Opinion
I.D. Nos. 9904010878, 9907014022
Date Submitted: July 2, 2001
Date Decided: July 3, 2001
UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF. SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
This 3rd day of July, 2001, upon review of the Motion for Postconviction Relief filed by Defendant and the record in this case, it appears that:
(1) On August 29, 2000, Defendant, Warren Coverdale, pleaded guilty to Trafficking in Heroin, Use of a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances, Resisting Arrest, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Assault Second Degree, and Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited. The Court sentenced Defendant on the same date.
(2) Defendant now moves this Court for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. Defendant argues that his defense counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss his indictment due to insufficient evidence, because counsel failed to file a timely motion requesting discovery materials, and because counsel failed to adequately investigate his case. Defendant also states in his conclusion that he was coerced into pleading guilty.
(3) This is Defendant's first Motion for Postconviction Relief and the Court finds that none of the procedural bars listed in Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) are applicable. Therefore, the Court may consider the merits of Defendant's motion.
(4) As noted above, Defendant pleaded guilty to the above-captioned charges. Despite Defendant's allegations that defense counsel coerced him to plead guilty, the Court finds that, based upon a review of Defendant's guilty plea form and plea agreement, Defendant entered his plea voluntarily and without coercion. On the guilty plea form Defendant signed, he stated that he was satisfied with his lawyer's representation of him and that his lawyer had fully advised him of his rights and of the guilty plea. Defendant indicated that he voluntarily and freely decided to plead guilty to the charges listed in the plea agreement and that neither the State or his attorney threatened him or forced him to enter his plea.
(5) Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a defendant is bound by his signed statement on the guilty plea form. Fullman v. State, Del. Supr., No. 268, 1988, Christie, C.J. (Feb. 22, 1989)(ORDER). Defendant has presented no such evidence. In addition, the Court questioned Curtis during the plea colloquy and Curtis indicated again that he was entering into the plea freely and voluntarily and that he had sufficient time to go over the plea agreement with his attorney.
(6) Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant' claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his attorney's failure to prepare his case are without merit. A criminal defendant who raises an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel must show that an attorney's conduct did not meet reasonable professional standards so that such conduct was prejudicial to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A defendant must be able to show that "[t]here is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." Id. at 669.
(7) By pleading guilty, Defendant gave up his trial rights, including the right to present evidence on his own behalf and to challenge the charges against him. Therefore, even if the Court accepted Curtis' allegations regarding his attorney's conduct in preparing for trial as true, Curtis has not shown that the result of his proceedings would have been different.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that it plainly appears from Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record of prior proceedings in this case that Defendant is not entitled to relief. The motion is, therefore, SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.