Opinion
No. 108091
09-12-2019
STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TAI RON R. CROCKETT, Defendant-Appellant.
Appearances: Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Frank Romeo Zeleznikar, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Tai Ron R. Crockett, pro se.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-13-574520-A Appearances: Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Frank Romeo Zeleznikar, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Tai Ron R. Crockett, pro se. SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Tai Ron R. Crockett appeals the denial of a postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea under Crim.R. 32.1, which was filed with the trial court on December 10, 2018. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶ 2} This is Crockett's fourth appeal from his September 2013 convictions, in which he pleaded guilty to an amended count of murder, accompanied by a three-year firearm specification, and felonious assault. The trial court imposed the state and Crockett's agreed sentence of life with the possibility of parole after 23 years. State v. Crockett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104120, 2016-Ohio-4966, ¶ 3, citing State v. Crockett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100923, 2014-Ohio-4576, reopening denied, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100923, 2015-Ohio-300, appeal not allowed, 142 Ohio St.3d 1424, 2015-Ohio-1353, 28 N.E.3d 123 ("Crockett I"); see also State v. Crockett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103199, 2016-Ohio-220 (denial of petition for postconviction relief affirmed). As it pertains to the motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Crim.R. 32.1, the trial court denied Crockett's first such motion on March 26, 2018. Crockett did not timely appeal that decision. See State v. Crockett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107549.
{¶ 3} Instead, Crockett filed a second motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Crim.R. 32.1, which largely duplicated the original, unsuccessful motion. Unremarkably, the trial court again denied the motion. Crockett timely appealed the latest decision; however, we find no basis in law to reverse the trial court's decision.
{¶ 4} Crim.R. 32.1 provides that "to correct manifest injustice[,] the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea." The defendant has the burden of proof, and the postsentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is only available in extraordinary cases to correct a manifest injustice. State v. Dent, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100605, 2014-Ohio-3141, ¶ 3-4; State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977); State v. Sneed, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80902, 2002-Ohio-6502. We review the trial court's decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Smith at 264; State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). In order to consider a motion filed under Crim.R. 32.1, however, the trial court must possess jurisdiction to vacate the conviction.
{¶ 5} It is well settled that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion to vacate a guilty plea under Crim.R. 32.1 after a court of appeals has reviewed and affirmed the convictions in a direct appeal. State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Belmont Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 97-98, 378 N.E.2d 162 (1978); Smith v. Buchanan, 138 Ohio St.3d 364, 2014-Ohio-459, 7 N.E.3d 1134, ¶ 14; State v. Parker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106062, 2018-Ohio-1847, ¶ 7, citing Special Prosecutors; State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 61-62; State v. Nicholson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97567, 2012-Ohio-1550, ¶ 9-10; and State v. Vild, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 87742 and 87965, 2007-Ohio-987, ¶ 12. Quite simply, Crim.R. 32.1 "does not 'vest jurisdiction in the trial court to maintain and determine a motion to withdraw the guilty plea subsequent to an appeal and affirmance by the appellate court.'" Parker, citing Special Prosecutors at 97.
{¶ 6} Crockett's conviction was affirmed in Crockett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100923, 2014-Ohio-4576, and that included any challenges to Crockett's guilty plea that were or could have been timely raised. Accordingly, and in light of the unsuccessful direct appeal, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider his latest motion to withdraw the guilty plea under Crim.R. 32.1. The trial court could not have granted Crockett relief at this stage in the proceedings.
{¶ 7} Notwithstanding the jurisdictional impediment, even if the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the merits of Crockett's postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Crockett would have been precluded from raising issues that could have been raised in the direct appeal from the denial of the March 2018 motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The doctrine of "'[r]es judicata prevents repeated attacks on a final judgment and applies to all issues that were or might have been litigated.'" State v. Sneed, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84964, 2005-Ohio-1865, ¶ 16, citing State v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84322, 2004-Ohio-6421. The doctrine is "'applicable to successive motions to withdraw a guilty plea under Crim.R. 32.1.'" State v. Aquino, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99971, 2014-Ohio-118, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Muhumed, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-1001, 2012-Ohio-6155, ¶ 13, and State v. Tinney, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2011 CA 41, 2012-Ohio-72, ¶ 27. In light of the fact that Crockett failed to timely appeal the denial of the original motion to withdraw his plea, he is now precluded from attempting to relitigate that final appealable order by refiling a substantively similar motion with the trial court. All of the issues raised in the current appeal could have been addressed in the previous appeal had one been timely taken. See Aquino at ¶ 12; State v. Walters, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 12CA3482, 2013-Ohio-695, ¶ 14; State v. Maggianetti, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10-MA-169, 2011-Ohio-6370, ¶ 15; State v. Wilson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26511, 2013-Ohio-1529, ¶ 7; State v. Britford, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-646, 2012-Ohio-1966, ¶ 13.
{¶ 8} Whether we consider the affirmative defense of res judicata or the jurisdictional bar to the trial court's consideration of the merits of Crockett's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Crockett's motion. We affirm.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. /s/_________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR