Opinion
No. C4-98-2322.
Filed March 16, 1999.
Appeal from the District Court, Martin County, File Nos. KX89646, K889869, KO9218.
Michael A. Hatch, Attorney General, Catherine M. Keane, Assistant Attorney General, and Terry W. Viesselman, Martin County Attorney, Michael D. Truschenski, Assistant County Attorney, (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Melissa V. Sheridan, Assistant Public Defender, (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Short, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Klaphake, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
On appeal from a reversal of probation and execution of stayed sentence for three separate offenses, Troy Allen Craig argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to expressly find: (1) he intentionally or inexcusably violated the terms of his probation; and (2) the need for confinement outweighed the policy favoring probation. We affirm.
DECISION
We will reverse a trial court's determination to revoke probation only if there is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Austin , 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). If an offender has admitted to violating a condition of probation, the trial court may continue probation or order the execution of a previously imposed sentence. Minn.R.Crim.P. 27.04, subd. 3 (3)b.
I.
Craig argues the trial court did not expressly find he intentionally or inexcusably violated the terms of his probation. See Austin , 295 N.W.2d at 250 (requiring court, before revoking probation, to designate specific conditions that were violated, find violation was intentional or excusable, and conclude need for confinement outweighs policies favoring probation). But a failure to make express findings is not an abuse of discretion where the record contains sufficient evidence supporting revocation. State v. Theel , 532 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Minn.App. 1995) (concluding court did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation without expressly making Austin findings), review denied (Minn. July 20, 1995).
The record demonstrates Craig: (1) failed to update his address on the sex-offender registry and failed to inform his probation agent of address or employment changes; (2) was not physically limited from informing his probation agent of his whereabouts; (3) admitted during the revocation hearing that his actions violated his probation agreement; and (4) was warned prior to that hearing of the consequences of these violations. Because Craig knew of the restrictions imposed on him and understood the consequences of noncompliance, we conclude he acted intentionally. See Austin , 295 N.W.2d at 250 (rejecting lack of intent argument where nothing physically prevented appellant's compliance with trial court instructions); Theel , 532 N.W.2d at 267 (concluding evidence was sufficient to find intentional violation because offender knew behavior exceeded limitations imposed by probation). Under these circumstances, the trial court's failure to make express findings was not an abuse of discretion.
II.
Craig also argues the trial court did not find the need for confinement outweighed the policy favoring probation. See Austin , 295 N.W.2d at 250 (stating purpose of probation is rehabilitation and revocation should only be used as last resort when treatment has failed); Minn. Sent. Guidelines III.B (cautioning against revocation and execution of stayed sentences based on technical violations). However, the record shows: (1) the October 1998 hearing was Craig's second revocation hearing relating to noncompliance issues in six months; (2) Craig was warned about the consequences of noncompliance during the previous revocation hearing; and (3) Craig's probation agent talked to him about the consequences of his "technical" failings. After a careful review of the record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by finding Craig was "unamenable to probation." See Theel , 532 N.W.2d at 267 (concluding failure to follow court's order despite repeated warnings indicated probation was not succeeding); State v. Wittenberg , 441 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn.App. 1989) (revoking probation where appellant pleaded guilty to second driving offense less than one month after being put on probation). The trial court properly executed Craig's sentence.