Opinion
ID No. 0501011499.
Submitted: August 23, 2006
Decided: November 30, 2006.
Upon Consideration of Motion for Postconviction Relief DENIED.
ORDER
This 30th day of November, 2006, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, it appears that:
1. Sebastian Corbin ("Corbin") has filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. For the reasons set forth below, Corbin's Motion is DENIED.
2. On October 4, 2005, Corbin pled guilty to Robbery 1st, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, Burglary 1st and Conspiracy 2nd.
3. On February 24, 2006, Corbin was sentenced as follows: (1) five years at Level V incarceration for Robbery 1st; (2) three years at Level V incarceration for Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony; (3) two years at Level V incarceration for Burglary 1st, and (4) one year at Level V incarceration, suspended immediately for six months at Level III supervision for Conspiracy 2nd. The time at Level V is mandatory.
4. Corbin did not appeal his sentence, nor did he file a Motion for Modification of Sentence. Instead, Corbin filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief on April 20, 2006.
5. Corbin contends that he should be afforded postconviction relief because of a fatal variance in the indictment that resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Corbin alleges that his indictment contains a fatal variance because it lists the wrong address. Defendant states that the indictment incorrectly names 204 North Franklin Street as the site of events subject to the indictment. According to Defendant, the listed offenses originally occurred at 232 North Franklin Street. At the preliminary hearing, the detective testified that Defendant and his accomplice forced their way into a dwelling at 204 North Franklin Street. Defendant claims that he brought this mistake to the attention of counsel, but counsel failed to appoint a private investigator and did not raise the issue of a fatal variance.
6. On the other hand, counsel recalls discussing the notion of two different addresses with Defendant before he entered the guilty plea. Counsel states that he further addressed this notion with the prosecutor in order to address Defendant's concern. According to counsel, the prosecutor "indicated that the address reported by the police and the victims in the case was in fact, 204 N. Franklin St."Counsel, thereby, "relayed to (Corbin) that all evidence in the case that counsel was aware of indicated that the actual address was 204 N. Franklin St. not 232." Following this statement, counsel affirms that Corbin "was aware of this when he decided to plead guilty" to the indictment of Burglary 1st Degree in open court.
7. Before addressing the merits of any postconviction relief claim, the Court must determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. To protect the integrity of Delaware's procedural rules, the Court will not consider the merits of a postconviction claim if defendant's claims are procedurally barred. Rule 61(i) imposes four procedural imperatives: 1) the motion must be filed within one year of a final order of conviction; 2) any ground for relief that was not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding is thereafter barred; 3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules; and 4) any ground for relief must not have been formerly adjudicated in any proceeding leading to the judgment of conviction. The Postconviction Relief Motion is timely filed and not repetitive. Therefore, the Court will consider the merits of the Motion below.
8. Corbin's claim that his defense counsel was ineffective must fail under Strickland v. Washington, and Flamer v. State. The test for ineffective assistance of counsel is (1) whether counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability, that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Additionally, there is a strong presumption that legal representation is professionally reasonable. To withdraw a plea after sentence has been imposed, the defendant must show either that his plea was not voluntarily entered or that it was entered because of misapprehension or mistake as to his legal options. A defendant is bound by the statements he made on the signed Plea Form and during the in court colloquy unless he proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.
9. On October 4, 2005, Corbin, freely and voluntarily, pled guilty to Robbery 1st, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, Burglary 1st and Conspiracy 2nd. In doing so, he signified that he understood the constitutional rights that he was relinquishing. He indicated to the Court that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation and that his attorney had fully advised him of his rights. Now, Defendant generally contests the validity of the indictment and the quality of his representation with insufficient evidence to support his allegations. Defendant adheres to his argument that the indictment lists the wrong address, but does not present any evidence to prove that the listed offenses occurred at 232 instead of 204 North Franklin Street. Furthermore, Defendant contests the actions that counsel took in addressing his concern about the two different addresses. Defendant generally states that counsel should have appointed a private investigator to address the issue. Under the circumstances presented, counsel had no need to conduct further investigation. Counsel discussed the concern with the prosecutor and found that both police and victims in the case reported the same address; 204 North Franklin Street. No evidence proved otherwise. After making Corbin aware of these circumstances, Corbin freely and voluntarily pled to the indictment. The Court, therefore, finds that counsel took professionally reasonable steps to address Defendant's concern. Nothing supports the contention that Defendant did not understand or disagree with the aspects of his plea agreement.
10. Based upon the above reasoning, Corbin's Motion for Postconviction Relief is, hereby, DENIED.IT IS SO ORDERED.
Trial Counsel's Aff. In Resp. to Def.'s Mot. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
Id.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
585 A.2d 736 (Del. 1990).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694.
Flamer , 585 A.2d at 753-54.
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988).
Smith v. State, 1990 WL 1475, at *1 (Del.Supr. 1990).