When such a claim is raised the entire record and transcript may be used to review the omissions and commissions of defense counsel. Palmer v. Adams, 162 Conn. 316, 323, 294 A.2d 297; State v. Costello, 160 Conn. 37, 40, 273 A.2d 687. Since they are unnecessary, the requested corrections will not be made.

Trial defense counsel in this case, however, is now deceased and could not testify at an evidentiary hearing. This court has previously considered on appeal claims of denial of adequate assistance of counsel; State v. Clark, 170 Conn. 273, 365 A.2d 1167; State v. Ralls, 167 Conn. 408, 356 A.2d 147; State v. Costello, 160 Conn. 37, 273 A.2d 687; and under the situation of this appeal, the issue will be reviewed. The sixth amendment of the federal constitution requires that "the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense in all criminal prosecutions.

Gentry v. Warden, 167 Conn. 639, 645, 356 A.2d 902, citing Palmer v. Adams, 162 Conn. 316, 321, 294 A.2d 297, which contains an excellent discussion by Thim, J., setting forth in detail the history, tests, standards and application of the requirements pertinent to the principle of adequate representation of counsel guaranteed under the federal and state constitutions. See also State v. Ralls, 167 Conn. 408, 432, 356 A.2d 147; State v. Costello, 160 Conn. 37, 40, 273 A.2d 687; United States ex rel. Boucher v. Reincke, 341 F.2d 977, 982 (2d Cir.); 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, 315; annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1403 4(b). In the wake of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, which guaranteed assistance of counsel to state criminal defendants under the sixth as well as the fourteenth amendments, the trend has been towards judging the assistance of counsel under the more stringent standards of the sixth amendment; United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir.); reasoning that the fundamental right to counsel would be a hollow right indeed if it did not encompass the right to have the effective assistance of counsel.

In determining what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel we have applied the test of whether the representation of counsel has been so woefully inadequate as to make the trial a farce and a mockery of justice. Palmer v. Adams, supra, 321; State v. Costello, 160 Conn. 37, 40, 273 A.2d 687; see United States ex rel. Boucher v. Reincke, 341 F.2d 977, 982 (2d Cir.). Recently, that stringent test has been criticized for placing an undue burden on the defendant; Finer, "Ineffective Assistance of Counsel," 58 Conn. L. Rev. 1077, 1078; see McCracken v. State, 521 P.2d 499 (Alaska); and several courts have abandoned the "farce and mockery" standard.

The issue, therefore, "is not what counsel should have done to constitute the proper representation of . . . [the petitioners] considering the case in retrospect . . ., but rather, whether in the circumstances, as viewed at the time," the petitioners received effective assistance of counsel. Kruchten v. Eyman, 406 F.2d 304, 312 (9th Cir.). As we stated in State v. Costello, 160 Conn. 37, 40, 273 A.2d 687: "`Where inadequacy of counsel is alleged, . . . independently stringent requirements have become well established. Thus, we have held that relief may be obtained only when representation has been so woefully inadequate "as to make the trial a farce and a mockery off" . . . Errorless counsel is not required, and before we may vacate a conviction there must be a "total failure to present the cause of the accused in any fundamental respect."' . . . `When reviewing cases charging incompetence of counsel, we are seeking to vindicate the most fundamental of rights.

To be certain that justice is done we have consulted the transcript of the hearing. See State v. Costello, 160 Conn. 37, 40, 273 A.2d 687. The transcript reveals that the plaintiff never objected to the defendant's offer of evidence on the ground that the question of a notice under oath was outside the pleadings.