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State v. Daniel

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One
Mar 19, 2007
137 Wn. App. 1041 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)

Opinion

Nos. 54263-0-I; 54662-7-I.

March 19, 2007.

Appeals from judgments of the Superior Court for King County, No. 03-1-06552-4, Steven G. Scott, J., entered February 12 and 24, 2004.

Counsel for Appellant(s), Charles Leo Daniel (Appearing Pro Se), #203020175, King County Jail, Seattle, WA.

Counsel for Respondent(s), Prosecuting Atty King County, King Co Pros/App Unit Supervisor, Seattle, WA.

Donald James Raz, Attorney at Law, King County Courthouse Rm W554, WA.


Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.


After a bench trial, the court rejected Charles Daniel's claims that he stabbed his roommate in self-defense. In appealing his second degree murder conviction, he contends the court made incorrect credibility determinations. Appellate courts do not review credibility determinations, and Daniel has not shown that the trial court erred in any way. We affirm.

According to the trial court's findings of fact, Raymond Lindsay rented a room in his Seattle home to Daniel. On a May morning in 2003, Lindsay's friend Ghia Arellano came to the house. As she walked up the steps to the front door, she saw Daniel come out of the house. He was wiping blood from his hands with a towel.

Daniel looked at Arellano and said he had stabbed Lindsay. Arellano told Daniel to call the police and went in the house. Daniel crossed the street and asked a neighbor to call 911.

In the house, Arellano found Lindsay in a chair, slouched, bleeding, and shaking. She went to a nearby business to call 911. Meanwhile, Daniel came back. Soon, police arrived. They saw Daniel come out of the front door, his clothes covered in blood. He shouted to the officers that Lindsay was inside. He said he had stabbed Lindsay and that Lindsay had attacked him. Inside, the officers found Lindsay and a bloody butcher knife. Emergency workers took Lindsay and Daniel to Harborview Medical Center, where Lindsay died. Daniel was treated for cuts on his hand.

The autopsy report concluded Lindsay died as the result of one of two stab wounds to his upper right chest. He also suffered two wounds to his left forearm and an incision across his hand.

The State charged Daniel with first degree intentional murder and second degree felony murder. Daniel waived his right to a jury trial. At the six day trial, the State called Arellano, the neighbor who called 911, Lindsay's wife, four law enforcement officers, and the forensic pathologist. Daniel testified that he stabbed Lindsay in self defense. He said that after an argument about money that morning, an angry Lindsay attacked him in his bedroom, even throwing a space heater and a small steel drum at him. Daniel took a butcher knife he kept in his room and pursued Lindsay into the living room. He said he feared Lindsay was going to grab a heavy living room lamp and use it as a weapon. According to Daniel, when Lindsay saw the knife he advanced on Daniel unarmed and punched him repeatedly, forcing Daniel to stab Lindsay to ward off the attack. Daniel testified that after calling 911 he noticed his knife had been cleaned; he dipped the knife in Lindsay's blood so as not to appear as though he was trying to cover up the killing.

The trial court found Daniel's testimony to be lacking in credibility. The court found that Daniel had initially intended to clean up the knife, walk out of the house, and later argue he had not done the stabbing. But Arellano's unexpected arrival at the house that morning forced Daniel to devise a new defense. Although physical evidence corroborated the claim of a struggle in the bedroom, the court did not believe Lindsay was the aggressor, that Lindsay threw items at Daniel, or that Daniel feared for his life. The court found the forensic evidence inconsistent with Daniel's account of how he had stabbed Lindsay and his claim that he had been punched repeatedly.

The court concluded that, beyond a reasonable doubt, Daniel had not acted in self-defense. The court convicted him of second degree intentional murder and, alternatively, second degree felony murder. The court sentenced Daniel to 206 months for the murder and another 24 months for a deadly weapon sentence enhancement. The court ordered Daniel to pay $7,161.84 in restitution.

Pro se, Daniel filed separate appeals of the restitution order and the judgment and sentence; those appeals have been consolidated. Daniel has raised no restitution issue on appeal.

Many of Daniel's assignments of error are not accompanied by argument or citation to authority in the remainder of his brief. We decline to review those claims. See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (Appellate courts need not review assignments of error unsupported by argument or authority). In support of his argument that the trial transcript is incorrect, he asks us to view a videotape of the trial, but there is no record indicating that such a videotape exists.

Daniel has challenged the findings of fact and conclusions of law. After a bench trial, we review factual findings for substantial evidence — evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the finding. We then review, de novo, whether the findings support the conclusions of law. State v. Stevenson, 128 Wn. App. 179, 193, 114 P.3d 699 (2005).

