Opinion
CR-20-20206
08-09-2021
STATE OF MAINE, Plaintiff, v. BRENT CROTEAU, Defendant.
ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT
This matter came before the court July 16, 2021, for hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. At the conclusion of the hearing, following argument, the court took the matter under advisement. On July 19, 2021, the court issued its Order, granting in part and denying in part the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
The court has now received, reviewed and considered the State's Motion to Amend Findings of Fact set forth in its Order, as well as the Defendant's Answer to the State's motion. The court issues the following as its Order on the State's Motion: the State's motion is GRANTED, as set forth more fully below.
The State's motion asks the court to consider further and to amend two "points of factual error that have significantly impacted the Court's decision." The court has reviewed its notes as well as the audio evidence contained in State's Exhibit 1, a recording generated by Trooper Olmstead's microphone pack. Upon review, the court agrees with the State's contention that it has made two factual errors.
The first of these involves the "timing of the quote from the nurse" attending to Mr. Croteau on the evening in question. In its initial Order, the court found that an emergency room nurse attending to Mr. Croteau stated that she was "going to steal a little more of your blood" at "almost the precise moment" that Mr. Croteau consented audibly to Trooper Olmstead's request that he submit to a blood draw for evidentiary purposes.
In fact, the nurse's statement/instruction to Mr. Croteau occurred slightly more than one minute prior to Trooper Olmstead's request. In his Answer to the State's motion, Mr. Croteau concedes this point, asserting that the nurse's request occurred "approximately one minute and eight seconds" prior to Trooper Olmstead's request. The court now adopts that as a finding.
The State's second contention is that the consent form completed by Mr. Croteau (State's Exhibit 2) was presented to Mr. Croteau and completed by him "approximately 20 minutes" after the recorded portion of Trooper Olmstead's emergency room interview of Mr. Croteau. Trooper Olmstead testified, credibly, that he shut off his microphone pack when he left the emergency room to retrieve the consent form and the test kit, and "forgot" to turn it back on when he returned. He also testified that "about 20 minutes passed" between his contacts with Mr. Croteau in the emergency room. The court therefore adopts as a finding of fact that approximately 20 minutes passed between Trooper Olmstead's request that Mr. Croteau submit to a blood draw and Mr. Croteau's execution of the consent form. The court also grants the State's request that the Order adopt and incorporate the "actual words Trooper Olmstead and the Defendant used"" at the time Mr, Croteau "audibly consented" to the requested blood draw.
In addition to the foregoing, the court adopts as Findings of Fact one of the two items noted in Mr, Croteau's answer, while declining to adopt the other. Specifically, the court adopts Mr. Croteau's request that the ''entirety of the conversation [between Trooper Olmstead and Mr. Croteau] contained in State's Exhibit 1" be included among its factual findings/ rather than limiting its findings to the portion of the conversation requested by the State in its motion. As Mr. Croteau correctly points out, the entirety of Exhibit ¶ itself is before the court as evidence, and the court now clarifies this point.
The court declines to adopt Mr. Croteau's second requested finding, which is that the blood draw "occurred at the time of the signing of the collection form." That conclusion can. be inferred. However, the court has no evidence regarding the timing or mechanics of the blood draw itself.
The court also wishes to make clear that the timing of the interaction between Trooper Olmstead and Mr. Croteau was but one element wid`¡in the larger context of its decision to suppress evidence relating to the blood draw. The court finds two other factors to be of greater significance.
The first of these is the absence of any indication on the record that Mr. Croteau knew he had any discretion in considering Trooper Olmstead's request. The court continues to believe Mr. Croteau's apparent agreement to the blood draw was in fact mere acquiescence, rather than actual consent.
The second is the lack of persuasive evidence that Mr. Croteau had (lie capacity to make an informed decision in response to Trooper Olmstead's request in the first instance. When Mr. Croteau was presented with this request, he had reasonably concluded that he no longer needed to focus on the trooper's questions or even his presence, At this point, Trooper Olmstead had advised Mr. Croteau that "I have everything I need" and that Trooper Olmstead would "give [Mr, Croteau] a call in a couple of days." Trooper Olmstead had directed Mr. Croteau's attention to his immediate medical concerns, stating that "you've got a lot going on with the hospital here" and expressing his hope that Mr. Croteau would "feel better bud.”
There was no intent to deceive or other bad faith on the part of Trooper Olmstead. Nevertheless, Mr. Croteau's acquiescence occurred in a context of distraction, and Trooper Olmstead, most likely unwittingly, benefited from that context.
The Clerk is directed to enter this order on the docket pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 79(a).