State v. Crandall

17 Citing cases

  1. Carroll v. Turner

    262 F. Supp. 486 (E.D.N.C. 1966)   Cited 9 times

    It is not only an admission of guilt, but is also a formal confession of guilt before the court in which the defendant is arraigned, and the defendant thereby admits to the facts alleged and the offenses charged in the indictment or warrant. State v. Crandall, 225 N.C. 148, 33 S.E.2d 861 (1945); State v. Robinson, 224 N.C. 412, 30 S.E.2d 320 (1944). With the above principles in mind, it is clear that it was not prejudicial to the Petitioner that Earthy Lee Robinson was not put on the stand to testify in his behalf, since Petitioner could not have interposed a plea of self-defense while pleading guilty at the same time.

  2. State v. Tirado

    No. 267PA21 (N.C. Jan. 31, 2025)

    2d 570, 572 (1966) (per curiam); State v. Hunt, 265 N.C. 714, 716, 144 S.E.2d 890, 891 (1965) (per curiam); State v. Slade, 264 N.C. 70, 72-73, 140 S.E.2d 723, 725 (1965) (per curiam); State v. Whaley, 263 N.C. 824, 824, 140 S.E.2d 305, 305 (1965) (per curiam); State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 92-93, 136 S.E.2d 208, 209 (1964) (per curiam); State v. Wright, 261 N.C. 356, 357-58, 134 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1964); State v. Blackmon, 260 N.C. 352, 357, 132 S.E.2d 880, 884 (1963); Blackmon, 260 N.C. at 357-59, 132 S.E.2d at 884-86 (Parker, J., dissenting); State v. Brooks, 260 N.C. 186, 190, 132 S.E.2d 354, 357 (1963); State v. Downey, 253 N.C. 348, 354-55, 117 S.E.2d 39, 44 (1960); State v. Lee, 247 N.C. 230, 230-31, 100 S.E.2d 372, 373 (1957); State v. Smith, 238 N.C. 82, 88, 76 S.E.2d 363, 367 (1953); State v. Welch, 232 N.C. 77, 82-83, 59 S.E.2d 199, 204 (1950); State v. Stansbury, 230 N.C. 589, 590-91, 55 S.E.2d 185, 187 (1949); State v. White, 230 N.C. 513, 514, 53 S.E.2d 436, 436-37 (1949); State v. Crandall, 225 N.C. 148, 150, 33 S.E.2d 861, 862 (1945); State v. Richardson, 221 N.C. 209, 210-11, 19 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (1942), overruled on other grounds by Blackmon, 260 N.C. 352, 132 S.E.2d 880; State v. Levy, 220 N.C. 812, 815, 18 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1942); State v. Parker, 220 N.C. 416, 419, 17 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1941); State v. Calcutt, 219 N.C. 545, 548, 15 S.E.2d 9, 11 (1941); Calcutt, 219 N.C. at 560, 564-66, 15 S.E.2d at 20, 23-24 (Clarkson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Wilson, 218 N.C. 769, 774, 12 S.E.2d 654, 657 (1941); State v. Brackett, 218 N.C. 369, 373, 11 S.E.2d 146, 148-49 (1940); State v. Moschoures, 214 N.C. 321, 322, 199 S.E. 92, 93 (1938) (per curiam); State v. Cain, 209 N.C. 275, 276, 183 S.E. 300, 300-01 (1936), overruled on other grounds by Blackmon, 260 N.C. 352, 132 S.E.2d 880; State v. Fleming, 202 N.C. 512, 514, 163 S.E 453, 454 (1932); State v. Daniels, 197 N.C. 285, 286, 148 S.E. 244, 244 (1929) (per curiam); Griffin, 190 N.C. at 136-38, 129 S.E. at 412-13; State v. Malpass, 189 N.C.

