PETERS, C.J. The appeal of this defendant from his conviction of three counts of murder is governed by our decision in State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 967, 83 L.Ed.2d 971 (1985). The defendant, Lawrence Pelletier, Jr., like Donald Couture, was charged with the murder of three guards at the Purolator Armored Car garage in Waterbury.
[Her] conduct and language in the trial of cases in which human life or liberty are at stake should be forceful, but fair, because [she] represents the public interest, which demands no victim and asks no conviction through the aid of passion, prejudice, or resentment.'" State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 564, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S.Ct. 967, 83 L.Ed.2d 971 (1985). The role of a prosecutor is different from that of an ordinary advocate for the prosecutor's duty is to see that justice is done.
We conclude that the probable cause issue is properly before us under both the United States and Connecticut constitutions. See State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 566-73, 482 A.2d 300 (1984) (Healey, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S.Ct. 967, 83 L.Ed.2d 971 (1985). We note that in none of our three earlier decisions in which we referred to Gates did any of the defendants claim that the respective circumstances failed to constitute probable cause under the Connecticut constitution.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Oehman, 212 Conn. 325, 335, 562 A.2d 493 (1989); State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 562, 482 A.2d 300 (1984). In Couture, the prosecutor called the defendant and his co-defendant “murderous fiends,” and “utterly merciless killers....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.
A search warrant affidavit must establish a nexus between the premises to be searched and the object sought, and that nexus can be inferred from the type of crime involved, the material sought, the opportunity for concealment, and normal inferences drawn from the facts in the affidavit. State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 536-37, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S.Ct. 967, 83 L.Ed.2d 971 (1985). Where the crime is the illegal sale of drugs, it "is a criminal activity which is not necessarily confined to a twenty day period as if it were inherently akin to the traditional Thanksgiving to Christmas retail sales period.
Looking to the Motion to Dismiss, where defendant erroneously attacked the search warrant affidavit as if it were an arrest warrant affidavit, the court must assume that defendant is claiming there was not probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the search warrant was issued. On a motion to suppress, defendant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of validity attaching to determinations of probable cause by a judicial officer and proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that her rights were violated. State v. Mariano, 152 Conn. 85, 91 (1964); State v. Williams, 169 Conn. 322, 326-330 (1975), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 943; and State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 536 (1984), and federal cases cited therein. In reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit for a search warrant, the standard is whether the judicial authority had a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. It is only a probability, not a prima facie showing of criminal activity, that is the standard of probable cause.
[citations omitted].State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 565-66, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S.Ct. 967, 83 L.Ed.2d 971 (1985) (rejecting double jeopardy challenge to imposition of two consecutive life sentences imposed for the felony murder of two victims of the same robbery); accord State v. Madera, 198 Conn. 92, 110, 503 A.2d 136 (1985) (rejecting claim that imposition of two consecutive sentences for a single act of arson that resulted in the deaths of multiple victims violated double jeopardy clause). While this Court agrees with the rationale underlying the quoted passage, such reasoning is inapplicable here because of the differences between the felony and arson murder statutes and the multiple murder capital felony statute.
” It bears noting that the phrase “mean and nasty” is relatively tame in the grand scheme of the invective considered in our voluminous prosecutorial impropriety jurisprudence. See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 204 Conn. at 546–47, 529 A.2d 653 (prosecutor called defendant, inter alia, “ ‘child-beater,’ ‘baby-beater’ and ‘infant-thrasher,’ ” as well as “ ‘a liar,’ ‘drunken drug-user, convicted felon, child beater,’ ” and referred to principal defense witness as “ ‘liar,’ ‘stupid,’ an ‘evil woman,’ and an ‘evil, terrible woman’ ”); State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 560–61, 482 A.2d 300 (1984) (prosecutor described defendants as “ ‘murderous fiends,’ ‘rats,’ ‘utterly merciless killers' and ‘inhumane, unfeeling and reprehensible creatures' ”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S.Ct. 967, 83 L.Ed.2d 971 (1985). Nevertheless, the relative severity of the improper comment is a factor to be considered in the ultimate due process analysis.
"A prosecutor may not appeal to the emotions, passions and prejudices of the jurors. United States v. Modica, [ 663 F.2d 1173, 1181 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 2269, 73 L.Ed.2d 1284 (1982)]; State v. Couture, [ 194 Conn. 530, 564, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S.Ct. 967, 83 L.Ed.2d 971 (1985)]; State v. Carr, 172 Conn. 458, 470, 374 A.2d 1107 (1977); State v. Ferrone, [supra, 96 Conn. 164]; [1 A.B.A., Standards for Criminal Justice (2d Ed. 1980) c. 3, standard 3-5.8(c)]. We have stated that such appeals should be avoided because they have the effect of diverting the jury's attention from their duty to decide the case on the evidence.
See Commonwealth v. Butler, 448 Pa. 128, 291 A.2d 89 (1972); Riddle v. State, 257 Ind. 501, 275 N.E.2d 788 (1971); People v. Alvarado, 255 Cal.App.2d 285, 62 Cal.Rptr. 891 (1967). Mills and Lucarz were cited with approval in State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S.Ct. 967, 83 L.Ed.2d 971 (1985). There the police sought the weapon used in a triple murder.