Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0090-PR
08-13-2018
Thaddeus Ikosys Crawford, San Luis In Propria Persona
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e).
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Cochise County
No. CR200700799
The Honorable Wallace R. Hoggatt, Judge
REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
Thaddeus Ikosys Crawford, San Luis
In Propria Persona
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Chief Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and Judge Brearcliffe concurred.
ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge:
¶1 Thaddeus Crawford seeks review of the trial court's order summarily denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the court characterized as a successive and untimely petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P., and by denying his motion for reconsideration. We will not disturb those orders unless the court abused its discretion. See State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, ¶ 7 (2015). Crawford has not shown such abuse here.
¶2 After a jury trial, Crawford was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of release for twenty-five years for murder, and consecutive and concurrent prison terms for the other offenses, resulting in an aggregate prison term of 25.5 years in addition to the life term. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Crawford, No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0188 (Ariz. App. Mar. 9, 2010) (mem. decision). Before this proceeding, Crawford has sought and been denied post-conviction relief on two occasions, and we have denied relief on review. State v. Crawford, No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0135-PR (Ariz. App. Jul. 3, 2013) (mem. decision); State v. Crawford, No. 2 CA-CR 2012-0417-PR (Ariz. App. Jan. 28, 2013) (mem. decision).
¶3 In November 2016, Crawford filed a notice of post-conviction relief. The trial court appointed counsel, who filed a notice that she had reviewed the record but found no "tenable issue" to raise in post-conviction proceedings. Crawford filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing that his trial, appellate, and first Rule 32 counsel had been ineffective for failing to argue various sentencing errors and that he had improperly been convicted of attempted first-degree murder. He further asserted that Rule 32 improperly abrogated his habeas corpus rights. The trial court, characterizing Crawford's petition as falling under Rule 32, summarily denied relief, finding both that the claims were precluded and that they lacked merit. Crawford filed a motion for reconsideration asserting the court had erred by ruling on his petition under Rule 32,
because it had ultimately failed to consider an exception to procedural default based on his "actual innocence." The court denied that motion, and this petition for review followed.
¶4 On review, Crawford repeats his contention that his claims are not subject to preclusion because he is actually innocent. But Crawford has not raised or otherwise asserted a substantive claim of actual innocence as grounds for relief under Rule 32.1(h). He instead refers to an inapplicable federal doctrine grounded in equity which allows federal courts to reach state claims notwithstanding a state procedural default. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006) ("[C]laims forfeited under state law may support federal habeas relief only if the prisoner demonstrates cause for the default and prejudice from the asserted error."); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319-20 (1995) (exceptions to federal preclusion are "equitable exception"). We have declined to apply federal equitable exceptions to procedural default in Arizona post-conviction proceedings because they do not implicate a constitutional right. See State v. Escareno-Meraz, 232 Ariz. 586, ¶¶ 5-6 (App. 2013).
¶5 Insofar as Crawford asserts Rule 32 abrogates his right to habeas relief, he is mistaken. "In Arizona, the writ of habeas corpus may be used only to review matters affecting a court's jurisdiction." In re Oppenheimer, 95 Ariz. 292, 297 (1964). Thus, "[t]he writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy to review irregularities or mistakes in a lower court unless they pertain to jurisdiction." State v. Court of Appeals, 101 Ariz. 166, 168 (1966). Crawford has not identified a jurisdictional claim, and instead clearly "attacks the validity of [his] conviction or sentence," and his claims therefore must be addressed under Rule 32. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.3. The trial court did not err by doing so.
¶6 Because this proceeding is untimely, Crawford was limited to raising claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d) through (h). Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)(2)(A), (D). He has identified no such claim and, thus, the trial court did not err in summarily rejecting his petition.
¶7 We grant review but deny relief.