Opinion
I.D. Nos. 0608015070, 0606012780, 0609004055.
Date Submitted: February 23, 2007.
June 11, 2007.
Donald Bucklin, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware.
Christopher Parker, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, DE.
Eric G. Mooney, Esquire, James D. Nutter, Esquire, Law Offices of Eric G. Mooney, P.A., Georgetown, Delaware.
Dear Counsel:
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Declare 21 Del. C. 4176A Unconstitutional or, in the Alternative, for an Order Requiring the State to Prove that the Defendant Acted Intentionally, Knowingly or Recklessly. As I told you during the office conference that took place with regard to the above-captioned matters on May 21, 2007, I have thoroughly considered the parties' briefs and applicable case law. Defendants' Motion is denied. The purpose of this letter is to outline briefly my reasons for denying the Motion.
Factual Background
Section 4176A of Title 21 reads, in relevant part, "A person is guilty of operation of a vehicle causing death when, in the course of driving or operating a motor vehicle or OHV in violation of any provision of this chapter other than § 4177 [Driving under the Influence] of this title, the person's driving or operation of the vehicle or OHV causes the death of another person." 21 Del. C. § 4176A(a). Three separate cases are before the Court; these matters have been consolidated for the briefing and arguing of this Motion. The underlying traffic violations for the respective Defendants are: inattentive driving, failure to yield the right of way, and failure to stop at a stop sign. Each Defendant faces a potential maximum sentence of a $1,150 fine and/or thirty months in prison under Section 4176A(b).
Defendants' Argument
Defendants argue Section 4176A violates the due process protections embodied in the United States and Delaware Constitutions because its language is impermissibly vague. More specifically, Defendants submit that, because the statute does not require the State of Delaware ("the State") to prove an accused's mental state, the statute unconstitutionally authorizes criminal punishment to be imposed for acts of ordinary negligence and strict liability offenses. The violations before the Court are based upon civil negligence and my holding is limited thereto; I decline to consider the issue of whether the statute impermissibly punishes strict liability offenses with criminal penalties.
Analysis
Statutes are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality and all doubts must be resolved in favor of the challenged legislative act. State v. Baker, 720 A.2d 1139, 1144 (Del. 1998). "[W]here a possible infringement of a constitutional guarantee exists, the interpreting court should strive to construe the legislative intent so as to avoid unnecessary constitutional infirmities." Richardson v. Wile, 535 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1988).
A vagueness challenge is often brought together with an overbreadth challenge. Here, Defendants do not allege Section 4176A is overbroad, nor do they argue the statute punishes constitutionally protected conduct. If a statute does not implicate constitutionally protected conduct, a vagueness challenge will not succeed unless the complainant demonstrates that the law is "impermissibly vague in all of its applications". State v. Baker, 720 A.2d at 1144. The standard of certainty is higher where criminal penalties are imposed than where civil penalties are imposed. Id.
"A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated behavior is forbidden by the statute, or if it encourages arbitrary or erratic enforcement." Id. at 1147-48. I conclude that the statute does not violate constitutional due process protections as applied to the Defendants.
Statutes similar to the one before the Court have been adopted by several states and the constitutionality of them considered by other courts. I find the North Carolina case of State v. Smith, 368 S.E.2d 33 (N.C.Ct.App. 1988), provides a compelling framework for analyzing the issues raised by Defendants. The challenged statute in that case defined "misdemeanor death by vehicle" as a person's violation of "any State law or local ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic, other than impaired driving", where such violation proximately caused the death of another person. The North Carolina appellate court reviewed decisions from other jurisdictions and concluded that only one state court had held a similar statute (one that permitted a criminal conviction for vehicular homicide premised upon ordinary negligence) unconstitutional. That case, also cited by Defendants in this case, is Commonwealth v. Heck, 491 A.2d 212 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1985), aff'd, 535 A.2d 575 (Pa. 1987). Although the statute in Heck was struck down, the court's ruling was based upon the existence of a statute in the Pennsylvania criminal code that establishes the minimum levels of culpability required for criminal prosecutions. Defendants argue Section 251 of Delaware's Criminal Code operates in the same manner in this case. Section 251 reads:
(a) No person may be found guilty of a criminal offense without proof that the person had the state of mind required by the law defining the offense or by subsection (b) of this section.
(b) When the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of an offense is not prescribed by law, that element is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly.