  3. State v. Handy

    326 N.C. 532 (N.C. 1990)   Cited 94 times
    Concluding that the State may refute the showing of a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a plea by evidence of concrete prejudice to its case by reason of such a withdrawal

    The sole North Carolina appellate decision addressing a presentence motion to withdraw a plea of guilty cites without analysis two cases addressing post-sentence motions to withdraw and a third that does not address a motion to withdraw at all. State v. Elledge, 13 N.C. App. 462, 464, 186 S.E.2d 192, 194 (1972) (citing State v. Crandall, 225 N.C. 148, 150, 33 S.E.2d 861, 862 (1945) (post-sentence motion to withdraw); State v. Morris, 2 N.C. App. 611, 163 S.E.2d 539 (1968) (post-sentence motion to withdraw); and State v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513, 518, 180 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1971) (court did not err when it failed to ex mero motu advise defendant to withdraw voluntary plea of guilty)). These cases in turn rely on dicta from State v. Banner, 149 N.C. at 561, 63 S.E. at 170.

  4. State v. Wynn

    278 N.C. 513 (N.C. 1971)   Cited 76 times

    The primary function of the court's discretionary decision to hear evidence after a voluntary plea of guilty is entered is to determine the nature and extent of punishment to be imposed; however, if the court determines that the evidence is insufficient to convict the defendant before a jury of the crime to which he has pleaded guilty, the court may in its sound discretion allow the defendant to withdraw his plea. State v. Branner, 149 N.C. 559, 63 S.E. 169; State v. Barbour, 243 N.C. 265, 90 S.E.2d 388; State v. Caldwell, supra; State v. Crandall, 225 N.C. 148, 33 S.E.2d 861. [5, 6] Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, express or implied, and without premeditation or deliberation.

  5. State v. Caldwell

    269 N.C. 521 (N.C. 1967)   Cited 38 times
    Providing that a guilty plea waives the defendant's right to contest the evidence against him and any other non-jurisdictional defenses

    PARKER, C.J. Defendant's plea of guilty of assault with a deadly weapon upon Hazel Bradley, which is a lesser degree of the felonious assault charged in the indictment, and his plea of guilty to the charge in the information of carrying a concealed weapon to wit, a pistol, are formal confessions of guilt by him before the Buncombe County Superior Court in which he was arraigned on these charges to which he pleaded guilty. S. v. Crandall, 225 N.C. 148, 33 S.E.2d 861; S. v. Robinson, 224 N.C. 412, 30 S.E.2d 320. Defendant assigns as error that the court failed of its own motion to set aside his plea of guilty to a charge of carrying a concealed weapon when the State failed to produce evidence to support said charge.

  6. Poindexter v. Motor Lines

    69 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. 1952)   Cited 12 times

    The defendant, however, cites and relies on Brown v. R. R., 204 N.C. 668, 169 S.E. 419; Eledge v. Light Co., 230 N.C. 584, 55 S.E.2d 179, and Essick v. Lexington, 233 N.C. 600, 65 S.E.2d 220, in which, it says, this Court has expressly approved the plea of contributory negligence on the part of the employer as a bar, pro tanto, in an action such as this. It stressfully insists that those cases are controlling here. But "the law discussed in any opinion is set within the framework of the facts of that particular case," Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N.C. 200, 17 S.E.2d 10; S. v. Crandall, 225 N.C. 148, 33 S.E.2d 861; Bruton v. Smith, 225 N.C. 584, 36 S.E.2d 9; Brown v. Hodges, 233 N.C. 617, 65 S.E.2d 144; or, as expressed by Chief Justice Marshall in U.S. v. Burr, 2 L.Ed. 684, at p. 690: "Every opinion, to be correctly understood, ought to be considered with a view to the case in which it was delivered." Brown v. Hodges, supra.

