendant since May 21, 1980. Therefore, the Court will not consider this report to be newly discovered evidence.
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990).
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). (emphasis added).
Younger, 580 A.2d at 554.
Based upon the foregoing, Elmer Daniels' Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.