Daniel argues generally that the court misinterpreted the law of self-defense. A homicide is justifiable if committed in "the actual resistance of an attempt to commit a felony upon the slayer, in his presence, or upon or in a dwelling, or other place of abode, in which he is." RCW 9A.16.050(2). Daniel argues that he was resisting a felony. However, there was substantial evidence that Daniel was the aggressor. Daniel contends the court ignored the fact that he had no duty to retreat from Lindsay. But the court did not need to address that question because the court did not find that Lindsay was attacking Daniel. Daniel contends the court unfairly disregarded his testimony that he feared Lindsay was going to attack him with a heavy lamp. This was a credibility determination that we cannot review on appeal. Credibility determinations are for factfinders, not appellate courts. State v. Walton, 64 Wn. App. 410, 415-16, 824 P.2d 533 (1992).

We conclude the court did not misapply the law of self-defense.

EVIDENTIARY RULINGS

A trial court's admission or exclusion of relevant evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 115 Wn.2d 434, 444, 798 P.2d 1146 (1990). We may refuse to review a claim of error not raised in the trial court. RAP 2.5(a).

Daniel contends the court erred by excluding an autopsy photograph of Lindsay's face and neck that would have supported his self-defense claim. The defense did not offer this photograph into evidence, and the court made no ruling excluding it. Consequently, we find no error.

The court excluded evidence that Lindsay had been arrested once for assault. Because there was no defense objection below, Daniel's claim that it was error to exclude this evidence will not be reviewed on appeal. Daniel similarly contends the court improperly excluded evidence of Arellano's criminal history.

His attorney agreed below that Arellano had no criminal history that would bear on her credibility, and so this claim is likewise unpreserved.

The pathologist who did the autopsy testified that Lindsay probably did not die until after reaching the hospital. His aorta had been sutured and part of his lung had been surgically removed, and the doctors would not likely have performed those procedures on a dead person. Daniel contends this evidence was unreliable and false. Because no objection was raised below to this testimony, we will not review this claim of error.

MISCONDUCT

Daniel contends the prosecutor violated his due process rights by introducing false evidence at trial.

He first claims the testimony that Lindsay had not likely died before reaching the hospital was false. He contends the autopsy photographs show it is unlikely that Lindsay underwent surgery before he died and that the pathologist later admitted that she lied. There are no photographs or documents in the record supporting this claim.

A detective testified that he took photographs of Daniel's alleged injuries on the day of the killing. Daniel contends that it was actually another officer who photographed him. Nothing in the record shows the detective's testimony to be false, and in any event such a discrepancy is immaterial.

Daniel accuses the prosecutor of concealing inconsistencies between Arellano's testimony and earlier statements. This claim is unsupported by either facts or legal argument and accordingly we cannot review it.

Daniel also believes the court committed misconduct because the court "circumstantially waived" his right to a speedy trial. The only evidence on this point in our record shows that Daniel signed waivers of his right to a speedy trial. No error has been shown.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Daniel contends his counsel's deficient performance requires a new trial. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this deficiency was prejudicial. Courts apply a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably. If defense counsel's conduct can be characterized as strategic, it does not constitute deficient performance. The prejudice prong requires a defendant to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different absent the deficient performance. State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 225-226, 743 P.2d 816 (1987).

Daniel first contends his counsel was deficient for failing to call a key witness who, on the morning of the stabbing, heard Lindsay hitting Daniel and Daniel telling Lindsay to get back.

Generally, the decision to call a witness will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The presumption of counsel's competence can be overcome by a showing, among other things, that counsel failed to conduct appropriate investigations. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d at 230. Daniel claims his attorney failed to interview the witness, but when he raised this issue with the trial court, he provided no evidence in support of this claim. By that time, Daniel's counsel had withdrawn from the case. Absent factual support, the claim cannot be reviewed on appeal.

Daniel contends his attorney should have called another witness to attack Arellano's credibility. He does not identify any facts she could have offered that were not produced at trial. He contends counsel should have more strongly emphasized inconsistencies between Arellano's testimony and the testimony of other witnesses. The trial court would have been aware of any such inconsistencies simply by listening to the testimony.

Thus, Daniel has not shown a likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different.

Daniel contends counsel should have brought out that Arellano was lying about owning the car that she drove to the scene. Again, there is no reason to believe that adopting this tactic could have affected the outcome of the trial.

Affirmed.


Summaries of

State v. Daniel

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One
Mar 19, 2007
137 Wn. App. 1041 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)
Case details for

State v. Daniel

Case Details

Full title:THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. CHARLES LEO DANIEL, Appellant

Court:The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One

Date published: Mar 19, 2007

Citations

137 Wn. App. 1041 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)
137 Wash. App. 1041