  7. State v. Meadows

    68 S.E.2d 406 (N.C. 1951)   Cited 15 times

    The rule has never been concerned with the plea interposed by an accused on the hearing of his appeal in the Superior Court. It has rested on his plea in the inferior court. Its underlying rationale has been that the plea of guilty in the inferior court waived the right of the accused under G.S. 15-177 and similar laws to have the cause tried or even considered anew or de novo on its merits by the Superior Court on the appeal, and converted the Superior Court from an appellate trial court into a court of review for the correction of errors of law in the judgment of the inferior court. The rule invoked by the defendant was first stated in 1893 in S. v. Warren, 113 N.C. 683, 18 S.E. 498. It has been applied in two subsequent cases only, namely, S. v. Crandall, 225 N.C. 148, 33 S.E.2d 861, which was decided in 1945, and S. v. Beasley, 226 N.C. 577, 39 S.E.2d 605, which was handed down in 1946. At its first session after the Crandall and Beasley decisions, to wit, that of 1947, the Legislature enacted G.S. 15-177.1, which reads as follows: "in all cases of appeal to the Superior Court in a criminal action from a justice of the peace or other inferior court, the defendant shall be entitled to a trial anew and de novo by a jury, without prejudice from the former proceedings of the court below, irrespective of the plea entered or the judgment pronounced thereon."

  8. Brown v. Hodges

    65 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1951)   Cited 13 times

    "Every opinion, to be correctly understood, ought to be considered with a view to the case in which it was delivered," — so declared Chief Justice Marshall, writing in 1807 in U.S. v. Burr, 4 Cranch 469, at 481. And the rule has been expressed in opinions in cases before this Court, among which are these: Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N.C. 200, 17 S.E.2d 10; S. v. Utley, 223 N.C. 39, 25 S.E.2d 195; S. v. Boyd, 223 N.C. 79, 25 S.E.2d 456; Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d 466; S. v. Crandall, 225 N.C. 148, 33 S.E.2d 861; Bruton v. Smith, 225 N.C. 584, 36 S.E.2d 9; In re Adoption. of Doe, 231 N.C. 1, 56 S.E.2d 8. However, since the opinion in the instant case is apparently misunderstood, and to avoid the possibility of further misunderstanding, it is deemed expedient to amplify and spell out the principles therein applied.

  9. In re Adoption of Doe

    56 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1949)   Cited 8 times

    However, as to the right of inheritance provided for, in G.S. 49-12, this Court has construed the statute in these cases: Bowman v. Howard 182 N.C. 662, 110 S.E. 98; Stewart v. Stewart, 195 N.C. 476, 142 S.E. 577; In re Estate of Wallace, 197 N.C. 334, 148 S.E. 456; Reed v. Blair 202 N.C. 745, 164 S.E. 118. There the Court was only considering the result of the change in the status of the child, brought about by the marriage of the mother to the reputed father, as to "rights in and to the estate, real and personal, of its father and mother." And "the law discussed in any opinion is set within the framework of that particular case," said Barnhill, J., in Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N.C. 200, 17 S.E.2d 10. See also S. v. Crandall, 225 N.C. 148, 33 S.E.2d 861, and cases there cited. In this light, nothing said by the Court in those cases, Bowman v. Howard, supra, and the others supra, is in conflict with what is said otherwise hereinabove as to the effect such intermarriage has upon the status of the child.

  10. State v. Jones

    41 S.E.2d 288 (N.C. 1947)

    The charge of attempting to assault an officer with a deadly weapon was not before the Superior Court. S. v. Nichols, 215 N.C. 80, 200 S.E. 926; S. v. Perry, 225 N.C. 174, 33 S.E.2d 869. The defendant had been acquitted on this count in the Recorder's Court, and his appeal on the second warrant was limited to the count of resisting arrest. See S. v. Crandall, 225 N.C. 148, 33 S.E.2d 861, and cases there cited. Cf. S. v. Baldwin, 226 N.C. 295, 37 S.E.2d 898; S. v. Bell, 205 N.C. 225, 171 S.E. 50.