(c) It is unnecessary to prove the defendant's state of mind with regard to:
(1) Offenses which constitute violations, unless a particular state of mind is included within the definition of the offenses; or
(2) Offenses defined by statutes other than this Criminal Code, insofar as a legislative purpose to impose strict liability for such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof plainly appears.
The cases before the Court are distinguishable from Heck because I conclude that the General Assembly plainly intended to exclude Section 4176A of the Motor Vehicle Code from the culpability requirements laid out in Section 251 as provided under subsection (c), above. Although the official legislative history of this Act is very brief, consisting of only a synopsis, this synopsis indicates the bill, otherwise known as the "Warren G.H. Pritchett Act", was enacted to honor Mr. Pritchett. Research reveals the legislation was introduced after the State dropped a criminally negligent homicide charge against the man whose truck struck Mr. Pritchett, killing him. See Jeff Brown, Dover woman's crusade leads to legislation against drivers who kill, Dover Post, July 2, 2003, found at http://www.doverpost.com/ PostArchives/07-02-03/pages/doverwomanscrus.html. Pursuant to the Defendants' argument, criminal negligence would be the lowe st level of culpability the State would have to prove in a prosecution under Section 4176A. This argument simply does not make sense because criminally negligent homicide was already an offense under Delaware law at the time the Warren G.H. Pritchett Act was signed into law. Thus, I conclude the General Assembly did not intend for Section 251 culpability requirements to apply to Section 4176A.
Having disposed of Defendants' argument that Section 251 of the Criminal Code applies to Section 4176A of the Motor Vehicle Code, I turn to the issue of whether the statute, absent a culpability requirement, satisfies constitutional due process guarantees.
The United States Supreme Court has held legislatures may make the doing of an act a criminal offense even in the absence of criminal intent. U.S. v. Balient, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). When considering constitutional limitations on legislative power to define criminal offenses, the court has held that legislatures have "wide latitude" to declare an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957). It is not a violation of due process to punish a person for committing a crime relating to the public welfare or safety even when the person is without knowledge of the facts making the act criminal. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952). Accordingly, the Court concludes the absence of a mental state, without more, does not render Section 4176A unconstitutional.
The Court recognizes the above rulings have been limited to situations in which the penalties are relatively minor and conviction does no great damage to the offender's reputation. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256. It is a matter of simple logic that a misdemeanor conviction causes less damage to one's reputation than a felony conviction. A violation of Section 4176A is an "unclassified misdemeanor" under Delaware law. Thus, I conclude the possible damage to an offender's reputation does not rise to unacceptable level. As far as the maximum sentence imposed and whether its potential length renders the statute unconstitutional, I note that the following jurisdictions have similar maximum sentence terms for death by motor vehicle violations: District of Columbia (5 years); Georgia (1 year for death resulting from general violations of rules of the road; 15 years for death resulting from specified violations); Idaho (1 year); Massachusetts (2 ½ years) and Michigan (2 years). In all of these jurisdictions, a conviction for death by motor vehicle may be sustained by a showing of ordinary negligence.
Finally, I note that the language of Section 4716A is not ambiguous. The e lements of an offense charged under Section 4176A are clearly: (1) an underlying violation of the Motor Vehicle Code (2) which causes (3) the death of another person. A driver is charged with conforming his conduct to the rules of the road and it must be presumed that the driver knows, or should have reason to know, when his conduct runs afoul of the Motor Vehicle Code.
Conclusion
In summary, the Defendants' argument that the minimum culpability requirements applicable to the criminal code apply to Section 4176A is without merit. The United States and Delaware Constitutions permit the General Assembly to impose criminal penalties of the magnitude at issue in this case with a showing of ordinary negligence. If prosecutions brought under Section 4176A seem "unfair", it is up to the General Assembly to amend the legislation accordingly; several state legislatures have done so. Defendants' Motion to Declare 21 Del. C. § 4176A Unconstitutional or, in the Alternative, for an Order Requiring the State to Prove that the Defendant Acted Intentionally, Knowingly or Recklessly is DENIED.
States that have amended their motor vehicle homicide statutes to require more than ordinary negligence include: Kansas (amended vehicular homicide language found at Kan. Stat. Ann § 21-3405(1); said language interpreted by State v. Randol, 597 P.2d 672 (Kan. 1979), to require a showing of more than simple negligence), Kentucky (current language for vehicular homicide found at Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507.040), and Oregon (criminally negligent homicide language found at Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.145, specific references to vehicular homicide have been completely eliminated).
IT IS SO ORDERED.