Opinion
No. 07-954.
Filed March 4, 2008.
Forsyth County No. 05CRS54479.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 16 April 2007 by Judge Stuart Albright in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 February 2008.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Catherine F. Jordan, for the State. Robin E. Strickland for Defendant.
Defendant was convicted by a jury on 16 April 2007 of possession of a controlled substance on the premises of a penal institution or local confinement facility and was sentenced to six to eight months imprisonment. Defendant appeals from the judgment entered, arguing solely that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the charge for insufficient evidence.
At trial, the State presented evidence that on 15 April 2005 Defendant was arrested pursuant to an order for arrest and was taken to the Forsyth County Law Enforcement and Detention Center for processing. Intake officer Natalie Brown took custody of Defendant in the magistrate's office within the detention center and asked Defendant if she possessed any drugs. Defendant firstanswered no, but then stated she "wasn't sure." Officer Brown took Defendant to a holding cell in the magistrate's office and conducted a pat-down, but did not find any drugs. Defendant then asked to use the restroom, and she was allowed to use the restroom in the magistrate's office. After using the restroom, Defendant again told Officer Brown that she did not have any drugs. A second, more thorough pat-down similarly revealed no drugs. Officer Brown took Defendant to the "female side" of the jail, and Defendant again asked to use the restroom. Defendant was allowed to use the restroom in the jail. In the restroom, Officer Brown noticed Defendant stuffing something into a tissue roll. Officer Brown seized the roll and found several small bags of a white powdery substance inside the roll. Officer Brown took Defendant to another area of the jail to "dress her out" and, in the process of undressing Defendant, several bags of a white powdery substance fell from Defendant's underwear. The powder was later analyzed and determined to be cocaine. Defendant did not present any evidence.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime and whether the defendant is the perpetrator of that crime. As to whether substantial evidence exists, the question for the trial court is not one of weight, but of the sufficiency of the evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion. When reviewing claims of sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether any evidence exists which tends to prove all material elements of the offense or reasonably leads to the conclusion of guilt as a fairly logical and legitimate deduction, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and resolving all contradictions and discrepancies in the State's favor.
State v. Harris, 361 N.C. 400, 402, 646 S.E.2d 526, 528 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
To obtain a conviction for possession of a controlled substance on the premises of a penal institution or local confinement facility, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant (1) possessed, (2) a controlled substance, (3) on the premises of a penal institution or local confinement center. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(e)(9) (2005). Defendant acknowledges that the State presented substantial evidence of the first two elements of this offense. Defendant argues, however, that the State only presented substantial evidence that she possessed a controlled substance in "the restrooms and administrative processing sections of a magistrate's office adjacent to a jail[,]" and that such areas do not fall within the definition of "local confinement facility" for purposes of this offense.
We agree with the State that Defendant's argument is "factually incorrect." Officer Brown did not testify that Defendant was in a magistrate's office "adjacent to a jail" when the drugs were found. Officer Brown's uncontroverted testimony was that Defendant was in the jail on both occasions when the cocaine was found. As the jail of the Forsyth County Law Enforcement and Detention Center is a penal institution, see, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6 (2005) (defining "penal institution" as, inter alia,"[a] detention facility operated by a local government in this State[.]"), Officer Brown's testimony constitutes substantial evidence that Defendant possessed a controlled substance on the premises of a penal institution or local confinement center. Defendant's argument is without merit.
Even if Defendant's contention about the situs of this crime within the Forsyth County Law Enforcement and Detention Center were factually correct, this Court recently resolved this precise issue contrary to Defendant's position. In State v. Dent, 174 N.C. App. 459, 621 S.E.2d 274 (2005), the defendant argued that the magistrate's office, lobby, and search rooms of the Forsyth County Law Enforcement and Detention Center did not constitute a "local confinement facility" for purposes of section 90-95(e)(9). After recognizing that "criminal statutes are generally construed narrowly against the State and in favor of the accused[,]" id. at 467, 621 S.E.2d at 280 (citation omitted), and undertaking a statutory analysis of section 90-95(e)(9), this Court stated that
[b]y including the term "on the premises of" in its description of the restricted area, the legislature plainly intended that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(e)(9) should extend beyond the bounds of the "lockup" area of a local confinement facility, including to those secured areas in which arrestees are temporarily detained for search, booking, and other purposes.
Id. at 467-68, 621 S.E.2d at 280. Defendant concedes that Dent resolves the issue contrary to her position, but argues that this Court improperly applied the rules of statutory construction in deciding Dent and asks us to overrule that decision. We decline the request. See In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) ("Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.") (citations omitted).
The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss.
No error.
Judges TYSON and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).