Opinion
No. 2-673 / 01-1917
Filed January 15, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, James D. Coil, Judge.
The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for driving while barred. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Robert Ranschau, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas Ferguson, County Attorney, and Randall Jackson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Hecht, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Leon Currie appeals his judgment and sentence for driving while barred. See Iowa Code §§ 321.560 and 321.561 (2001). Currie contends the district court should have: 1) granted his motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence, and 2) excluded evidence of his intoxication. He also raises two ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
"We will uphold the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the defendant's convictions." State v. Laffey, 600 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa 1999).
The jury was instructed that, to find Currie guilty of driving while barred, the State would have to prove the following elements:
1. That on or about July 3, 2001, the defendant, Leon Currie, operated a motor vehicle upon a public highway or elsewhere in Black Hawk County, State of Iowa.
2. That at the time the defendant's license to operate motor vehicles was barred.
3. That the defendant was not operating the vehicle in compliance with the restrictions of a temporary restricted license.
Currie contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the third element. We disagree.
Currie's temporary restricted license stated:
Valid when driving from residence to and from Westaff, 2733 University Ave., Waterloo, IA 50701 and as required by Westaff to get to the actual job locations. Must carry work schedule signed by employer that includes times, dates, driving locations and a telephone number for verification. Not valid for other purposes.
A jury could have found the following facts. On July 3, 2001, Currie was staying at 727 and a half South Street in Waterloo. He was asked to report to a residential treatment facility. Currie drove himself to the treatment facility. At the facility, he was unable to provide the residential officer with a temporary restricted license and a search of the vehicle did not uncover one. These facts constitute substantial evidence to support the third element. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Currie's motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence.
II. Evidence of Intoxication
Prior to trial, Currie filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence that he was intoxicated when he arrived at the residential facility. The district court partially overruled the motion, concluding the State could present evidence of Currie's "appearance, demeanor, odor, and factual observations" as well as the fact Currie tested positive for the presence of alcohol. Currie contends this evidence was irrelevant and its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 5.402, 5.403, 5.404(b). The State responds that the evidence of intoxication "undermined the proposition that [Currie] was on his way to work because people do not normally go to work intoxicated."
We are not persuaded by the State's relevancy argument. The evidence unequivocally established Currie drove to the residential facility rather than to work. Evidence that Currie was on his way to work when he stopped at the residential facility was immaterial because, under the plain terms of his temporary restricted license, he was only permitted to drive from home to his job location. Cf. Dept. of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Court, 458 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa 1990) (holding terms of predecessor statute did not authorize issuance of license to drive to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings). As evidence of Currie's ultimate destination was immaterial, so was evidence tending to rebut that assertion. We believe, therefore, that the intoxication evidence proffered by the State should have been excluded. We conclude, however, that the admission of this evidence was harmless error because there was overwhelming evidence Currie was driving while barred. See State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 244 (Iowa 2001).
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Currie argues his attorney was ineffective in 1) failing to move for a new trial, and 2) failing to object to the apparent fact that "the names of the prospective jurors where drawn from a container or area other than the official jury box."
Currie must show (1) trial counsel failed an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984). Prejudice exists when "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id., 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698.
With respect to his first ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Currie cannot satisfy the prejudice prong. Given the unrefuted evidence that Currie drove to a nonwork location in violation of the terms of his temporary restricted license, there was not a reasonable probability defense counsel would have prevailed on a motion for new trial. Accordingly, we reject this claim.
As for Currie's second claim, we believe it is too general to preserve for postconviction relief proceedings. See State v. Blair, 347 N.W.2d 416, 422 (Iowa 1984).
IV. Disposition
We affirm Currie's judgment and sentence for driving while barred.